Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Environmental Enforcement by Rechtschaffen, Clifford
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Publications Faculty Scholarship
9-1998
Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving
Theory of Environmental Enforcement
Clifford Rechtschaffen
Golden Gate University School of Law, crechtschaffen@ggu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1181 (1998(
DETERRENCE VS. COOPERATION 
AND THE EVOLVING THEORY OF 
ENVlRONMENTALENFORCEMENT 
CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN* 
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................ 1182 
II. THE CURRENT SYSTEM ............................................ 1186 
III. THE PUSH FOR REFORM ........................................... 1190 
A. CHANGED CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES .. 1191 
1. Compliance and Social Responsibility .................. 1191 
2. Compliance and Market Forces ............................ 1194 
3. Internal Regulatory Systems .................................. 1198 
B. THE COMPLEXITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION ............................................................... 1201 
C. THE DETERRENCE-IS-COUNTERPRODUCTIVE 
ARGUMENT ................................................................. 1203 
D. THE INEFFICIENCY ARGUMENT AGAINST 
DETERRENCE ............................................................... 1212 
E. SOCIETY'SAMBIVALENCEToWARDPOLLUTION ........ 1216 
F. THEFIxATIONONBEANCOUNTING ............................ 1218 
G. SUMMARy .................................................................... 1220 
IV. THE BENEFITS OF DETERRENCE-BASED 
ENFORCEMENT ............................................................ 1220 
A. THE EXPRESSIVE FuNCTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENFORCEMENT ............................................................ 1220 
B. THE DANGERS OF AGENCY CAPTURE AND 
INCONSISTENT TREATMENT ........................................ 1222 
* Professor and Co-Director, Environmental Law & Justice Clinic, Golden Gate University 
School of Law. A.B., 1978, Princeton University; J.D., 1984, Yale Law School. Golden Gate law 
students Brian Acree, Vandana Date, Frank Howard, Kirsten Hasselbrink, and Lynne Williams pro-
vided valuable research assistance on this Article. Special thanks to Ken Alex, Karen Kramer, Larry 
Morandi, Joel Mintz, and Cheryl Wasserman for comments on earlier dmfts of the Article. Thanks 
also to Kristine Ogilvie, reference libmrian at Golden Gate School of Law. 
1181 
1182 SOUTHERN CAUFORNIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 71:1181 
1. Agency Capture ...................................................... 1222 
2. Inconsistent Treatment ........................................... 12 23 
C. A SmONG, CREDIBLE THREAT OF ENFORCEMENT ..... 1225 
D. A SmONG SYSTEM OF CmZEN ENFORCEMENT ......... 1230 
V. HOW TO REFORM ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENFORCEMENT ............................................................ 1234 
A. AGENCIES SHOULD PROVIDE MORE CONSULTATION 
AND COOPERATIVE ASSISTANCE ................................ 1234 
B. POLICIES AUTOMATICALLY PRECLUDING SANCTIONS 
AND ELIMINATING ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION ARE 
UNDESIRABLE ............................•........•....................... 1239 
C. GREATER SELF-REGULATION SHOULD BE 
ENCOURAGED TO SUPPLEMENT, NOT REPLACE 
ENFORCEMENT ............................................................ 1243 
1. Mandatory, Publicly Disclosed Environmental 
Audits of Publicly Traded Companies .................. 1244 
a. Existing policies for disclosure of violations 
detected by environmental audits .................... 1244 
b. The benefits of mandatory, publicly disclosed 
audits of publicly traded corporations ............ 1248 
c. The disadvantages of audit privilege and 
immunity laws to enforcement ......................... 1252 
2. Environmental Management Systems .................... 1257 
a. The key environmental management systems .. 1258 
b. Environmental management systems as the 
basis for enforcement benefits ......................... 1261 
3. Summary ................................................................ 1265 
D. CmZEN ENFORCEMENT SHOULD REMAIN AN 
INTEGRAL FEATURE OF THE ENFORCEMENT 
SYSTEM ....................................................................... 1265 
E. REFORMS TO COMMAND AND CONTROL REGULATION 
SHOULD INCLUDE STRICT ENFORCEMENT .................. 1266 
F. BETTER WAYS TO MEASURE THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF ENFORCEMENT SHOULD BE DEVELOPED .............. 1268 
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................ 1272 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The world of environmental enforcement is evolving and experienc-
ing some profound changes. As with other aspects of environmenta11aw, 
key assumptions established over the past twenty-five years are under as-
sault by an array of critics, including governmental regulators, business 
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advocates, and scholarly commentators. For example, in 1996, the former 
manager of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Superfund en-
forcement program argued that "[i]t has become manifest that the manner 
in which [the EPA] imposes, implements, and enforces environmental re-
quirements is in serious need of reform.,,1 Likewise, Virginia's Secretary 
of Natural Resources recently told Congress that "[t]he truth is that en-
forcement action means 'failure' not success .... [P]olicies which focus on 
compliance with environmental laws are better for the natural resources 
than policies which focus on enforcement.,,2 A New York deputy attorney 
general similarly wrote that "[ d]ecades of experience have illustrated that 
traditional 'command and control' enforcement or punishment mecha-
nisms have been unable to fully achieve the lofty goals of the major envi-
ronmental statutes."3 
In response, both the federal and state governments have been re-
examining traditional enforcement systems, which focus on deterrence and 
punishing violations. For example, the Clinton Administration is experi-
menting with nonadversarial approaches, including greater reliance on 
self-enforcement and greater willingness to waive penalties in exchange 
for compliance. In 1996, with a unanimous Senate vote, Congress passed 
the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA), 
1. Bruce M. Diamond, Confessions of an Environmental Enforcer, 26 EnvtI. L. Rep. (EnvtI. L. 
lnst.) 10,252, 10,252 (May 1996). Diamond contends that the EPA should shift from its traditional, 
deterrence-based, adversarial approach to enforcement to one emphasizing cooperative efforts and 
greater reliance on industry self-compliance. See id at 10,252 to 10,256. 
2. The Relationship Between Federal and State Governments in the Enforcement of Environ-
mental Laws: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 105th Congo 190 (1997) 
[hereinafter Hearings on the Relationship Between Federal and State Governments] (prepared state-
ment of Becky Norton Dunlop, Secretary of NaturaI Resources, Commonwealth of Virginia). 
3. Dean S. Sommer, Cooperative Approaches: Public PollutionlPublic Resolution, NAT'L 
ENVIL. ENFORCEMENT J .• Aug. 1995, at 3, 3. See 142 CONGo REC. S5644 (daily ed. May 24, 1996) 
(statement of Sen. Lott) ("Better environmental compliance using a voluntary flexible approach: this 
is what we all-both Republicans and Democrats alike-believe to be the new environmentalism."); 
MALCOLM K. SPARROW, IMPOSING DUTIES-GOVERNMENT'S CHANGING ApPROACH TO COMPLIANCE 
(1994) (arguing that traditional culture and strategies of environmental enforcement are changing); 
Marshall J. Breger, Regulatory Flexibility and the Administrative State, 32 TuLSA LJ. 325, 325-26 
(1996) ("[M]any in the Republican-controlled Congress have sought to shift from an adversary or en-
forcement paradigm for regulation to a cooperative partnership with the regulated community .... 
[M]any in Congress and government have stressed the need to promote flexibility in regulatory en-
forcement and policy making."); Michael M. Stahl, Enforcement in Transition, ENVTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 
1995, at 19, 19 [hereinafter Stahl, Enforcement in Transition) (''For the past several years, practitio-
ners of environmental enforcement, from Washington to state capitals to city halls, have begun to 
transform their philosophy and methods, redefining the roles of government, business, and the public 
in ensuring environmental compliance and thereby improving environmental protection."). See also 
Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1333 (1995) (caIling for model 
of "reflexive" environmental law that places greater reliance on self-critical analysis by businesses). 
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which mandates forgiveness for minor violations by small businesses.4 
Legislators in the 104th Congress also attempted to dramatically reduce 
funding for EPA enforcement activities, limit the agency's ability to im-
pose penalties, and take other steps to discourage traditional enforcement.5 
It is the states, however, which carry out nearly ninety percent of all 
enforcement actions,6 that have been leading the charge to modify en-
forcement practices? They have championed a "compliance first" strategy 
that emphasizes working cooperatively with violators to obtain compli-
ance, and eschewing penalties in favor of persuasion.8 Many states have 
cut funding for traditional enforcement activities, reduced the number of 
facility inspections, and greatly curtailed the penalties assessed for viola-
tions.9 In Virginia, for instance, a scathing audit by the State's General 
4. See Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 
§ 223,110 Stat 857, 862 (1996). 
5. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmentalww as a Mirror of the Future: Civic Values COII-
fronting Market Force Dynamics in a Time of Counter-Revolution, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 733, 
734-35,754-56 (1996) (noting that the House sought to slash the EPA enforcement budget, prohibit 
enforcement of numerous environmental regulations, and limit imposition of penalties based on envi-
ronmental audits); George S. Hawkins, Compliance and Enforcement Changes in Congress and EPA, 
NAT. 'REsOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1997, at 42 (explaining how memhers of Congress tried to cut 
EPA's enforcement budget to forcibly limit the agency's "enforcement first" strategy and support 
other· agency tools, such as outreach and assistance). As part of the SBREFA, moreover, Congress 
amended the Equal Access to Justice Act to allow small businesses to rccover attorneys fees and costs 
when the federal government's enforcement efforts are determined to be excessive, and required the 
Small Business Administration to establish regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards to 
hear compliants about excessive agency enforcement against small businesses. See Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act § 222, 231-32. See also S.582, 104th Congo (1995) (proposing 
discovery privilege for voluntary disclosure made pursuant to environmental audit). 
6. See Hearings on the Relationship Between Federal and State Governments, supra note 2, at 
188 (prepared statement of Mark Coleman, Executive Director, Oklahoma Department of Environ-
mental Quality, and Chairman, Compliance Committee, The Environmental Council of Stlltes). 
7. See id. at 199 (statement of Patricia S. Bangert, Director of Legal Policy, Attorney Gen-
eral's Office, State of Colorado) ("[T]here is general agreement that a 'command and control' ap-
proach to environmental protection, by itself, does not work. The States, as the laboratories of democ-
racy, are trying out new approaches that may bring greater protection at lesser cost."). 
8. See id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Chafee) ("States that are trying to attain better results in ad-
ministering environmental programs increasingly are experimenting with more carrots and fewer 
·sticks .... ); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECfION: EPA's AND STATE'S 
EFFORTS TO Focus STATE ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS ON RESULTS, GAOIRCED-98-113, 21-29 (1998) 
[hereinafter GAO, EFFORTS TO Focus ON REsULTS] (describing more flexible enforcement approaches 
adopted by numerous states). 
9. See Hearings on the Relationship Between Federal and State Governments, supra note 2, at 
220-23 (prepared statement of Todd E. Robins, Environmental Enforcement, U.S. Public Interest Re-
search Group) (documenting reductions in inspections, penalties, enforcement actions and spending 
on enforcement staff in numerous states); Keith Welks, Voluntary Compliance Measures in the United 
States 26 (Oct. 1996) (unpublished report for the Commission of Environmental Cooperation, on file 
with author) ("[S]tate rcgulatory officials have begun to raise a myriad of creative efforts to encourage 
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Assembly in 1996 found that the state failed to take meaningful enforce-
ment action against persistent and serious violators. One investigator 
concluded that the state's regulators "work with industry [and] don't en-
force the law.,,10 
The enforcement reform movement is notable not only because of its 
potentially sweeping scope but also because of the exceptional speed with 
which it has been embraced.ll Just a few years ago, for instance, the EPA 
completed two long-range planning documents about enforcement that 
barely considered the type of criticisms currently being levied against the 
traditional system. The EPA instead focused its attention on measures to 
strengthen its traditional enforcement approach.12 When Congress reau-
thorized the Clean Air Amendments in 1990, it likewise was most con-
cerned about enhancing all three legs of a deterrence-based enforcement 
approach: civil, citizen, and criminal enforcement.13 The movement to 
fundamentally change the traditional approaches to environmental en-
forcement has gained remarkable momentum in the last few years. Since 
1993, twenty-three states have enacted bills that give businesses eviden-
tiary privileges or immunity for environmental law violations discovered 
and corrected as a result of internal environmental audits. Businesses have 
. or assure compliance with environmental requirements. Many of these have as their common element 
less frequent resort to traditional enforcement responses.") (citations omitted). 
10. Ellen, Nakashima, Report Pans Va. Efforts on Pollution; Agency Called Lax; Water In-
spections, Fines Show Decline, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1996, at AI. See also John H. Cushman, Vir-
ginia Seen as Undercutting U.S. Environmental Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1997, at 22 [hereinafter 
Cushman, Virginia Seen]. 
11. One commentator describes the quickness with which the reform movement has been ac-
cepted as follows: 
Not very long ago, the observation that environmental regulatory systems in the United 
States appeared to be moving from traditional command and control instruments to a more 
inclusive "compliance" philosophy might be regarded as perceptive. The same observation 
today would merely be trite, so quickly has this movement taken hold. 
Welks, supra note 9, at 1. 
12. See U.S. ENVTI.. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT FOUR-YEAR STRATEGIC PLAN: 
ENHANCED ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT FOR THE 1990's (1991) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT 
FOUR-YEAR STRATEGIC PLAN]; U.S. ENVTI.. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT IN THE 1990'S 
PROJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ANALYTICAL WORKGROUPS (1991). James Strock, Assistant 
Administrator for Enforcement of the EPA, offered insight to the agency's enforcement approach: 
"For those who stumble off the road of responsible environmental citizenship, the message from EPA 
enforcement should be clear: The bear is hungry." James M. Strock, EPA's Environmental Enforce-
ment in the 1990s, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,327, 10,332 (Aug. 1990). 
13. See George Van Cleve & Keith W. Holman, Promise and Reality in the Enforcement of the 
Amended Clean Air Act Part II: Federal Enforceability and Environmental Auditing, 27 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 10,151, 10,157 (Apr. 1997). 
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been aggressively lobbying for similar measures in virtually every other 
state, as well as in Congress.14 
Although the reform movement has assumed an air of inevitability in 
many quarters, its speed and scope cry out for a close and systematic ex-
amination. This Article critically examines the assumptions underlying the 
reform movement, and concludes that we should ease the rush to dismantle 
traditional, deterrence-based civil enforcement. 15 While some of the un-
derlying critiques of traditional enforcement have merit, they do not dem-
onstrate that a wholesale shift to a primarily cooperative-oriented approach . 
will improve compliance with environmental law. In fact, a deterrence-
based system of enforcement contains many attributes that are equally if 
not more essential to achieving compliance. Rather than discarding the 
current enforcement approach, we should move to a system of environ-
mental enforcement that is grounded in deterrence theory but integrates the 
most constructive features of a cooperative modeL 
Part II of this Article describes the theoretical basis for the traditional 
approach to enforcing environmental law, and how this approach has 
evolved in practice. Part ill assesses the major theoretical critiques of de-
terrence-based enforcement that underlie the current push for reform. Part 
IV discusses the positive elements of deterrence-based enforcement and 
why they should not be abandoned. Part V analyzes the wisdom of the 
most significant proposed reforms currently being considered or imple-
mented, and suggests a better approach for improving enforcement of our 
nation's environmental laws. 
II. THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
The traditional practice of environmental enforcement is grounded in 
theory on a deterrence-based model of enforcement. It assumes that most 
regulated entities are rational economic actors that act to maximize profits. 
As such, decisions regarding compliance are based on self-interest. In 
short, businesses comply where the costs of noncompliance outweigh the 
benefits of noncompliance. The benefits of noncompliance consist of 
money saved by not purchasing pollution control equipment or taking 
other required measures. The costs of noncompliance include the costs of 
14. See Kirk F. Marty, Note, Moving Beyond the Body Count and Toward Compliance: Legis-
lative Options for Encouraging Environmental Self-Analysis, 20 VT. L. REV. 495, 495-98, 524-25 
(1995). 
15. There is a related debate.about the need to change certain aspects of criminal environmental 
law, in particular the very liberal mens rea requirements of criminal environmental statutes. That 
subject is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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implementing control measures once a violation is detected, plus any ad-
ditional penalties imposed for being found in violation, multiplied 
(discounted) by the probability that the violations will be detected.16 The 
task for enforcement agencies is to make penalties high enough and the 
probability of detection great enough that it becomes economically irra-
tional for facilities to violate environmental requirements. The speed and 
the certainty with which sanctions are imposed are also important factors 
in obtaining compliance.17 
Deterrence may be achieved through civil or criminal sanctions. 
Criminal sanctions may be more appropriate where the amount of civil 
penalties needed to constitute an economic deterrent is unrealistic. 18 Many 
also believe that the unique moral stigma and threat of jail time from 
criminal enforcement constitute the most powerful incentives to obey the 
law.19 But whether the penalty is civil or criminal, the essential inquiry 
16. A finn's cost-benefit evaluation can go beyond purely monetary losses and include damage 
to the business' reputation, potential tort liability, legal system costs, increased scrutiny by regulatory 
agencies, and other costs. See Colin S. Diver, A Theory of Regulatory Enforcement, 28 PUB. POL'y 
257,263 (1980). 
17. See TOMB. TYLER, WHY PEoPLE OBEY THE LAW 21 (1990). 
18. Cf. Michael B. Metzger, Corporate Criminal Liability for Defective Products: Policies, 
Problems, and Prospects, 73 GEO. L.J. 1, 67 (1984) (suggesting that extraordinarily severe penalties, 
such as those that threaten corporate solvency, may be necessary for meaningful deterrence, especially 
for large corporations); Mark A. Cohen, Environmental Crime and Punishment: LegaVEconomic The-
ory and Empirical Evidence on Enforcement of Federal Environmental Statutes, 82 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1054, 1057-58 (1992) (noting that a possible rationale of criminal enforcement may be 
the failure of civil and administrative law to deter violations). 
19. See Cohen, supra note 18, at 1058. There are other important values served by imposing 
criminal sanctions on conduct that society considers morally blameworthy. In practice, most envi-
ronmental statutes give enforcement agencies tremendous discretion in detennining whether to prose-
cute a violation criminally or civilly (or administratively). Government officials consider a number of 
factors in determining how to proceed. Some of these relate to the nature of the violator, such as his 
or her culpability or past compliance history. Another consideration is the nature of the violation 
committed, which is determined by examining how serious a deviation from applicable requirements 
it was, the extent of harm it posed to the environment and public health, and the perceived deterrence 
value of a criminal prosecution on other regulated entities among other factors. The decision also 
turns on a number of strategic considerations. Some enforeement officials prefer criminal prosecution 
because it is generally quicker and less resource intensive than civil cases. Another factor is the 
strength of the evidence in a case. In criminal matters, the evidence must be sufficient to satisfy the 
higher burden of proof requirement (proof beyond a reasonable doubt versus preponderance of the 
evidence), as well as to make the greater showing of intent needed to establish liability for certain 
violations. Moreover, if certain evidence to prove a violation is lacking, civil discovery may be the 
only way to obtain it. Another consideration is the need to obtain injunctive relief, which is only 
available in civil cases. Finally, prosecutors consider the probability that a criminal conviction will 
lead to jail time or a more severe sanction than civil enforcement. If, for example, an individual cor-
porate defendant has no prior record and other factors suggest that imprisonment is unlikely, the gov-
erument will probably bring a civil action with its lower burden of proof. For a discussion of these 
issues, see Clifford Rechtschaffen, Enforcement of Hazardous Waste Management Requirements, in 
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turns on the same pleasure-pain calculus: Make the penalty sufficiently 
painful so that rational actors will be deterred despite the benefits of non-
compliance. 
As a theoretical construct, a deterrence-based system has a number of 
distinctive features.2o A central concern regards the application of pun-
ishment for breaking a rule: If there is a breach of a legal requirement, it 
deserves punishment. Thus, there is a strong emphasis on detecting non-
compliance and gathering evidence to prove it. Imposing fines is seen as a 
mark of success and serves notice that all violators will be treated simi-
larly. Enforcement is also largely retrospective since it focuses on reacting 
to violations that have already occurred and penalizing violators as a 
means of deterring future violations. 
By contrast, a "compliance" or cooperative system emphasizes secur-
ing compliance rather than sanctioning wrongdoing. Penalties are seen as 
threats rather than sanctions, and sanctions are typically withdrawn if 
compliance is achieved. Levying penalties is seen as a mark of the sys-
tem's failure (to otherwise obtain compliance); compliance systems rely 
far more on rewards and incentives than penalties.21 Enforcement is pri-
marily prospective, oriented toward inducing conditions that lead to con-
formity. The system focuses more on the underlying conditions or viola-
tions than on the violator. 
Deterrence-based enforcement is the prevailing societal approach for 
controlling unlawful individual and corporate conduct.22 This theory un-
derlies the EPA's current enforcement system.23 The agency's enforce-
ment approach is legalistic, and its extensive enforcement policies stress 
the use of formal enforcement actions. Since the mid-1980s, one of its 
guiding principles has been ensuring "timely and appropriate responses" to 
observed violations, which involves applying a series of escalating actions 
once noncompliance is detected. The agency has traditionally measured 
the success of its program by the number of inspections conducted, the 
number of enforcement actions initiated, and the number and size of pen-
alties assessed-all indicators that some type of formal enforcement action 
CALIFORNIA LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICE 54-40 to -43 (Kenneth Manaster & Daniel 
Selmi eds., 1995). 
20. For a comparison of the features of systems based on deterrence and compliance, see Albert 
J. Reiss, Selecting Strategies of Social Control Over Organizational Life, in ENFORCING REGULATION 
23, 23-26 (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds., 1984). 
21. See id. at 24. 
22. See TYLER, supra note 17, at 3. 
23. See JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 102-03 
(1995). 
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has been taken.24 State environmental agencies have generally followed 
the EPA's lead, especially when implementing federally-delegated pro-
grams that entail EPA oversight of their enforcement activities. 
Although the theoretical underpinning of the current enforcement 
system relies largely on deterrence, in practice the process is much more 
flexible. Most enforcers use a hybrid strategy that includes elements of 
both coercion and cooperation; few rely on a strictly legalistic model. 
Most enforcement activity, particularly state enforcement, is aimed at 
bringing violators back into compliance rather than punishing or deter-
ring.25 Most instances of noncompliance are met with either no sanctions 
or only minor, informal ones.26 Moreover, most regulatory officials do not 
rigidly adhere to legalistic procedures. In their extensive study of en-
forcement of the Clean Water Act, for example, Professors Susan Hunter 
and Richard Waterman found a "pragmatic" EPA enforcement process in 
which agency staff were flexible and employed considerable discretion.27 
24. See id. at 119. 
25. See CLIFFORD S. RussELL, WINSTON HARRINGTON & WILLIAM J. VAUGHAN, ENFORCING 
POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS 37 (1986). 
26. See id. at 24-25, 37-43. See also ENFORCEMENT FOUR-YEAR STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 
12, at 27 (pointing out that the EPA's mobile source enforcement program resolves over 95% of its 
cases through an informal administrative Notice of Violation program); SUSAN HUNTER & RICHARD 
W. WATERMAN, ENFORCING THE LAW: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACTS 53-54 (Kenneth J. 
Meier ed., 1996) (indicating that a study of Clean Water Act enforcement showed 70% of actions were 
at the three lowest levels of enforcement: level (0) no action warranted, comment, permit modification 
request; level (1) telephone calls, meetings, enforcement notice letters; and level (2) warning letters, 
notices of violations); PETER C. YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF LAW: THE PuBUC REGULATION OF PRIVATE 
POLLUTION 278-79 (1991) (reporting that a study of Clean Water Act enforcement in EPA Region II 
showed that "the single most common agency response to [violations of effiuent limits] is to take no 
formal action against [facilities]," and revealing there was no formal action in 423% of cases with 
warning letters issued in another 40.8% of cases); Paul Downing & James N. Kimball, Enforcing 
Pollution Control Laws in the U.S., II J. POL'Y STUDIES 55, 59-60 (summarizing numerous studies 
showing that agencies resolve most violations through informal means and negotiations to bring viola-
tors back into compliance); Richard G. Kozlowski & Howard Bleichfeld, Wetlands Enforcement: Lion 
or Lamb?, NAT. REsOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1996, at 62,64 (noting that, over a five-year period in 
8,000 cases where the Corps of Engineers found violation of wetlands requirements, over 90% were 
resolved without imposing any penalty, and that over a three-year period, the EPA completed 870 
wetlands enforcement actions resulting in almost 90% resolved without any penalty and two-thirds 
resolved without formal enforcement action). 
27. See HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 50-65. This fiexibility and discretion is not 
unique to the EPA staff. 
The performance of various enforcement agencies are remarkably similar. . .. They all at-
tempt to maintain a cooperative relationship with each source. Sources are given repeated 
opportunities to comply without penalty for failure. The agency considers economic and 
technical feasibility in its enforcement even though in many cases this is prohibited by law. 
Past violations are forgiven if compliance is achieved or in the offing. Compliance is de-
layed, often several years. And economic penalties are almost never imposed. 
Paul Downing, &lrgaining in Pollution Control, 11 POL'y STUD. J. 577, 581 (1983). 
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Hunter and Watennan concluded that; "[t]he intent of the enforcement 
process, therefore, was not to punish violators, but rather to coax them to-
ward compliance. Most enforcement personnel explicitly infonned us that 
a reliance on higher-level enforcement activity is not the best means of 
achieving compliance for a variety of reasons.,,28 Likewise, a recent sur-
vey noted that "[m]any regulators argue that they have always employed a 
wide range of mechanisms to secure compliance, and that enforcement has 
seemed predominant only because it is publicized the most.,,29 
Even though the EPA's and the states' enforcement systems are much 
more flexible and compliance-oriented than their deterrence-based under-
pinning suggest, many of the current caIls for refonn attack the theoretical 
model of rigid deterrence-based enforcement.3o Therefore, to some extent, 
these attacks are aimed at a strawman version of current enforcement. 
Nonetheless, critics have also raised important fundamental questions 
about how society should approach enforcement of its environmental laws. 
ID. THE PUSH FOR REFORM 
The current effort to refonn enforcement practices has many sources. 
Unquestionably, it originates in part from those who simply dislike effec-
tive environmental enforcement: businesses who want to be treated more 
leniently, political leaders with antipathy toward environmental regulation, 
and state regulators who wish to relax enforcement to create a more busi-
ness-friendly climate.31 These constitute important political forces push-
28. HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 60. See also Christen Carlson White, Regulation 
of Leaky Underground Fuel Tanks: An Anatomy of Regulatory Failure, 14 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & 
POL'y lOS, 116 (1996) (stating that regulators at the regional water board reported that "consultation 
and education is the best way for them to pursue their job and that issuing an enforcement order or a 
fine was both ineffective and unnecessary to achieve compliance"). In San Francisco, for example, 
the Bay Area Quality Management District imposed an average fine of $625 against refineries for 
more than 1,000 air-quality violations from 1990 to 1996. See Jane Kay & Dick Rogers, Tiny Fines 
for Refinery Air Law Violations, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 9, 1997, at AI. According to the district en-
forcement manager, "'We're not here to be monetary collectors of civil penalties .... We're here to 
monitor facilities and make sure they're in compliance with rules.'" Id. 
29. Welks, supra note 9, at 3 n.4. 
30. One critic likened the EPA's enforcement methods to Gestapo tactics: 
[H]ow does the EPA enforce environmental statutes under its jurisdiction? .. , They act like 
the gestapo .... They come invading with terrorizing and threatening leiters. They do not 
seek to solve problems but impose their will .... [T]heir problem is an absolute lack of 
common sense-a sort of [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms] approach to regula-
tory enforcement. 
139 CONGo REC. S5141 (daily ed. April 29,1993) (statement of Sen. Wallop). 
31. See John H. Cushman, States Neglecting Pollution Rules, White House Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. IS, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Cushman, States Neglecting]; Cushman, Virginia Seen, sllpra note 
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ing for change. From a scholarly perspective, the more interesting argu-
ments are those raised by serious and well-intentioned observers of the en-
forcement system-"well intentioned" in the sense that they support the 
goal of effective enforcement. 
A. CHANGED CORPORATE ATIlTUDES AND PRACTICES 
One of the most vigorously asserted arguments is that the current en-
forcement system is based on an outdated model of corporate attitudes and 
behavior. The argument has several related components: (1) Most busi-
nesses try to comply with environmental laws because of a sense of social 
responsibility, and adherence to social and moral norms; (2) businesses are 
highly motivated to comply voluntarily because of external factors such as 
market forces, potential reputational harm, and third-party liability claims; 
and (3) many businesses have implemented sophisticated internal regula-
tory systems that parallel or exceed governmental requirements. As a re-
sult, a punitive enforcement approach is largely unnecessary. These issues 
are discussed below. 
1. Compliance and Social Responsibility 
A number of observers challenge the view of corporations as 
economic actors solely interested in maximizing profit or value, and 
contend that corporate actors instead are influenced by a mix of civic 
and social motives. Some argue that corporations perceive themselves 
as political citizens who are ordinarily inclined to comply with 
the law-partially because of their belief in the law, and partially as a 
matter of their long term self-interest.32 This is particularly true where 
corporations believe the law is reasonable.33 For example, regulatory 
scholars Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite insist that corporate actors 
are "often concerned to do what is right, to be faithful to their identity as a 
law abiding citizen, and to sustain a self-concept of social responsibil-
10, at 22 (reporting EPA officials' consideration of Virginia as a leading example of widespread resis-
tance by some states against vigorous enforcement of federal environmental laws). 
32. See Robert A. Kagan & John T. Scholz, The "Criminology of the Corporation" and Regu-
latory Enforcement Strategies, in ENFORCING REGULATION, supra note 20, at 67. See also Cheryl E. 
Wasserman, Federal Enforcement: Theory and Practice, in INNOVATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL POUCy 
21,24-25 (T.H. Tietenberg ed., 1992) (suggesting an array of factors may explain compliance behav-
ior, "only some of which are rational, reasonable, and economically motivated," including societal 
norms, moral values, and sense of professional conduct). 
33. See Kagan & Scholz, supra note 32, at 67; Wasserman, supra note 32, at 25. 
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ity.,,34 Others claim that corporate actors have internalized the general 
societal norms about environmental protection: 
[Business] leaders tend to see themselves comfortably in the mainstream, 
cherishing and reflecting society's values and norms. More specifically, 
today's business leaders grew up during decades when their culture af-
firmatively espoused protection of the environment as an inherently 
positive goal, and held up for censure conduct which jeopardized our 
natural world simply to increase profits. Accordingly, the argument 
goes, today's business leaders bring a fundamentally different attitude 
about environmental regulations, and their obligation to meet them, than 
their predecessors who made decisions and ran facilities at the dawn of 
the environmental age. 
The normative rationale for a broader compliance approach to environ-
mental regulation is ultimately based on the belief that regulators and 
regulatees now share-perhaps for the first time-the same goals and 
value systems.35 
The critics of deterrence-based enforcement correctly reject an eco-
nomically deterministic model as the only explanation for voluntary 
compliance. Corporate motivations are undoubtedly more complex, and, 
as the critics accurately point out, the current level of sanctions imposed 
by most enforcement agencies is probably an insufficient incentive for 
businesses to comply purely on grounds of economic self-interest.36 Pro-
34. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REsPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE 22 (1992). The authors find that 
Id. 
business infonnants repeatedly argued that the common characterization of them as moti-
vated only by money was a simplistic stereotype. Conceding that their primary motivations 
were economic, they claimed that they and their colleagues took seriously business respon-
sibility, ethics, and obligations to abide by the law and to be responsive to nonshareholding 
stakeholders in the corporation. 
35. Welks, supra note 9, at 5. See also Michael R. Harris, Promoting Corporate Self-
Compliance: An Examination of the Debate Over Legal Protection for Environmental Alldits, 23 
EcOLOGY L.Q. 663,711 (1996) ("American businesses often argue that years of command and control 
regulation, increased public scrutiny due to environmental reporting requirements, liability under 
CERCLA, and intense pressure to confonn to international standards have fostered a commitment 
among some firms toward voluntary environmental compliance."). 
36. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 34, at 96 (explaining that regulatory agencies 
rarely have the resources to detect, prove and punish cheating with sufficient consistency for it to be 
economically rational not to cheat); RUSSELL ET AL., supra note 25, at 43 (noting that even in states 
with the largest penalties, sanctions for noncompliance are unlikely to be sufficient to induce continu-
ous compliance). But see Winston Harrington, Enforcement Leverage When Penalties Are Restricted, 
37 J. PuB. EcON. 29 (1988) (suggesting that firms comply with environmental laws despite the small 
size of penalties assessed, because enforcement agencies and regulated entities behavc according to a 
dynamic repeated-game model in whieh, among other things, agencies adjust inspection frequency 
and penalties based on past perfonnance of firms); Downing & Kimball, supra note 26, at 60-63 
(suggesting that corporations comply despite low penalties because compliance costs relatively low, 
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fessors Ayres and Braithwaite are closer to the mark in arguing that firms 
have different "lexical orderings" of money and responsibility: The behav-
ior of regulated entities ranges from those exclusively motivated by money 
to those for whom this goal is constrained to a greater or lesser degree by 
ideals of social responsibility. For example, some firms will insist on sat-
isfying a minimum level of care before pursuing maximum profits; others 
will engage in as much socially responsible activity as they can before it 
affects profitability. 37 
However, many critics also understate the role that ideological resis-
tance to regulation plays in undermining compliance. Absent deterrence, 
corporate actors are far more likely to adhere to laws that in their eyes 
are legitimate, particularly when compliance is expensive.38 As Peter 
Yeager notes, corporations violate environmental protection laws more 
frequently than laws designed to protect the integrity of the marketplace 
such as tax, securities, and unfair trade laws, because these laws do not 
enjoy the same legitimacy in the eyes of businesses.39 This is hardly 
a novel proposition; individuals are much more likely to comply with 
laws that are consonant with their own moral and political values.40 In-
deed, many law-abiding individuals ignore rules inconsistent with their 
beliefs if there is little or no risk of getting caught.41 There is no question 
allows finns to argue for strict enforcement of regulations against competitors, may reduce the fre-
quency offuture government monitoring and inspections, and may help finns maintain a positive cor-
porate image). 
37. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 34, at 27-29. Analyzing the issue from a more 
psychological perspective, the authors argue that corporations are "bundles of contradictory commit-
ments to values of economic rationality,law abidingness, and business responsibility." Id. at 31. Pro-
fessor Christopher Stone also argues that within corporations there are a variety of goals associated 
not only with different corporate types but also with different stages of corporate development. In 
particular, once a corporation's basic survival is assured, it is more likely to seek a satisfactory level 
of profits rather than be entirely profit-oriented; at later stages of corporate development, it is likely to 
become more social-oriented in its objectives. See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: 
THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 38-39 (1975). 
38. See Kagan & Scholz, supra note 32, at 67 (acknowledging that among businesses which 
act like "political citizens," some noncompliance will result from principled disagreement with the 
law). 
39. See YEAGER, supra note 26, at 8-10. He adds that "where laws lack legitimacy, violation 
rates are likely to be relatively high, other factors held constant" Id. at 9. See also STONE, supra note 
37, at 228 (noting that laws regulating corporate behavior run into the widely held business view that 
the conduct they forbid is not morally reprehensible). 
40. See TYLER, supra note 17, at 37-38, 64; Douglas C. Michael, Cooperative Implementation 
of Federal Regulations, 13 YALEJ. ON REG. 535, 543 (1996) (arguing that individuals will voluntarily 
comply with rules only so long as rules are perceived as reasonable). 
41. Consider laws governing minor drug use or requiring all income earned under the table to 
be reported to the IRS. See David C. Johnston, Despite an Easing of Rules, Millions Evade 'Nanny 
Tax,' NY TiMES, April 5, 1998, at Al (reporting that the IRS estimates that fewer than 1 in 13 persons 
are complying with federal law for reporting wages paid to nannies, maids and other servants, and for 
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that many businesses are philosophically opposed to some substantial 
portion of the current regime of environmental regulation and consider 
it illegitimate. This opposition has been fueled over the past five to ten 
years by a drumbeat of intense criticism of the EPA and other regulatory 
agencies. Members of Congress have repeatedly referred to EPA inspec-
tors as part of an "environmental Gestapo.,,42 
During the early days of the 104th Congress, when the political 
climate seemed most sympathetic to corporate concerns, regulated entities 
proposed to radically weaken the major environmental statutes.43 Their 
rush to overthrow basic environmental regulation is hardly consistent with 
an internalization of environmental protection values. Given this strong 
hostility to environmental regulation, the belief that a deterrence orienta-
tion should be abandoned because businesses will comply with these 
laws because of their identity as law-abiding citizens is naive. Thus, theo-
rists who argue that predominant reliance on voluntary compliance is 
the answer because "regulators and regulatees now share-perhaps for 
the first time-the same goals and value systems"44 are overly optimis-
tic.45 
2. Compliance and Market Forces 
Other adherents of the "changed corporate attitude" school rely less 
on the civic-mindedness of businesses, and emphasize instead that other 
paying the employer's share of Social Security, Medicare and federal unemployment taxes to house-
hold help). 
42. See Hawkins, supra note 5, at 42. See also 139 CONGo REC. S5142 (daily cd. April 29, 
1993) (statement of Sen. Wallop) (describing the EPA as a "Gestapo-like agency" and as an 
"un tethered agency arrogantly imposing itself on the people of America, not to resolve the problems 
of the environment, but to assert its own power"); 141 CONGo REC. H4952 (daily ed. May IS, 1995) 
(statement of Rep. Shuster) ("[I]n western Maryland there are hundreds of people who are furious 
about the environmental Gestapo which is there and which is attempting to tell thcm how to live their 
lives .... "). 
43. Among other things, members of Congress sought to drastically rewrite the Clean Water 
Act and the Endangered Species Act, repeal the I 990 Clean Air Act Amendments, and attach numer-
ous riders to the EPA's appropriations bill severely restricting the agency's ability to enforce existing 
laws. The House also passed a moratorium on new regulations and a comprehensive regulatory re-
form bill that would have required federal agencies to prepare risk assessments and cost-benefit analy-
ses for every major regulation, greatly increasing the analytic burdens on agencies and delaying new 
rulemaking. Finally, the House cut the overall EPA budget by 30% and the budget for its enforcement 
activities by 50%. See Plater, supra note 5, at 742-60. 
44. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
45. See Joel Mintz, Rebuttal: EPA Enforcement and the Challenge of Change, 26 EnvtI. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst) 10,538, 10,540 (Oct. 1996) (arguing that there is insufficient evidence to support 
the notion that "the 'regulated sector' has gradually altered its attitude toward regulatory compliance 
and environmental protection"). 
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market factors make it a matter of self-interest for businesses to voluntarily 
comply with environmental requirements. Thus, in enacting its law pro-
viding a grace period for certain environmental violations, the New Jersey 
legislature recently found that 
the economic dynamics of pollution control ... have changed since the 
inception of environmental regulatory and enforcement programs; that 
considerable market forces now exist which substantially influence the 
economics of compliance; that the threat or imposition of monetary 
sanctions is no longer the dominant force driving corporate compliance 
decisions and investments.46 
The fact that environmental performance is now viewed as a criterion 
for product quality and firm reputation has become the biggest such mar-
ket force.47 Corporations see important benefits from being publicly per-
ceived as environmentally responsible entities. The rush by business to 
market environmentally-friendly products over the past decade is perhaps 
the most obvious, but certainly not the only example of this.48 The Na-
tional Academy of Public Administration characterized the new business 
thinking as follows: "[C]hanging attitudes ... have dramatically altered 
the operating environments faced by businesses and industries. Many 
firms have found that becoming 'environmental leaders' is good for busi-
ness because a good corporate image can appeal to consumers and improve 
relations between factories and host communities.'>49 
Other external forces also motivate voluntary compliance measures. 
One is the desire to avoid tort liability. 50 Another is the recognition that 
doing so saves money through reduced waste management and disposal 
46. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1D-125 <,Vest 1995). See also Welks, supra note 9, at 41 (explaining 
the impetus behind compliance assurance refonns in Minnesota: "Minnesota feels that it can encour-
age change from inside organizations, by helping leaders understand that conscientious environmental 
performance can translate into risk reduction, enhanced efficiency and, ultimately, savings and in-
creased profits."). 
47. See Tony Lent & Richard P. WeIIs, Corporate Environmental Management Survey Shows 
Shift from Compliance to Strategy, in ENVIRONMENTAL TQM 13 (John T. Willig, ed., 1994). 
48. See John M. Church, A Market Solution to Green Marketing: Some Lessons from the Eco-
nomics of Infonnation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 245, 277 (1994). 
49. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PuB. ADMIN., SEITING PRIORITIES, GEITING RESULTS 25 (1996) 
[hereinafter NATIONAL ACADEMY]. See also Marianne Lavelle, Environmental Vise: Law, Compli-
alice, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 30, 1993, at SI ("A nationwide survey of more than 200 corporate general 
counsel .•• revealed ... that vast majority believe that investment in environmentally sound practices 
and products wiJI improve profitability over the long run."). 
50. EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK-THE PROBLEM OF 
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 60-62 (1982). 
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expenses, purchases of raw materials, energy costs, and other ways.51 
Moreover, firms realize that superior environmental performance can lead 
to competitive advantages, that "[t]he result of excellence in environmental 
management is higher productivity.,,52 
While market forces have changed the dynamics of environmental 
compliance,53 critics are mistaken in suggesting that these considerations 
by themselves will result in widespread compliance with environmental 
laws.54 Reputation benefits are important for firms that directly market 
consumer products; indeed, consumers report that they consider the envi-
ronmental reputation of a product or manufacturer to be an important pur-
chasing factor.55 However, there are significant limits to relying on the 
consumer product marketplace as a way to reward positive environmental 
performance. For example, for some products there are no readily avail-
able substitutes consumers can purchase if they are dissatisfied with the 
record of a manufacturer.56 Additionally, many consumers will not have 
the time or interest to seek out product information; and even if they do, 
judging among competing claims of compliance/noncompliance by firms 
may depend upon information that is complex, uncertain, and difficult to 
obtain.57 Moreover, for most regulated entities-those that do not sell 
consumer products-there are relatively few tangible gains that come from 
being perceived as an environmentalleader.58 Few commercial purchasers 
51. See NATIONAL ACADEMY, supra note 49, at 25. See also Testimony of Donald E. Huffman, 
Chainnan of the American Textile Manufacturers Institute Environmental Excellence Task Force, be· 
fore U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Workshop on National Perfonnance Measures Strategy 
for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance 6 (March 17, 1997) ("[W]e are confident that a high per· 
centage of companies realize that compliance does affect the bottom line and treat environmental 
compliance as an important part of doing business."); Lent & Wells, supra note 47, at 14 (noting that 
pollution prevention results in finns spending fewer resources buying, storing, tracking and managing 
pollutants, and spending more on the product). 
52. Lent & Wells, supra note 47, at 13. 
53. See, e.g., BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 50, at 60 ("In many areas of protective regula· 
tion, voluntary compliance is prevalent because economic pressures and the threat of private lawsuits 
compel enterprises to institute safety measures that parallel the content of government regulations."). 
54. See STONE, supra note 37, at 88-92. 
55. See Church, supra note 48, at 252 & n.l8, 253-54 (1994); Terri Shaw, The Selling of 
"Green"; Labels Use All the Buzz Words, But What Do They Mean, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1991, at 
T9. 
56. See Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game: Evaluating Warnings Under California'S 
Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303, 316 (1996). 
57. Cf. Howard A. Latin, Environmental Deregulation and Consumer Decisionmaking Under 
Uncenainty, 6 HARV. ENVIL. L. REV. 187 (1982) (noting these as difficulties in detennining whether 
products are environmentally beneficial in decentralized consumer decisionmaking context). 
58. See STONE, supra note 37, at 90-91 (pointiug out that many corporations produce too few 
consumer products, even indirectly, to submit them to classic market pressures). See also Naomi 
Roht·Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation: The International Organization for Standardization 
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or suppliers use a firm's environmental record as a criteria for doing busi-
ness. Likewise, few government programs provide direct rewards to busi-
nesses for achieving environmental compliance.59 Thus, many private 
firms will not be driven by market forces to comply with the law. Addi-
tionally, these market forces will have no impact on compliance by gov-
ernment entities, which face totally different incentives than private busi-
nesses but are nonetheless responsible for a substantial share of pollution. 
Likewise, while the occasional large tort damages award may have 
some deterrent value, the fear of tort litigation in the environmental con-
text is a highly imperfect means of ensuring compliance with environ-
mental requirements. Private lawsuits alleging environmental harm from 
routine, continuous environmental discharges, as opposed to catastrophic 
accidents or releases, are very difficult to win for a host of reasons. Cau-
sation is difficult to prove because of long latency periods and the problem 
of confounding causes for most environmental harms.6o The cases are 
lengthy and expensive, requiring a great deal of expert testimony. In the 
workplace, the effectiveness of tort claims is further limited by workers' 
compensation.61 These and other factors make these cases economically 
unattractive to litigate, particularly on behalf of individual plaintiffs, and 
corporations understand the very small likelihood of their being sued, suc-
cessfully or not, for routine emissions or discharge. Moreover, for some 
regulatory requirements, such as training, record-keeping, or reporting ob-
ligations, there is almost no likelihood that failure to comply will increase 
a corporation's risk of tort liability since these violations often do not re-
alld Global Lawmakillg 011 Trade alld the Ellvirollmellt, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 479, 531 (1995) ("[T]he 
'compliance pull' of voluntary standards may be limited to consumer goods and other highly visible 
sectors, or to large enterprises where brand-name recognition is important."). See gellerally Jennifer 
Nash & John Ehrenfeld, Code Greell: Busilless Adopts Volu1llary Ellvirollmelltal Stalldards, 38 
ENV'T, Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 16 (reporting that companies participating in private environmental codes 
tend to maintain direct sales relationships with the public or to hold corporate values that are strongly 
consistent with code requirements). 
59. There is a growing socially responsible investment movement that evaluates the environ-
mental record of companies as a basis for investment in the stock market. See STEVEN J. BENNEIT, 
RICHARD FREIERMAN & STEPHEN GEORGE, CORPORATE REALITIES & ENVIRONMENTAL TRUTHS-
STRATEGIES FOR LEADING YOUR BUSINESS IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL ERA 13 (1993) (estimating that 
$625 billion is invested in products that are selected on the basis of ethical, environmental and politi-
cal criteria). The size and impact of this movement is uncertain, but in any case it is not relevant to 
the majority of regulated facilities, which are not publicly-traded corporations. 
60. See Daniel Farber, Toxic Causatioll, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1227-29 (1987); Develop-
mellts ill the Law-Toxic Waste Litigatioll, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1617-30 (1986). Accord Ruban-
ick v. Witco Chern. Co., 593 A.2d 733, 739 (N.J. 1991) ("[W]e have recognized the extraordinary and 
unique burdens facing plaintiffs who seek to prove causation in toxic-tort litigation."). 
61. See 82 AM. JUR. 2d Workers Comp § 62 (1997) (explaining that workers' compensation is 
generally the exclusive remedy for injuries suffered by employees against employers). 
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suIt in direct environmental harm. Arguably in fact, corporations have an 
incentive not to comply with reporting requirements out of fear that disclo-
sure of releases might trigger tort liability by exposed individuals.62 Most 
likely then, the primary deterrent effect of potential tort liability is to 
stimulate prophylactic measures aimed at avoiding accidents, since litiga-
tion stemming from these occurrences is the most worrisome to busi-
nesses. These prophylactic steps lead to compliance with some underlying 
environmental requirements, but there is little reason to believe it will lead 
to compliance with all or even most of them. 
It is harder to assess whether the prospect of improved profitability 
will motivate most companies to voluntarily obey regulations. In many 
instances, firms will save money, often substantial amounts, from envi-
ronmental compliance, particularly if they invest in pollution prevention or 
other measures that translate into improved productivity. But some of 
these benefits are counterbalanced by the economic savings realized from 
noncompliance. Not all compliance measures translate into economic 
gains; likewise, some may result in savings in five to ten years but cause 
short-term financial losses that cash-poor companies are hesitant to incur. 
3. Internal Regulatory Systems 
Commentators also argue that traditional enforcement approaches 
should be modified to account for corporations' increasingly sophisticated 
internal regulatory schemes, the content of which parallels government 
rules. Scholars have for some time urged that greater attention be paid to 
corporate self-regulation.63 Some contend that internal regulatory pro-
grams are, in many cases, more comprehensive and effective than govern-
ment enforcement efforts.64 Over the past decade, in response to stepped-
62. These record-keeping and reporting requirements are nonetheless considered essential for 
agency and public review, and oversight of the activities of regulated entities. 
63. See JOSEPH V. REEs, REFORMING THE WORKPLACE-A STUDY OF SELF-REGULATION IN 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 6-8 (1988) (emphasizing importance of internal regulatory systems and argu-
ing that "[tlaken as a whole, the American regulatory system can be viewed in terms of the proverbial 
iceberg, the tip being government's regulatory bureaucracy, while the massive body represents soci-
ety's great array of private regulatory systems"). 
64. See AYRES & BRAITHWAI1E, supra note 34, at 2. According to Ayres and Braithwaite, 
studies show that internal corporate rules cover a wider range of hazards and corporate abuses than 
government regulations. They also suggest that persons found violating regulatory requirements are 
more likely to be disciplined by internal compliance groups. See also BARDACH & KAGAN, SlIpra 
note 50, at 99-109; James M. Weaver, Robert J. Martineau, Jr. & Michael K. Stagg, Slale Environ-
menIal Audil Laws Advance Goal of a Cleaner Environmenl, 11 NAT. RESOURCES & ENy'T, Spring 
1997, at 6, 11 ("Environmental regulators simply do not have the financial resources or personnel to 
perform the type of detailed inspections being performed by companies in their efforts to self-police, 
nor can the regulators inspect every permitted business with the frequency self-policing provides."). 
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up government enforcement activity, liability concerns, and other eco-
nomic forces, U.S. companies have greatly enhanced their self-policing ef-
forts in the environmental area.65 Many fIrms now regularly conduct envi-
ronmental audits to assure compliance with regulatory requirements.66 
Others have implemented more complex environmental management sys-
tems,67 and a considerable number have adopted private, voluntary codes 
of conduct.68 EPA offIcials note that most reports of problems with Clean 
Water Act permits come from permittees themselves.69 Accordingly, as 
two state enforcement officials suggest, environmental agencies "must re-
tool [their] policies to address the reality of the highly professional, so-
phisticated nature of environmental management currently underway in 
many quarters of the regulated community.,,70 
The growth in environmental auditing and other environmental man-
agement systems undoubtedly has improved compliance among regulated 
65. See Mary Ellen Kris & Gail L. Vannelli, Today's Criminal Environmental Enforcement 
Program: Why You May Be Vulnerable and Why You Should Guard Against Prose clition Through an 
Environmental Audit, 16 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L 227, 240 (1991); Lucia Ann Silecchia, Ounces of Pre-
vention and Pounds of Cure: Developing Sound Policies for Environmental Compliance Programs, 7 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 583, 584-594 (1996). 
66. See Lavelle, supra note 49, at SI (noting that 65% of 200 corporate counsel surveyed indi-
cated that they have audit programs; of the remaining finns, about half indicated they had plans to 
implement such programs in the future). A 1995 survey by Price Waterhouse found that 75% of the 
369 companies that responded reported performing environmental audits. See Price Waterhouse LLP, 
Tile Voluntary Environmental Audit Survey of u.s. Business 1,5 (Mar. 1995) [hereinafter Voluntary 
Environmental Audit]. See also Craig N. Johnston, An Essay on Environmental Audit Privileges: The 
Rigllt Problem, the Wrong Solution, 25 ENVTL. L 335, 336 (1995) (noting that a survey by Investor 
Responsibility Research Center found that 85% of the 249 companies surveyed had established volun-
tary audit programs and that a 1992 Arthur Anderson survey of 257 companies, including 38 compa-
nies with revenues less than S100 million, found that 59.2% had conducted compliance audits be-
tween 1989 and 1991). 
67. For discussion of environmental management systems, see infra Part V.C.2. 
68. See Nash & Ehrenfeld, supra note 58. Among these private codes are (I) the Chemical 
Manufacturer Association's (CMA) Responsible Care program, (2) the Coalition for Environmentally 
Responsible Economies' (CERES) (formerly the Valdez) principles, and (3) the International Chamber 
of Commerce (lCC) Business Charter for Sustainable Development. To varying degrees, these codes 
encourage companies to conduct life-cycle management, addressing the "cradle to grave" environ-
mental impacts of business activities; to engage in environmentally sustainable practices; and to in-
volve outside groups, including suppliers, customers, and community groups, in their environmental 
programs. Each calls on businesses to implement environmental management systems. To differing 
degrees, these systems require businesses to assess the environmental impacts of their activities; to 
establish environmental goals, targets and timetables for meeting these goals; to audit their progress 
toward realizing these objectives; and to provide appropriate employee training. The CERES princi-
ples also require companies to complete and make public an annual report containing detailed infor-
mation on corporate environmental practices. 
69. See HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 61. 
70. Gary L Spielman & Frank V. Bifera, DEC Enforcement in the Modem Day Environmental 
Management System, 1 ALB. L ENVTL. OUTLOOK, Summer 1995, at 46, 47. 
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firms, although there is little hard data demonstrating this effect or to what 
degree it has occurred, and as discussed further below, it should be a factor 
in enforcement decisions. This development, however, does not justify 
discarding the current system. For one thing, many firms cannot afford 
environmental audits and do not have sophisticated internal regulatory 
programs.71 Moreover, merely because a firm conducts an environmental 
audit does not ensure that it will correct any violations detected, or of 
greater concern, take appropriate measures to prevent a violation from re-
curring.72 In addition, and perhaps most fundamentally, self-policing ef-
forts are not infallible, underscoring the need for regulatory oversight. 
This was dramatically illustrated recently by a major enforcement case in-
volving the flawed self-monitoring efforts of Pacific, Gas & Electric 
(pG&E) at its nuclear power plant in Diablo Canyon, California, which re-
sulted in a $14 million Clean Water Act settlement and undetermined 
damage to the marine environment.73 
71. The size of a company and its available resources impact the likelihood that a company will 
have an auditing program. See Voluntary Environmental Audit, supra note 66, at 66. For example, 
Price Waterhouse found in its survey that every company with sales over $1 billion conducted audits, 
and less than half of companies with sales under $50 million maintain auditing programs. See id. See 
also Harris, supra note 35, at 719 ("[S]mall businesses have limited technical and financial resources 
to comply with the law,let alone engage in proactive environmental management strategies like envi-
ronmental auditing."); Tom Arrandale, Can Polluters Police Themselves?, GOVERNING MAG., June 
1997, at 36 (quoting a senior EPA enforcement official who states that "[s]mall business doesn't do 
audits. This is coming from big companies that have been targets of enforcement action ...• "). See, 
e.g., Donald A. Carr & William L. Thomas, Devising a Compliance Strategy Under tire ISO 14000 
International Environmental Management Standards, 15 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 85, 149 & n.l54 
(1997) (citing estimates that ISO 14000 certification costs may range from $100,000 to $1 million for 
large multinational companies and as much as $10,000 to $100,000 for medium-size businesses, and 
concluding that "[i]t is yet unclear whether small and medium-sized firms will find the hurdles to cer-
tification insurmountable"). 
72. See generally CHRISTOPHER BEDFORD, ENVTL. ArnON FOUND., DIRTY SECRETS: THE 
CORPORATIONS' CAMPAIGN FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT PRIVILEGE (Feb. 1996) 
<http://www.envirolink.orglorgslgnp/dirtyl.html> (pointing to several instances in which corporations 
failed to correct environmental violations revealed to them by internal environmental audits or failed 
to act on repeated recommendations by environmental, health and safety staff to remedy unsafe con-
ditions that later resulted in serious accidents). Accord Sanford Lewis, Analysis of ISO 14000 Mall-
agement Systems: A Community Environmental Perspective (Sept. 25, 1996) (evolving paper, on the 
Good Neighbor Project for Sustainable Industries website) <http://www.environlink.orglorgs/gnp/ 
isollhtml> [hereinafter Lewis, Analysis of ISO 14000] (using example of Rhone-Poulcnc facility in 
Institute, West Virginia, to illustrate that environmental audits can fail to diagnose and rectify underly-
ing problems-in this case, underinvestment in preventive maintenance at a facility-and that as a 
result, audits can fail to prevent the recurrence of chemical leaks). See generally RICHARD WELFORD, 
ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT-THE CORPORATE CHALLENGE FOR 
THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY 56 (1994) ("Seeing a single audit as a panacea would not only be 
wrong but is likely to lead to more problems than it solves."). 
73. There, PG&E's Clean Water Act permit required it to monitor the impacts of its massive 
cooling water intake system on the adjacent marine environment. In 1988, PG&E omitted sampling 
data from a key report that showed the possibility of up to a 90% loss of larval fish between cooling 
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Likewise, many environmental management systems are designed not 
to evaluate compliance with regulatory requirements but to ensure that 
regulated entities have appropriate training, decisionmaking, and other 
management systems.14 Similarly, none of the existing voluntary industry 
codes include specific performance standards or prescribe specific opera-
tional practices, and none explicitly require compliance with environ-
mental requirements. Nor do any require third-party verification of firms' 
environmental systems.15 Additionally, participation in the voluntary 
schemes has been relatively limited thus far, and most of the participants 
have been large firms.16 At least some preliminary results suggest that 
compliance with voluntary standards may falter during difficult economic 
times.17 
B. THE COMPLEXITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
Another motivation underlying current reform efforts is the complex-
ity of environmental law.18 Professor Richard Lazarus has recently pro-
vided one of the most detailed analyses of the sources of environmental 
law's complexity.19 First, he argues, environmental law is highly techni-
cal, requiring sophistication and expertise to understand because of its de-
water system intake and discharge points, indicating a possible significant impact on the marine envi-
ronment. PG&E produced additional reports and took additional samples following government 
agency questions raised by the data actually submitted by the company, but PG&E continued to with-
hold the original results. Eventually, after years had passed, PG&E biologists "rediscovered" the 
omitted data and requested internally that PG&E management turn it over to the regulatory agencies. 
PG&E failed to do this for another two years. In 1997, 10 years after the original studies were carried 
out, regulators ordered PG&E to redo the initial two-year study since the omitted data rendered the 
original study invalid. Throughout this 10-year period, PG&E maintained control over the study and 
data generated; government agencies relied entirely on the company's entire control and audits. See 
Chris Bowman, Big PG&E Settlement Over Nuclear Plant, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 28,1997, at A3; 
Telephone Interview with Ken Alex, Deputy Attorney General, State of California (Aug. 8, 1997). 
74. See discussion infra Part V.C.2. 
75. See Nash & Ehrenfeld, supra note 58, at 16. 
76. This is not true for members of the CMA; adherence to the Responsible Care program is 
mandatory. The members' degree of commitment to meeting code requirements has varied, however. 
See id. See also WELFORD, supra note 72, at 76 (noting that the pilot program of the British Standards 
Institution's voluntary environmental management system showed that firms were generally strong on 
drawing up environmental policies but weak on providing training and resources). 
77. See Alastair T. lIes, Letter to Editor, ENV'T, Sept. 1996, at 4 (commenting on and quoting 
Welford's work, which notes that a report of the British Responsible Care program for 1993 showed 
that many firms failed to follow standards and concludes that "voluntary approaches often slip down a 
list of priorities when other pressing issues arise. It is perhaps not surprising that the lack of response 
from the chemical industry over Responsible Care occurred during a particularly bad economie reces-
sion."). See also WELFORD, supra note 72, at 36-37. 
78. See Diamond, supra note 1, at 10,254. 
79. See Richard Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environ-
mental LaIV: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407 (1995). 
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pendence on science, engineering, and economics.8o Second, the law is 
relatively indeterminate: Outcomes are hard to predict, and legal categories 
do not necessarily tum on differences that are significant in the real 
world.81 Third, the law is obscure: It can be difficult for regulated entities 
to locate all the "law" applicable to them because, among other things, 
regulations are densely worded, and rules are made through informal 
agency documents, regulatory preambles, or other materials difficult to ac-
cess.82 Finally, environmental law is considerably differentiated; regula-
tory authority is fragmented among federal agencies, and between federal 
and state (and sometimes local) agencies.83 
Although Lazarus' critique does not describe all environmental regu-
lation, it does highlight genuine difficulties faced by regnlated entities. 
One local prosecutor's guide candidly acknowledges that "[n]o facility of 
moderate complexity which handles hazardous materials or wastes ... can 
be expected to be in full compliance at all times.,,84 Likewise, a survey of 
general corporate counsel at major firms found that two-thirds believed 
their businesses had operated, at least some time in the prior year, in vio-
lation of environmental laws. Nearly seventy percent indicated that they 
did not believe absolute compliance was achievable because of the law's 
complexity, varying interpretations by regulators, the role of human error, 
and cost considerations.85 Numerous other observers have likewise noted 
the difficulty of maintaining perfect, continuous compliance with all envi-
ronmental rules.86 Small businesses face particularly great challenges in 
dealing with complicated environmental regulations.87 The widespread 
80. See id. at 2429-31. 
81. See id. at 2431-36. 
82. See id. at 2436-38. 
83. See id. at 2438-39. Other scholars argue that modern regUlations are complex because 
regulated entities seek to exploit the slightest ambiguity in simple, generally-worded rules, forcing 
government agencies to draft exquisitely detailed provisions. See ROBERT REICH, TALES OF A NEW 
AMERICA 212-21 (1987). 
84. CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASS'N, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO HAZARDOUS MA· 
TERIALS ENFORCEMENT AND LIABILITY I-I (1992). 
85. See Lavelle, supra note 49, at S1. 
86. See Harris, supra note 35, at 710; Silecchia, supra note 65, at 590 & n.14 (citing multiple 
sources). 
87. For an illustrative discussion, see ILLINOIS ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY & ILLINOIS DEP'T 
OF COMMERCE AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, GOVERNOR'S SMALL BUSINESS ENVIRONMENTAL TASK 
FORCE REpORT & RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (1994) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S SMALL BUSINESS EN-
VIRONMENTAL TASK FORCE] (copy on file with author). In summarizing its findings, the Task Force 
noted: 
a widespread and pervasive 'fear factor' among small businesses .... [This includes] a fear 
by small businesses that they cannot detennine whether they need a permit or mUltiple 
pennits from the [Illinois EPA]. They cannot understand how to determine what regulations 
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concern with these burdens explains the overwhelming Congressional sup-
port for mandating grace periods for environmental violations committed 
by small businesses.ss 
The complexity of environmental law suggests a number of things. It 
points out the need for agencies to spend considerably more resources on 
education and compliance promotion, particularly with smaller businesses. 
It highlights the need for agencies to be flexible and pragmatic in their en-
forcement of many requirements, which is how most environmental agen-
cies operate in practice. It also indicates the need to re-examine the very 
liberal mens rea requirements of criminal environmental statutes, as Pro-
fessor Lazarus recommends. But the law's complexity is not a justifica-
tion for a wholesale dismantling of the enforcement system. Other areas 
of law that are highly complex-tax law, for example-have not gone in 
this direction. Thus, while the Internal Revenue Service has recently em-
barked on an important effort to increase voluntary compliance through a 
variety of service-oriented initiatives, it has not discarded deterrence-based 
enforcement. S9 
C. THE DETERRENCE-Is-COUNTERPRODUCTIVE ARGUMENT 
Critics charge that a cooperative approach to enforcement is the best 
way to achieve compliance and that sanction-oriented enforcement is 
counterproductive.9o The basic argument proceeds from the assumption 
that corporations have a generalized commitment to abiding by the law. 
Under this mind-set, persuasion works better than punishment; essentially, 
carrots are superior to sticks. Thus, John Braithwaite explains: 
Id. 
Punishment is the best strategy when good will is wanting. We apply 
this common sense psychology in educating our children, in manage-
ment, and in our everyday lives .... Punishment is something we resort 
apply to them. And they cannot understand the multitude of regulations that may apply to 
them. 
88. See discussion infra Part V.B. 
89. See SPARROW, supra note 3, at 15. The IRS' initiatives include tax simplification, taxpayer 
assistance programs, customer-oriented total quality management, community volunteer programs to 
help those who need it preparing their returns, and other measures. See id. See generally NATIONAL 
COMM'N ON RESTRUcruRlNG THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., A NEW VISION FOR A NEW IRS (1997) 
(outlining initiatives to improve the IRS' public image). Likewise, very recent IRS reform legislation 
was enacted to rectify perceived over zealousness in the IRS enforcement system. See Richard w. 
Stevenson, Senate Votes 96-2 on Final Approval for Changing IRS, NY TIMES, July 10, 1998, at Ai. 
90. See Sommer, supra note 3, at 8 (noting that enforcement attorneys should realize that liti-
gation is "expensive and delay-ridden, and frequently rewards no one but the professional litigator," 
and that it fosters an "unproductive dynamic" between the community and industry and government). 
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to only when we confront a spouse, a student or a colleague at work to 
whose better nature we cannot appeal for compliance with the goals we 
have in mind .... Every schoolteacher knows that in some circumstances 
a child who would have been alienated by punishment can be given a 
greatly enhanced will to behave by saying, "That's not like you, Johnny 
Brown," and then forgiving the transgression.91 
The same psychology applies to businesses. Therefore, the argument 
goes, if they are found in violation of regulatory requirements, they should 
be treated like a partner, and they will respond positively to suggestions 
and advice about how to achieve compliance. If, however, the response to 
noncompliance is inflexible, sanction-oriented enforcement, regulated en-
tities will become resentful and hostile. They will feel as though they have 
been treated unfairly and that their efforts to comply have gone unrecog-
nized and unrewarded by regulators. The result will be resistance: Corpo-
rations will be less forthcoming with information, more apt to exploit 
regulatory loopholes, more likely to contest agency conclusions, and more 
likely to expend resources litigating citations. In short, they will become 
less cooperative. The job of agencies in turn will become more difficult. 
They will have a harder time detecting violations, since companies will be 
less likely to voluntarily disclose problems to them. They will have to 
spend more resources litigating cases, as well as more time and effort 
gathering competent evidence for enforcement actions. The net impact is 
less compliance by regulated entities (or, at the least, more instances of 
minimal compliance) at greater cost to enforcement agencies.92 
Supporters of this view cite favorably to the less adversarial approach 
of enforcement agencies in European countries. In Great Britain, for in-
stance, Keith Hawkins found that water pollution inspectors rarely impose 
sanctions on firms found to be in violation, relying instead on a system of 
informal negotiation and persuasion to achieve compliance. The central 
assumption of enforcement personnel is that their efforts will be more pro-
ductive if they are conciliatory rather than coercive, and that they will 
91. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, To PUNISH OR PERSUADE: ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE SAFETY 99 
(1985). 
92. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 50, at 99-117; BRAITHWAITE, supra note 91, at 100 
("The problem with the punitive model of man as essentially bad is that we dissipate the will of well-
intentioned people to comply when we treat them as if they were ill-intentioned."). Professors Ayres 
and Braithwaite argue that the psychological theories of minimal sufficiency and positive attribution 
demonstrate that long-term internalization of a commitment to compliance is more Iikcly to occur 
when triggered by positive incentives rather than punishment. See AyRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra 
note 34, at 49-50. 
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achieve the most compliance by maintaining good relations with regulated 
entities.93 
The argument that cooperation works better than deterrence to 
achieve compliance with environmental law is unconvincing. Most fun-
damentally, it is largely untested.94 As two researchers conclude: 
[S]cholarly attention has focused much more on building credible argu-
ments for particular points of view than on evaluating their effectiveness 
based on actual experience in the field. As a result, there is little in the 
way of empirical evidence that can be used in deciding which enforce-
ment techniques [approaches based on deterrence or cooperation] are 
most likely to achieve regulatory goals.95 
Likewise, in 1991, the EPA noted that although the states and federal 
government had tried different enforcement philosophies over the prior 
two decades, "[l]ittle systematic research or program evaluation has been 
conducted to help understand what techniques are effective under what 
circumstances.,,96 Six years later, the EPA reiterated the need for a na-
tional compliance study designed to better characterize compliance with 
federal environmental laws, including developing a better understanding of 
the motivation for compliance or noncompliance.97 
There are several reasons for skepticism about the argument that de-
terrence-based enforcement is counterproductive. First, this contention 
rests on certain suppositions about enforcement behavior-most notably 
that inspectors are rigid and legalistic, and respond to all violations with 
formal sanctions.98 These assumptions, however, are belied by studies 
showing that enforcement personnel in fact eschew formal, legalistic ac-
93. See KEITH HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REGULATION AND THE SOCIAL 
DEFINmoN OF POLLUTION 110-54 (1984). 
94. See Mintz, supra note 45, at 10,541 (noting that there is no persuasive evidence that coop-
emtive approaches are more likely to produce environmental compliance than a deterrent-based re-
gime). 
95. Raymond J. Burby & Robert G. Paterson, Improving Compliance with State Environmental 
Regulations, 12 J. POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 753, 757 (1993). See Kathryn Harrison, Is Cooperation 
the Answer? Canadian Environmental Enforcement in Comparative Context, 14 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS 
& MGMT. 221, 223 (1995) ("[P]ast studies that have hailed the merits of coopemtive enforcement have 
offered surprisingly little by way of empirical support."). See also Wasserman, supra note 32, at 30 
(asserting that there is need for research to determine the efficiency of dollars spent promoting com-
pliance versus enforcing requirements). 
96. ENFORCEMENT FOUR-YEAR STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 12, at 19. 
97. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTEcrION AGENCY, MEASURING THE PERFORMANCE OF EPA'S EN-
FORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM, DRAFT REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PER-
FORMANCE MEASURES STRATEGY (Sept. 1997) [hereinafter DRAFT REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE MEASURES STRATEGY]. 
98. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 50, at 72-80,99-114. 
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tions and rely heavily on informal negotiations (while using traditional 
sanctions as a backup) to achieve compliance.99 Second, advocates of co-
operative enforcement presuppose that most corporations are inclined to 
generally comply with law. As detailed above, this assumption is prob-
lematic with respect to environmental regulations. lOo Third, the coopera-
tive model under emphasizes the economic pressures for noncompliance. 
Coaxing and persuasion may be productive when firms make good-faith 
efforts to comply and have the resources to do so. It is far less likely to 
work when compliance has significant financial consequences for a 
firm. 101 A North Carolina enforcement study discussed below illustrates 
this point: Researchers found that deterrence-oriented enforcement was 
more effective'than cooperation when substantial cost savings could be 
realized by noncompliance.t02 
Finally, there is little hard evidence to support the claim that deter-
rence is counterproductive. To be fair to critics of existing practice, the 
current state of compliance with environmental regulations does not pro-
vide definitive evidence that deterrence-based enforcement is more effec-
tive. In fact, rather surprisingly, we do not have a good idea about what 
the overall state of compliance with environmental requirements is. On 
99. See HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 53-56,72-73; YEAGER, sllpra note 26, at 280 
(stating that the study of EPA enforcement found that agency "stayed well away from nitpicking en-
forcement"). 
100. See HUNTER & WATERMAN, sllpra note 26, at 60. Some argue that a portion of companies 
fail to comply because of organizational incompetence, and that for these finns, a strategy of educa-
tion and persuasion will be most effective in stimulating compliance. See Kagan & Scholz, Sllpra note 
32, at 67-69 (observing that where violations are attributable to organizational failures, the appropriate 
regulatory strategy should be education, not sanctions; enforcers should act like consultants). But as 
other scholars point out, the threat of sanctions can be a strong deterrent to lack of organizational care 
in the first place. See Harrington, supra note 36, at 51 ("A finn has considerable discretion in the care 
with which abatement equipment is operated and maintained. It stands to reason that its diligence 
would be the greater during those times when violations were likely to be costly."); Johnston, slIpra 
note 66, at 338 ("Most violations result from a mere simple lack of care-a lack of sufficient attention 
being paid to environmental matters. Vigorous enforcement programs can and do have a dramatic 
impact on the amount of attention that regulated entities pay to environmental compliance matters."). 
101. See White, supra note 28, at 151-53 (suggesting that the cost of compliance was the most 
important factor explaining low compliance rates of regulated entities where the local agency adopted 
conciliatory enforcement style). See also JOSEPH F. DIMENTO, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
AMERICAN BUSINESS: DILEMMAS OF COMPLIANCE 86-87 (1986) ("We find sufficient examples of 
cost-benefit calculations in the toxic dumping cases to support the conclusion that in some areas of 
environmental control the 'rational man' [i.e., deterrence-based enforcement] model may be useful for 
devising control policies."). 
102. See Burby & Paterson, Sllpra note 95, at 759, 765 (estimating that noncompliance with the 
requirement that sedimentation and erosion plans be installed and maintained could save $8,000 for a 
typical project). See also RUSSELL ET AL., slIpra note 25, at 107-16 (suggesting that modeling exer-
cise demonstrates that voluntary compliance will work poorly for finns wishing to skimp on mainte-
nance of pollution control equipment). 
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the one hand, the evidence generally suggests that presently there are rela-
tively high levels of compliance, particularly in those areas where en-
forcement has been systematic, aggressive and targeted. 103 New Jersey's 
deterrence-oriented Clean Water Act Enforcement Act,I04 to cite one very 
recent illustration, has significantly improved compliance since it was 
adopted in 1990.105 Even advocates for change concede that the traditional 
approach has worked effectively in achieving compliance with many 
regulatory requirements.106 
On the other hand, a host of studies, most notably a series of reports 
by the General Accounting Office and EPA's Inspector General, demon-
strate considerable levels of noncompliance by regulated entities. 107 In 
one recent report, for instance, the GAO found that one in six major facili-
103. See Mintz, supra note 45, at 10,539 to 10,540; HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 46 
(indicating that some EPA officials state that 95% of all NPDES pennittees in their region are in 
compliance at any given time). 
104. N. J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-14.1 ('Vest 1995). 
105. See Hearings on the Relationship Between Federal and State Governments, supra note 2, at 
227 (prepared statement of Todd E. Robins). Among other provisions, the statute provides for manda-
tory minimum penalties for serious violations and significant noncompliance, requires that penalties 
recover the economic benefit resulting from violations, and enhances citizen enforcement. According 
to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, the number of Clean Water Act violations 
in the state has dropped by 78% since 1992. See id. (quoting NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF ENVTL. PRO-
TECTION, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CLEAN WATER ENFORCEMENT ACT (March 1997); NEW 
JERSEY DEP'T ENVTL. PROTECTION, 1995 ANNUAL REpORT OF THE CLEAN WATER ENFORCEMENT ACT 
(March 1996». Moreovcr, enforcement actions have declined by 67% since 1992, and penalties have 
declined by 92% since 1994, suggesting that the law's strong deterrent effect has prompted much of 
the increased compliance. See id. 
106. See Hawkins, supra note 5, at 47. The critics argue, however, that this method is not ap-
propriate for the more complex compliance challenges regulatory agencies currently confront. See id. 
107. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIR POLLUTION: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN 
DETECTING AND PREVENTING VIOLATIONS, GAOIRCED 90-155 (1990) (observing that in more than 
50% of significant violator cases under the Clean Air Act over a two-year period, no penalties were 
imposed, and when they were assessed, they were often insufficient to recover the economic benefit 
gained from noncompliance); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER POLLUTION: IMPROVED 
MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT NEEDED FOR TOXIC POLLUTANTS ENTERING SEWERS, GAOIRCED-
89-101,3 (1989) [hereinafter GAO, WATER POLLUTION: IMPROVED MONITORING] (indicating that a 
survey found that 41 % of industrial users were not complying with publicly owned treatment works' 
pretreatment discharge limits under the Clean Water Act); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER 
POLLUTION: OBSERVATIONS ON COMPUANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES UNDER THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT, GAOrr-RCED-91-90 (1991) (statement of Richard L. Hembra, Director of Environ-
mental Protection Issues, before the Senate Subcommittee on Environmental Protection) (reporting 
that a series of GAO and EPA evaluations have revealed the widespread and continuing pattern of 
noncompliance with water quality programs, and a reluctance on the part of the EPA and states to take 
strong enforcement action); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER POLLUTION: STRONGER 
ENFORCEMENT NEEDED TO IMPROVE COMPUANCE AT FEDERAL FACILITIES, GAOIRCED-89-13, 3 
(1988) (stating that over a two-year period in the late 1980s, 20% of major federal facilities violated 
priority Clean Water Act requirements, and more than 40% of those violating facilities did not comply 
for a year or more). 
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ties was in "significant noncompliance" of the discharge limits in their 
NPDES permits,I08 and that the actual number could be twice as high.109 
Moreover, during fiscal year 1994, fifty percent of major dischargers vio-
lated their permits at some time during the year (including both lesser in-
fractions and significant violations).llo Other observers have reached 
similar conc1usions.lll These latter studies do not tell us, however, 
whether noncompliance resulted from flaws in the deterrence-based model, 
or, as others argne,II2 from, a lack of meaningful deterrence-based en-
forcement. 
The limited empirical data actually comparing deterrence and coop-
erative-oriented strategies is mixed. Some studies indicate improvements 
in compliance rates after cooperative strategies were substituted for tradi-
tional practices. For example, a pilot cooperative compliance program 
conducted by the California Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion (CallOSHA) in the early 1980s resulted in significantly lower accident 
rates at the participating job sites than at comparable company projects or 
comparable projects by other firms in California. II3 Under the program, 
108. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER POLLUTION: MANY VIOLATIONS HAVE NOT 
RECEIVED ApPROPRIATE ENFORCEMENT ATTENTION, GAOIRCED-96-23, 1-2 (1996) [hereinafter 
GAO, WATER POLLUTION: ENFORCEMENT ATTENTION]. The EPA defines "significant noncompli-
ance" as "(I) for toxic pollutants as exceeding an average monthly limit by 20 percent or more in any 
2 months of a 6-month period and (2) for conventional pollutants as exceeding an average monthly 
limit by 40 percent in any 2 months of a 6-month period." Id. at 3. 
109. See id. at 2. 
110. See id. at 3. 
Ill. Most recently, a study by the U.S. Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) found that during 
a IS-month period from 1995 to early 1996, close to 20% of the major industrial, municipal and fed-
eral dischargers nationwide were listed by the EPA in significant noncompliance with their Clean 
Water Act permits in at least one quarter. The study additionally found that 21 % of major industrial 
dischargers exceeded their discharge limits by 50% or more during the first quarter of 1996. See Todd 
Robins, U.S. PUB. INTEREST REsEARCH GROUP, DIRTY WATER SCOUNDRELS: STATE-BY-STATE 
VIOLATIONS OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT BY THE NATION'S LARGEST FACILITIES (1997) (visited July 
16, 1997) <http://www.pirg.org/pirg/enviro/water/dws97> [hereinafter DIRTY WATER SCOUNDRELS]. 
See also David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System: Call 
Three Not Be a Crowd Whell Enforcement Is Shared by the United States, the States, and Their Citi-
zens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1603-09 (1995) (discussing the erratic enforcement record of govern-
ment agencies and significant levels of noncompliance by regulated entities). 
112. Professor Hodas, for instance, attributes the documented rate of significant noncompliance 
with the Clean Water Act to a combination of the relaxed enforcement efforts by states (to create fa-
vorable business conditions), and the reluctance of the federal government (due to politics) to mean-
ingfully supervise state enforcement efforts. See Hodas, supra note Ill, at 1572-75, 1585-89, 1615-
17. See also Joseph F. DiMento, Can Social Science Explain Orgallizatiollal NOllcompliallce with 
Envirollmental Law?, 45 J. SOC. ISSUES 109, 112 (1989) (stating that traditional literature finds that 
efforts to achieve compliance with environmental law fail because of a weak enforcement approach: 
"Not enough violators are identified; when identified, not enough are sanctioned; and when they are 
sanctioned, penalties are too weak to communicate that violations will not be tolerated."). 
113. See REES, supra note 63, at 1-6. 
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CallOSHA largely refrained from traditional enforcement activities at se-
lected construction sites in favor of self-regulation by a joint labor-
management safety committee. Cal/OSHA stopped its routine compliance 
inspections of these sites and instead assigued a compliance officer to as-
sist the safety committee in devising solutions to problems at the sites. 
The author of this study, however, cautions against broadly applying this 
model: The firms involved already had stellar safety records; there was 
broad agreement between labor and management as to the nature of the 
safety problems at the sites; and the beneficiaries of self-regulation were 
directly involved at the site where the violations occurY4 As he points 
out, the experience may be very different in other regulatory contexts, like 
environmental protection, where the affected constituents are not present at 
the firm. 
In another example, the federal OSHA has found benefits in its Vol-
untary Protection Program (VPP). Employers who have outstanding safety 
records and a program to identify and correct workplace hazards assume 
primary responsibility for monitoring compliance and are thereby ex-
empted from routine agency inspections. ll5 In 1992, with 150 worksites 
participating in the program, injury incidence rates averaged from thirty-
five percent to sixty-five percent below the expected average for similar 
industries, and workday injury rates were sixty percent below the expected 
average in similar industriesY6 Likewise, a study of occupational safety 
114. Seeid. at 237. 
115. OSHA conducts a pre·approval review of all participating worksites before they qualify for 
the VPP. OSHA also conducts a review similar to the pre·approval review, including a site visit, 
every three years. See Michael, supra note 40, at 559. There are three levels of VPP participation. 
For those companies that have the most comprehensive health and safety programs and have achieved 
the highest level ("star status"), minor violations reported to OSHA or detected during recertification 
inspections are resolved by requiring prompt correction or revoking the company's star status. Only 
cases involving knowing misconduct or serious injury at a star facility are referred to OSHA's en· 
forcement staff. See Breger, supra note 3, at 330. 
116. See Michael M. Stahl, Promoting Voluntary Compliance: A Valuable Supplement to Envi· 
ronmental Enforcement, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 551, 554 (1994) [hereinafter THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE]. 
In 1996, OSHA reported that in the prior three years participation in the program had doubled, and 
that injury rates at participating companies were 45% below the industry average. See Occupational 
Safety and Health Admin., U.S. Dept. of Labor, Head Says Programs of "New OSHA" Are Successful 
Ways to Improve Worker Safety and Health, Sept. 16, 1996, available in 1996 WL 536220 (D.O.L.) 
(news release). For criticism that the VPP has not in fact promoted better compliance, see Kenneth A. 
Kovach, Nancy G. Hamilton, Thomas M. Alston & Judith A. Sullivan, OSHA and the Politics of Re-
fonn: An Analysis of OSHA Refonn Initiatives Before the l04th Congress, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 169, 
179-80 (1997) {noting that according to the AFL-CIO, industries in which compliance has been volun-
tary have shown little improvement in the death and injury rates of workers since 1970, and that a 
study by the Associated Press reviewing 778,000 OSHA inspections found that lack of inspections 
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and health enforcement suggests that the level of cooperation employed by 
enforcement agencies increases the effectiveness of their enforcement ef-
forts, as measured by lower injury rates among workers. ll7 
A compliance incentive program implemented with the auto repair 
industry in Santa Rosa, California, also reported positive results. In place 
of traditional enforcement practices, local regulators began an intensive 
program of providing information and technical assistance to businesses. 
In addition, the regulators awarded recoguizable stickers to complying 
businesses, and attempted to raise consumer awareness about the pro-
gram. 118 Whereas before the campaign the compliance rate hovered near 
zero, nearly three-quarters of the repair shops were fully compliant after 
two inspections.119 
On the other hand, a comparative study between the pulp and paper 
industries in the United States and Canada, where regnlators follow the 
cooperative school, found that rates of compliance with effluent limitations 
in Canada are significantly lower than in the United States. 120 In particu-
lar, the study found that rates of compliance with Biological Oxygen De-
mand requirements for Canadian mills were around sixty-nine percent, 
compared to an average in the United States ranging from eighty-six per-
cent to ninety-eight percent, and that compliance with Total Suspended 
Solids CTSS) requirements was fifty-nine percent, compared to an esti-
mated ninety-two percent compliance in the United States. 121 Noting that 
the regulatory systems of the two countries are very similar except for the 
since 1990 correlated with 75% of the worksites reporting serious worker accidents in 1994 and early 
1995). 
117. See John T. Scholz, Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative 
Effectiveness, 85 AM. POL. SCIENCE REV. 115, 128 (1991) [hereinafter Scholz, Cooperative Regula-
tory Enforcement]. Scholz developed a rough "cooperation index" based on the percentage of cita-
tions issued that included serious violations and the percentage of penalties imposed for serious viola-
tions. High percentages mean a high concentration of agency activities on egregious violators, which 
is consistent with a cooperative strategy. See id. at 120. 
118. See John w. Gam, Martin L. Grimsrud & Dean C. Paige, The Compliance Incelllive Experi-
ence in Santa Rosa, California, in THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 116, at 527, 529. 
119. See id. at 544. The study's results should be viewed with some caution, however. First, the 
low rate of prior compliance may be attributable to the fact that the auto repair shops had rarely bcen 
inspected in the past. See id. Second, a key factor motivating compliance was market pressure 
stemming from publicly designating facilities as being in compliance. See id. at 544-46. This same 
type of pressure can be deployed in a deterrence-based system. 
120. See Harrison, supra note 95, at 237-38. 
121. See id. at 238. The evidence also suggests that the U.S. firms would have a substantially 
higher rate of compliance with toxicity standards. 
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divergent approaches to implementation,122 the author concluded that 
"[t]he findings thus constitute prima facie evidence that cooperative en-
forcement is less effective than the more prosecution-oriented approach, at 
least in North America."123 
The EPA and states also proved singularly unsuccessful in bringing 
municipalities into compliance with safe drinking water and municipal-
treatment plan violations through a compliance promotion approach.124 In 
the mid-1980s, close to 1,500 publicly-owned treatment works (POTWs) 
were not in compliance. One important reason was that many industrial 
users were exceeding their limits on discharges to POTWs, and the efforts 
of POTW s to coax compliance from these dischargers through a voluntary 
approach were unsuccessful.125 Regulators then initiated a major en-
forcement effort against the municipalities and filed judicial or adminis-
trative actions against almost eighty percent of noncomplying facilities, 
resulting in dramatic increases in compliance. 126 
Another study of local environmental enforcement in North Carolina 
found that both deterrence-based and cooperative strategies were necessary 
to ensure adequate compliance with environmental standards. The study 
examined compliance with the state's sedimentation and erosion control 
program by private developers. It concluded that deterrence-based aspects 
of the enforcement system, including more frequent and lengthier inspec-
tions, were key factors in ensuring greater compliance with the more ex-
pensive requirements that approved plans be installed and maintained. 127 
On the other hand, a cooperative approach worked better at ensuring 
compliance with the performance standard of the regulations-that all 
sediment be retained on site. 128 
In the end, in the absence of more supporting evidence, those advocat-
ing a wholesale departure from a deterrence-based approach bear some 
burden of persuasion-namely, explaining why the basic theory of deter-
rence that predominates so many other areas of law enforcement (the 
Benthamite utilitarian notion that behavior is based on a pleasure-pain cal-
122. "Canadian regulators have been more inclined to bend the rules when they perceive that 
regulated firms are making good faith efforts, and to negotiate informal compliance schedules when 
firms fail to comply." Id. 
123. Id. at 238-39. 
124. See Wasserman, supra note 32, at 30. 
125. See GAO, WATER POLLUTION: IMPROVED MONITORING, supra note 107, at 25-31. 
126. See Robert I. Van Heuvelen & Peter Rosenberg, Successful Compliance and Enforcement 
Approaches, in THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 116, at 163, 164-65. 
127. See Burby & Paterson, supra note 95, at 763. 
128. See id. at 763, 765-66. 
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culation) is inappropriate for environmental regulation.129 Americans still 
regard economic sanctions against business as one of the most potent, if 
not the most potent, means to shape corporate behavior and achieve com-
pliance. A striking illustration is the recent global tobacco settlement 
reached by the states and the tobacco industry. A key part of that agree-
ment provides that if underage use of tobacco products fails to meet certain 
specified reduction targets, the tobacco companies will be penalized bil-
lions of dollars based on a percentage of the profit earned from product 
sales in excess of the stipulated levels.130 Notably, among many groups 
reviewing the settlement, the question is not the appropriateness of this ap-
proach, but whether the sanctions are high enough to prompt the desired 
industry response. 13 I 
D. THE INEFFICIENCY ARGUMENT AGAINST DETERRENCE 
The argument about the superior effectiveness of a cooperative ap-
proach is often joined with the contention that such an approach is more 
efficient, both because it is less costly to administer and because its flexi-
ble nature allows facilities to use the most efficient methods to achieve 
compliance. 132 
129. See HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 3-5. Hunter and Watennan note the dichot-
omy in attitudes toward general criminal enforcement and enforcement of environmental regulations 
among some politicians: 
Id. 
Should enforcement of environmental standards be strict and severe? The message that is so 
emphatic in the area of law enforcement [that enforcement should be strict and severe] does 
not seem to resonate as clearly when we tum our attention to the behavior of federal regula-
tory agencies .... Whereas most politicians today voice similar opinions about the need for 
vigorous criminal enforcement, opinion is widely distributed on the issue of regulatory en-
forcement. 
Likewise, in New York, Assemblyman Richard Brodsky commented on the results of an EPA 
audit showing a lack of enforcement by the New York Department of Environmental Conservation: "It 
shows a pattern of lawbreaking gone unpunished. If these were petty street thieves, (officials in the 
[Governor George] Palaki administration) would be pounding their fists on the table and demanding 
law and order. But when it comes to corporate polluters, they look the other way." Sarah Metzgar, 
Federal Audil Faults DEC on PoliutionLaws, UMES ALBANY UNION, May I, 1997, at B2. 
130. See Excerpts from Agreement Between Slates and Tobacco Industry, reprinted in N.Y. 
UMES, June 25, 1997,atA7. 
131. See Neil A. Lewis, Citing Flaws, Health Panel Rejects Deal on Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES, June 
26, 1997, at D26 (reporting that a panel of leading public health experts established to advise Con-
gress on the proposed tobacco settlement claimed the proposed penalties were far too small to have an 
impact). 
132. See Diamond, supra note I, at 10,254; John T. Scholz, Voluntary Compliance and Regula-
tory Enforcement, 6 L. & POL'y 385, 390-92 (1984) [hereinafter Scholz, Voluntary Compliance] 
(arguing net social benefits wiII be higher if enforcement and compliance costs are minimized through 
cooperation between agencies and regulated entities). 
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Many critics note that government agencies lack the resources neces-
sary to enforce environmental law according to the traditional model. The 
traditional model requires agencies to monitor and detect violations, in-
spect facilities, and timely and appropriately respond to each observed 
violation. Responses range from informal warnings to civil or administra-
tive penalty actions. This is a highly resource-intensive approach. By 
contrast, a system that places greater reliance on self-policing and self-
enforcement would allow a government to concentrate its limited re-
sources on the most serious instances of noncompliance.133 It would also 
allow increased government spending on outreach and education efforts 
that commentators suggest can reach a larger audience and educate regu-
lated entities at a lower cost to enforcement agencies.134 
One such critic, political scientist John Scholz, contends that a game 
theory model of enforcement also demonstrates the superior efficiency of a 
cooperative approach, and that the standard deterrence model fails to ac-
count for the strategic interactions that occur between regulated firms and 
enforcement agencies. 135 Based on this model, he claims that whenever an 
agency adopts a strict deterrence approach, firms are better off evading the 
law rather than complying. Scholz argues that agencies will expend re-
sources pursuing insignificant violations; firms will be required to achieve 
compliance in one prescribed manner. A cooperative approach, in which 
regulators overlook minor violations in recognition of efforts to do more 
than the law requires, avoids these inefficiencies. Firms can comply with 
regulations in a more cost-effective way, while agencies can conserve 
scarce enforcement resources. 136 
133. Thus, the New Jersey legislature concluded that 
[e]xpanding the use of grace (compliance) periods will promote compliance by allowing 
those members of the regulated community who are committed to working diligently and 
cooperatively toward compliance, to invest private capital in pollution control equipment 
and other measures which will yield long-term environmental benefits, instead of in costly 
litigation and the payment of punitive monetary sanctions .... [T]his will enable the 
[Department] to more sharply focus limited public resources on serious violations of envi-
ronmental law. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:ID-125 (\Vest 1995). See also Michael, supra note 40, at 554. 
134. See Diamond, supra note I, at 10,254. 
135. See Scholz, Voluntary Compliance, supra note 132. Broadly speaking, game theory is a 
branch of economic theory holding that, in markets consisting of just a few participants, the behavior 
of a participant is explained by how she believes other participants will react to her actions rather than 
by standard economic assumptions. See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is 
There a "Race" and Is It "To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 299-300 (1997) (quoting sources). 
The teachings of game theory have been extended to other situations where participants interact stra-
tegically so that each participant's action is influenced by the anticipated reaction of others to her own 
measures. 
136. In Scholz's view, cooperation is not an altruistic strategy but one which helps both regu-
lated entities and enforcers maximize their utility over the long term. The contingent nature of en-
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It is certainly true that government resources are constrained, forcing 
the government to depend to a considerable degree on the self-policing ef-
forts of firms. Indeed, enforcement agencies have never had sufficient 
staff to inspect more than a fraction of regulated facilities nor the resources 
to pursue more than a small percentage of violations in court or through 
the administrative hearing process. 137 From 1979 to 1994, for example, 
the EPA's budget remained frozen, despite the passage of numerous new 
statutes.138 The problem recently has become even more severe as budget 
battles have caused sharp reductions in the EPA's enforcement budget,139 
while the universe of regulated facilities has become larger and more dis-
persed.140 
forcement, however, results in a type of prisoners' dilemma when a cooperative strategy is used. 
Firms will be tempted to cheat to avoid compliance costs, since instances of noncompliance arc less 
likely to be detected in a cooperative scheme. Conversely, agencies uncertain that all finns arc com-
plying are tempted to retreat from cooperation because deterrence-based enforcement is more likely to 
detect noncompliance. Firms then have no guarantee that if they act exceptionally and do morc than 
the law requires, the agency still will not enforce the law strictly against them. The result is that, 
while mutual cooperation is in the long-tenn iuterest of both sides, it is unlikely to occur in a single 
encounter because of the short-tenn temptation to cheat. Thus, agencies arc always safer in choosing 
deterrence, and firms are safer in choosing to cheat. Scholz suggests a cooperative uTit for Tat" strat-
egy in which the agency sets a minimal level of compliance, uses less rigorous enforcement routines 
against firms that meet this level in the prior period, and reserves its more severe enforcement proce-
dures for firms that fail to meet these minimal compliance standards. To maximize the effectiveness 
of this approach, the agency should seek to maximize sanctions against violators, but also be willing 
to forgive rapidly when the firm decides to cooperate. See Scholz, Voluntary Compliance, sllpra note 
132, at 393. 
137. See E.S. Schaeffer, Encouraging Voluntary Compliance Withow Compromising Enforce-
ment: EPA's 1995 Auditing Policy, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, FOURTII INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 451, 453 (1996) [hereinafter 
FOURTIlINTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE] (indicating that u[b]y one estimate, at least 700,000 facilities 
are subject to one or more federal environmental laws, while the federal government and states to-
gether conduct fewer than 100,000 inspections per year"); HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 
62 (noting that EPA officials rely on a fiexible approach to enforcement because it does not have the 
fiscal or personnel resourees necessary to implement a strict enforcement approach, which would re-
quire a radical increase in the number of enforcement personnel). 
138. See Robert I. Van Heuvelen & Peter J. Fontaine, Planning and Executing Strategic Envi-
ronmental Enforcement 1nitiatives: Maximizing Enforcement 1mpact, in THIRD INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE, supra note 116, at 309,310; Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire, 
Aim: A New Framework to Link Environmental Targets in Environmental Law, 85 Ky. LJ. 803, 912 
(1997). 
139. See Silecchia, supra note 65, at 622 & n.l24 (documenting how EPA enforcement re-
sources have been greatly constrained). 
140. Federal and state environmental statutes 
have swept increasingly more, and increasingly smaller, entities into the net of liability .... 
In short, the original view that environmental degradation could be solved by changing the 
behavior of a few, easily identified and large-volume polluters has given way to a new per-
ception that the universe of culprits is substantially more diffuse and atomistic. 
Welks, supra note 9, at 3-4 (citations omitted). 
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A cooperative approach, however, mayor may not save agencies 
money, depending on its structure.141 Agencies will be spared some of the 
costs of monitoring, detecting, and proving violations, which will shift to 
private corporations. On the other hand, agencies will have to devote 
considerably more resources to providing technical advice and cooperative 
assistance to regulated facilities. In addition, the government oversight of 
regulated firms in a cooperative scheme may be just as costly as the tradi-
tional inspection model it is replacing. For example, inspectors in 
Cal/OSHA's Cooperative Compliance Program stopped most routine 
compliance inspections and were assigned to assist the joint labor-
management safety committee in improving safety at construction sites. 
This new role for OSHA staff was expensive as inspectors spent up to ten 
times more time inspecting these sites than they did at other facilities. 142 
Likewise, as the General Accounting Office recently reported, measuring 
the results of cooperative enforcement strategies can be quite expensive.143 
The fact that agencies will never have sufficient resources to ade-
quately monitor, detect, remedy, and sanction all instances of noncompli-
ance does not necessarily mean that an overhaul of the current system is 
the answer. Limited resources may suggest that any actions brought 
should have the most widespread deterrent effect, such as by generating 
the maximum penalties. They also suggest the need for enforcement ac-
tivities to be strategically targeted. Others cite the lack of adequate agency 
resources as demonstrating not the wisdom of greater self-regulation but 
the need for more vigorous private enforcement of environmental laws. 
Scholz's game theory model suffers from a number of flaws. First, it 
posits a model of deterrence-based enforcement in which enforcement 
agencies lack discretion, each violation is met with maximum enforce-
ment, and all firms are treated randomly. Such a model is greatly over-
The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, for example, reports that small businesses col-
lectively add up to a major source of poIIution, but the agency lacks enforcement staff and resources 
to force them to comply. See Small Businesses Encouraged to Make "Clean Break" with Polluting 
Practices, 4 ILL. ENVTL. L. LETIER, May 1995, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, AIInws File. 
141. See Wasserman, supra note 32, at 40 ("[W]e do not have a good feel for the impact or cost-
effectiveness of the various types of enforcement responses."). 
142. See REEs, supra note 63, at 234. See also BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 50, at 160 
(suggesting that a flexible enforcement approach requires time, knowledge, and money); Welks, supra 
note 9, at 32 (noting that compliance-assistance programs are resource intensive). Welks, who exam-
ined the Illinois Clean Break Program, found that the agency stiII may have to spend substantial re-
sources on enforcement because one-third of the original participants remained out of compliance. 
See Welks, supra note 9, at 32. Welks concluded that "[e]ven with carefuIIy controIIed studies, which 
do not presently exist, it may be impossible to gauge whether small business programs like Clean 
Break realize a greater compliance return on resource investments." Id. 
143. See GAO, EFFORTS TO Focus ON REsULTS, supra note 8, at 39. 
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simplified, and in practice, minor infractions are frequently overlooked or 
met with minimal response.l44 Second, it assumes that as a trade-off for 
overlooking minor violations, firms take steps to reduce even greater haz-
ards not addressed by the law or to comply more efficiently. But firms 
that deviate from strict compliance may not be doing more in other areas; 
they may simply be skirting the law. Third, the model downplays the con-
cern that a cooperative approach will lead to agency capture by regulated 
entities.145 Lastly, the critique that cooperative enforcement leads to more 
cost-effective compliance strategies by firms is in many ways an argument 
for greater flexibility in the underlying, substantive environmental stan-
dards, not pliancy in how these standards are enforced. These issues are 
distinct, and it is important for them to be treated as such so that they can 
rise and fallon their own merits.146 
E. SOCIETY' S AMBIVALENCE TOWARD POLLUTION 
Another important argument for a nonadversarial enforcement ap-
proach, developed in detail by Keith Hawkins, is that society has ambiva-
lent attitudes toward polluting activity. This ambivalence is due in part to 
the fact that most pollution results from otherwise productive, economi-
cally desirable activity that contributes to the material well-being of soci-
ety.147 Thus, "the [typical] conduct prohibited by economic regulatory 
laws is not immediately distinguishable from modes of business behavior 
that are not only socially acceptable, but affirmatively desirable in an 
economy founded upon an ideology ... of free enterprise and the profit 
motive.,,148 
Second, the lines between what is or is not permitted by environ-
mental regulation are often only a matter of degree and are not intuitively 
obvious. Pollution frequently falls in the category of conduct that is ma-
lum prohibitum rather than malum se-conduct that is illegal because it is 
proscribed by law, not because it is morally reprehensible. 149 
144. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text. 
145. See infra Part IV.B.!. 
146. The difference is reflected, for example, in the distinction between (I) the EPA's Environ-
mental Excellence and Leadership (XL) initiative, which gives facilities discretion to vary from some 
environmental standards in exchange for realizing environmental improvements in other areas, and (2) 
its Environmental Leadership Program, which encourages innovative approaches to achieving compli-
ance. See discussion infra Part V.E. 
147. See HAWKINS, supra note 93, at 10-13, 203. See also REES, supra note 63, at 178. 
148. Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions ill Ellforcing Eco-
nomic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 423, 436 (1963). 
149. See HAWKINS, supra note 93, at 10-13,203. Hawkins also notes that societal ambivalence 
about environmental enforcement exists because environmental regulation is relatively new, regulat-
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Analyzing societal attitudes toward pollution-generating activity and 
pollution is a complex undertaking, and a subject well beyond the scope of 
this Article. While much of the underlying activity that generates pollu-
tion is socially beneficial, it is an oversimplification to argue that the pub-
lic therefore is ambivalent about the resulting pollution or about enforcing 
pollution control requirements. Rather, much of the public apparently 
wants economic activity to proceed so long as it accommodates environ-
mental concerns. Thus, solid majorities of the public (sixty-three percent 
in 1996) consistently say that environmental protection and economic de-
velopment can go hand in hand. Where a conflict between the environ-
ment and development is unavoidable, the public favors protecting the en-
vironment by a three-to-one ratio, sixty-three percent to twenty-one 
percent. ISO These findings suggest that public attitudes are more complex 
than Hawkins indicates, and that the public's desire to protect economic 
activity may not greatly temper its concomitant wish to sanction pollution 
resulting from that activity, regardless of whether in fact these two desires 
are incompatible. 
Hawkins also overstates matters by suggesting that the public clearly 
distinguishes unlawful pollution from other inherently evil conduct. For 
some segments of the population, protection of the environment has a de-
cidedly moral character, and pollution, even that which results from eco-
nomically desirable activity, is morally wrong. As Mark Sagoff explains, 
"Americans have moral convictions about the environment that have 
nothing to do with economic 'common sense."'ISI Thus, the public may 
ing behavior that for decades or centuries has been pennissible or even encouraged, and because the 
harms associated with regulatory violations are more amorphous and delayed than those resulting 
from other laws. The relative "newness" of environmental law, however, does not justify relaxing 
enforcement. As with any area of law, environmental requirements have changed in response to per-
ceived changes in social conditions, and businesses must adapt to these changes. In any event, mod-
ern environmental law is no longer novel, having been introduced 25 years ago. Likewise, the de-
layed nature of environmental harms is not a reason to enforce environmental requirements less 
rigorously. In fact, because it is more difficult to win tort actions for such harms, environmental re-
quirements arguably should be enforced even more strictly. 
150. See NATIONAL ENVTL. EDUC. AND TRAINING FOUND., REPORT CARD: ENVIRONMENTAL 
ATTITUDES AND KNOWLEDGE IN AMERICA 10-14 (1996). A plurality of Americans (45%) believe that 
environmental laws generally have not gone far enough, and substantial majorities believe this to be 
true with respect to water pollution (73%) and air pollution (64%). See id. at 31-33. See also John H. 
Cushman, Public Backs Tough Steps for a Treaty on Wanning, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1997, at A36 
(reporting that 6 I % of Americans favor protecting the environment even if it costs jobs in their com-
munity, and 57% believe environmental improvements must be made regardless of costs); EVERETT C. 
LADD & KARLYN H. BOWMAN, ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ENVIRONMENT-TwENTY-FlVE YEARS 
AFI"EREARTHDAY 7-8, 20-23 (1995). 
151. Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1393, 1398 
(1981). 
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believe that companies are morally blameworthy for conduct such as 
skimping on compliance expenditures to increase profits, exposing indi-
viduals to avoidable risks, using unknown chemicals, burdening commu-
nities that do not benefit from the polluting activity, and so forth. Such 
moral judgments may be derived from the deeply held values that some 
scholars suggest underlie much of the public's support for environmental 
protection.152 These values include religious and spiritual values, concern 
for the preservation of a healthy environment for future generations, and 
fidelity to the idea that nature has rights and deserves justice.153 Clearly, 
societal attitudes about polluting activity are not sufficiently ambivalent to 
justify treating violations of environmental requirements differently than 
other unlawful conduct. 
F. THE FIXATION ON BEAN COUNTING 
Critics charge that the current system results in a preoccupation with 
numerical indicators: counting the number of inspections carried out, 
complaints filed, criminal convictions obtained, and the size of penalties 
collected. They contend that this focus is inherent in a deterrence-based 
enforcement system because deterrence theory holds that the best way to 
promote compliance is to enforce the law. Thus, all enforcement activities 
are seen as contributing to the effectiveness of the deterrent threat; more 
actions mean more deterrence, and larger penalties have a more powerful 
deterrent impact than weaker sanctions. 
According to the critics, bean counting fails to accurately measure the 
success of enforcement efforts. They maintain that "a focus on enforce-
ment statistics measures the number of problems encountered, not avoided. 
Each violation and resulting case is a failure to achieve the goal of elimi-
nating harms to human health and the environment.,,154 Moreover, critics 
argue, bean counting distorts the priorities of enforcement agencies, which 
152. See WIllET KEMPTON, JAMES S. BOSTER & JENNIFER A. HARTLEY, ENVIRONMENTAL 
VALUES IN AMERICAN CULTURE 87-115 (1996). The authors found that most Americans share a 
common set of environmental beliefs and values (in favor of environmental protection) and that there 
was no coherent or consistent "anti-environmental position." [d. at 211-12. 
153. See id. 
154. Hawkins, supra note 5, at 46. Virginia Wetherell, secretary of the Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection, warns that stressing the "beans" risks losing focus on the real concern of 
environmental quality: 
People assume that a drop in penalty orders means a state has gone soft on polluters. But 
how can one make that assumption without information on compliance rates? ... If we don't 
move beyond the beans, we will miss what is really important: the quality of our environ-
ment. 
Virginia Wetherell, Counting Results, ENVTL. F., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 21,26. 
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concentrate as a result on concluding a greater number of easy-to-prove 
but insignificant infractions (inflating their numerical indicators) rather 
than on more threatening but time-consuming violations. ISS 
Few are satisfied with or interested in defending bean counting as the 
sole means of measuring the effectiveness of an enforcement program.156 
Few also would disagree that an excessive focus on bean counting has at 
times skewed agency activities. Indeed, the EPA, which until very re-
cently relied almost exclusively on numerical indicators to evaluate its 
program, has acknowledged that it needs to go beyond these traditional 
measures, and has been involved in a major effort to develop and imple-
ment an enhanced set of performance measures for its enforcement pro-
gram.157 The more fundamental question is whether a bean counting ap-
proach is inevitable with deterrence-oriented enforcement. The answer is 
no. Bean counting has been relied upon because it is much more conven-
ient than tackling the difficult problems of measuring compliance and en-
vironmental outcomes,158 and because it makes it far easier to evaluate the 
performance of enforcement personnel,159 not because it represents the 
ends of enforcement activity. Indeed, compliance-based enforcement 
could easily fall into the identical trap of using the number of consultations 
or advice visits carried out to evaluate the success of the program. One 
advocate of compliance-based approaches, for instance, calls for EPA to 
substitute counting the number of training sessions and compliance-
ISS. Colin Diver points out that using the volume of citations as a measure of performance 
will induce inspectors to concentrate, in their selection of targets to inspect, evidence to ex-
amine, and conditions to report, on readily identifiable violations at the cost of less obvious 
violations. Since readily observable violations are more amenable to self-policing and very 
frequently less serious in nature, this tendency will produce suboptimal performance. 
Diver, supra note 16, at 296. 
156. See ENFORCEMENT FOUR-YEAR STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 12, at 6; Stahl, Enforcement 
in Transition, supra note 3, at 19 (counting activities "reveals little, if anything about the actual state 
of compliance or even the actual impact of enforcement actions, much less the state of the environ-
ment"). 
157. The project is known as EPA's National Performance Measures Strategy. See Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Notice of Public Meeting on the National Performance Measures Strategy 
for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, FRL-569 1-9, 62 Fed. Reg. 8014 (Feb. 21, 1997) 
(announcing and describing the project). The EPA has issued a draft report summarizing its conclu-
sions. See generally DRAFT REpORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES STRATEGY, supra 
note 97. 
158. "Outputs, by their nature, are inherently easier to measure, report, and understand than out-
comes and environmental results." GAO, EFFORTS TO Focus ON RESULTS, supra note 8, at 33. 
159. See David W. Ronald, The Role of the CEC in Balancing Free Trade with Environmental 
Protection, 12 NAT'L ENV1L. ENFORCEMENT J. 3, 6 (1997) ("Measuring effective enforcement and 
levels of environmental protection has bedeviled environmental regulators in the United States for 
years .... "). Accord SPARROW, supra note 3, at 144 (suggesting it is much easier to evaluate em-
ployee performance when the measure of success is enforcement outputs rather than results). 
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assistance inspections conducted for its traditional enforcement outputs.160 
The bottom line in both systems is achieving compliance and better envi-
ronmental outcomes; beans are counted as a very imperfect proxy for those 
results. If better measures are developed to evaluate performance, there 
will be less focus on inflating beans and more emphasis on those activities 
that clearly lead to greater compliance and improved environmental qual-
ity. 
G. SUMMARY 
As the above discussion illustrates, the critiques of traditional envi-
ronmental enforcement advance a number of legitimate points. The criti-
cisms do not, however, justify a radical altering of traditional enforcement, 
nor do they demonstrate that a primarily or exclusively cooperative-
oriented scheme is a superior way to improve compliance with our nation's 
environmental laws. 
IV. THE BENEFITS OF DETERRENCE-BASED ENFORCEMENT 
While the rush to dismantle traditional environmental enforcement 
may seem a welcome shift in some sectors, a heavy axe approach is short-
sighted and detrimental to the country's long-term interest in effective en-
vironmental enforcement. A deterrence-based system contains many 
positive attributes that are essential to an effective system of enforcement. 
First, strong enforcement serves an important expressive function. Sec-
ond, deterrence-based enforcement better guards against agency "capture" 
by regulated entities and ensures more consistent treatment of regulated 
facilities. Finally, and most fundamentally, a deterrence-based system 
provides a strong and credible threat of vigorous enforcement that is 
needed for widespread voluntary compliance. This includes a strong sys-
tem of citizen enforcement to supplement goverument enforcement efforts. 
A. THE EXPRESSIVE FuNCTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 
Environmental regulation, like other areas of law, serves important 
expressive functions. The underlying notion is that when the government 
acts, it conveys ideas and attitudes in addition to the tangible consequences 
160. See Diamond, supra note I, at 10,255. An audit of 10 states by the GAO recently found 
that most compliance-assistance programs were assessed on the basis of outputs, such as the number 
of facilities participating in a program or the number of workshops conducted, rather than on results. 
See GAO, EFFORTS TO Focus ON RESULTS, supra note 8, at 6. 
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resulting from its action. 161 As Professors Richard Pildes and Richard Ni-
emi explain: "Actions of all sorts-public and private, collective and in-
dividual-express certain values as well as bring about certain conse-
quences. Actions both 'do' something and 'mean' something; at the same 
time that they bring about certain consequences, they also express some set 
of values and normative attitudes."162 
The meaning of the government's action can thus be as important as 
what the government actually does.163 Moreover, when the government 
acts, it does not merely reflect what it interprets as the collective public 
understanding about the values underlying certain areas of law; it also 
"shapes and reconstitutes them."l64 
Thus, when the government enforces the law, it gives voice to the 
public's desire to regulate and sanction undesirable behavior. Criminal 
law most forcefully expresses collective moral values by conveying con-
demnation and shame about unlawful activity .165 But civil sanctions also 
give symbolic representation to moral values. These sanctions can be 
punitive in character, they can convey moral outrage, and they can result in 
significant negative publicity and its attendant negative consequences for 
violators. 
The current debate over the future of environmental enforcement, 
with its emphasis on the efficiency and relative efficacy of various ap-
proaches, obscures the important expressive values served by deterrence-
based enforcement. Deterrence-based enforcement, with its reliance on 
sanctions and enforcement orders, conveys a set of meanings about envi-
ronmental violations that is very different from that communicated by a 
cooperative-oriented approach, with its emphasis on negotiation and con-
ciliation. The message imparted by deterrence reaffirms for the public that 
161. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Hanns. "Bizarre Districts," and 
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483, 
506-07 (1993); Richard H. Pi1des, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy: A Com-
ment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REV. 936, 938 (1991) (explaining that in addition to direct con-
sequences, public policy has significant impacts on social understandings, nonns, and meanings). 
162. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 161, at 511 (citation omitted). 
163. See id. at 507. 
164. Id. ("Governmental actions can express-and therefore perhaps sustain-a reaffinnation or 
a rejection of these nonns"). Professor Cass Sunstein explains that 
[a] society might identify the kind of valuation to which it is committed and insist on that 
kind, even if the consequences of the insistence are obscure or unknown. A soeiety might, 
for example, insist on an antidiscrimination law for expressive reasons even if it does not 
know whether the law actually helps members of minority groups. 
Cass R. Sunstein. Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779,823 (1994). 
165. See Susan Hedman, Expressive Functions of Criminal Sanctions in Environmental Law, 59 
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 889, 896 (1991); Cohen, supra note 18, at 1060. 
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environmental statutes are important and that transgressions are to be taken 
very seriously. This message is consistent with the public's expressed 
strong disapproval of noncompliance with environmental requirements-a 
desire evidenced by the harsh sweeping penalties for noncompliance and 
the potent enforcement tools contained in all of the major environmental 
statutes. 
B. THE DANGERS OF AGENCY CAPTURE AND INCONSISTENT TREATMENT 
1. Agency Capture 
A fundamental tenet of a cooperative-based system is that regulators 
work closely and in alliance with regulated facilities; they act more as edu-
cators and consultants than inspectors or punishers, seeking to solve prob-
lems jointly and bring facilities into compliance. While this approach can 
be highly beneficial, it raises an important countervailing concern: Regula-
tors who become so cozy and closely identified with regulated entities will 
overlook important violations and bend over too far in the direction of le-
nient treatment. In short, the agency staff will be captured by those they 
are ostensibly regulating.166 
The concern with agency capture is certainly not novel,167 and agen-
cies have often sought to deal with it by limiting the discretion and flexi-
bility of agency staff.168 But eliminating agency flexibility has its own se-
rious drawbacks, such as forcing regulators to sometimes punish trivial 
violations or act unreasonably, and in tum provoking resentment on the 
part of regulated entities.169 Other approaches may hold more promise, 
166. See Welles, supra note 9, at 33 (stating that the cooperative-based approach is vulnerable to 
capture because it "reserves enforcement authority for certain circumstances about whose existence 
reasonable people could (and may be forced to) disagree"). 
167. See MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 90, 
270-71 (1955). Welles describes the regulators' concern to maintain objectivity or the appearance of 
objectivity as follows: 
Regulators have generally felt it essential that they avoid the perception, or the reality, that 
they are so closely affiliated with a facility or company that they have lost the ability to re-
spond impartially and in a manner consistent with the treatment of other facilities. This un-
healthy closeness can occur on the personal level of an inspector who is too identified with a 
facility or on the institutional level, as when an agency appears to endorse the actions of a 
facility. 
Welles, supra note 9, at 12. 
168. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 50, at 44-46 (citing concern with agency capture as the 
primary motivation for legislation that limited discretion of regulatory enforcement officials). 
169. See id. Professors Bardach and Kagan conclude that concerns of potential capture are out-
weighed by the importance of providing regulators with the additional flexibility necessary to avoid 
regulatory unreasonableness. They offer a number of administrative management recommendations 
for keeping regulatory discretion in check. See id. 
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such as having separate inspectors carry out the more "cooperative" 
(advice and consultation) functions of regulatory agencies as opposed to 
the agencies' traditional inspection and enforcement activities. Some re-
cently developed state compliance-assistance programs are structured this 
way po Another thoughtful solution suggested by Professors Ayres and 
Braithwaite is a republican form of tripartism in which relevant public in-
terest groups become the third player in the game traditionally played be-
tween regulators and regulated entities only. These public interest groups 
would have the power to sanction regulators who fail to punish noncom-
pliance by firms, access to all information available to regulators, a seat at 
the negotiating table with regulators and firms, and the same standing as 
regulatory agencies to bring enforcement actions. l7l 
2. Inconsistent Treatment 
One of the most desired features of any enforcement system is consis-
tency-similarly situated enterprises should be treated consistently. Such 
consistency is essential to ensuring the credibility of an enforcement pro-
gram and widespread voluntary compliance.172 An oft-quoted and saga-
cious maxim of enforcement practice coined by Chester Bowles, a member 
of the 1941 wartime Office of Price Administration, holds that "20 per-
cent of the regulated population will automatically comply with any 
regulation, 5 percent will attempt to evade it, and the remaining 75 
percent will comply as long as they think that the 5 percent will be 
caught and punished.,,173 
In environmental law, consistent treatment is particularly crucial so 
that regulated entities believe they are competing on a level playing field. 
Thus, 
[l]aws such as the [Clean Air Act] often require facilities to make large 
investments in pollution-control equipment. These investments can be 
large enough that they may materially affect decisions concerning the 
construction of new facilities; the sale or purchase of businesses; the de-
cision to continue or discontinue a line of business; the competitive po-
sition of a company within an industry; and so on .... If, however, only 
some companies within an industry are permitted to evade such control 
170. See infra note 231 and accompanying text. 
171. Professors Ayres and Braithwaite further propose that the right to participate as a public 
interest guardian should be contestable among public interest organizations in a market created for this 
purpose. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 34, at 54-60. 
172. See DIMENTO, supra note 10 I, at 100-02. 
173. BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 50, at 65-66 (quoting CHESTER BOWLES, PROMISES TO 
KEEp: My YEARS IN PUBLIC LIFE 1941-1969,25 (1971)). 
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requirements, ... the evaders can unfairly obtain an advantage over their 
competitors, who will in response quickly resist making continued or 
additional pollution control investments themselves. 174 
As a recent study concludes, many firms have invested heavily in 
meeting strict standards and want their competitors to be forced to do the 
same.175 They worry that inadequate enforcement can lead to a competi-
tive disadvantage for firms that comply. 176 
To be sure, under the current system there is substantial variability in 
the way regulated entities are treated, since many inspectors take a prag-
matic approach to enforcement, and since different EPA regional offices 
and the states respond differently to similarly situated violators. 177 But in 
a truly cooperative regime in which all compliance and enforcement issues 
are open to negotiations, there is a much greater likelihood that firms will 
be treated differently by individual inspectors.178 Moreover, the percep-
tion of disparate treatment is likely to increase considerably without uni-
form policies governing enforcement, thus undermining the extent of vol-
untary compliance. 
174. Van Cleve & Holman, supra note 13, at 10,157. See also ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEcrJON 
AGENCY, OmCE OF INSPEcrOR GEN., FuRTHER IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
RCRA CIVIL PENALTIES 6 (1997) [hereinafter EPA, FuRTHER IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED] ("Managing 
hazardous waste in accordance with regulations can be expensive. Therefore, facilities may have a 
strong economic incentive to violate regulations. As a result, without effective enforcemcnt, facilities 
in compliance may be vulnerable to competitors who avoid the high costs of compliance."). 
175. See NATIONAL ACADEMY, supra note 49, at 25. 
176. See Government Has Too Many Rules, Too Little Enforcement, Not Enough Prevention, 
Environmental Managers Report in BNA Survey, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2386, 2387 (Feb. 14, 1992). 
See also White, supra note 28, at 136-37 (noting that disparate treatment by regulatory agency bred 
resistance by facilities against compliance). 
177. See Letter from Joel A. Mintz, Professor, Nova Southeastern University, to author (Sept. 22, 
1997) (on file with author). 
178. See Downing, supra note 27, at 581-82, 584 (arguing that bargaining between regulatory 
sources and agencies about pollution control requirements undennines enforcement and compliance). 
Larger, more politically powerful sources are likely to obtain delays in compliance, lower levels of 
control, and a greatly diminished likelihood of penalty for noncompliance. See id. See also MINTZ, 
supra note 23, at 104 (suggesting that varying types of enforcement can lead to inconsistent treatment 
by regulatory officials); Breger, supra note 3, at 336 ("The difference between two hypothetical set-
tlement agreements may depend as much upon the attitude of the EPA negotiator or the persuasive 
ability of industry officials as on the objective characteristics of each site. The danger, then, is that 
flexibility could mean relaxed standards rather than adapting compliance to circumstances.") (citations 
omitted). 
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C. A STRONG, CREDIBLE THREAT OF ENFORCEMENT 
Environmental enforcement, like other areas of regulatory enforce-
ment, is highly "leveraged."179 Because regulators lack the resources to 
systematically inspect and monitor every entity, their enforcement actions 
must provide a big bang for their buck. The actions must send a credible 
signal to other regulated entities that their noncompliance will also result 
in meaningful and certain penalties, including recovery of any economic 
gain realized from noncompliance.180 Without this general deterrent ef-
fect, widespread voluntary compliance is unlikely. 181 
The perception of enforcement consequences is as important as the 
reality in achieving compliance. 182 Publicity about enforcement efforts 
can lead to enhanced compliance by increasing an individual or corpora-
tion's subjective belief about the likelihood of being caught.l83 As one 
EPA official relates: "The annals of military history are filled with stories 
of military battles won where few in number created an effective image of 
a formidable fighting force, thereby successfully competing against snpe-
179. See Hodas, supra note Ill, at 1609. 
180. See EPA, FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED, supra note 174, at 10. The significant eco-
nomic benefits a facility can reap from some violations may result in a facility paying a sizable pen-
alty without paying back "the full economic benefit it gained from noncompliance." Id. The penalty 
in such a case would be ineffective because the facility would have no incentive to comply since it 
"would be better off economically by remaining out of compliance." Id. Thus, "[r]ecovering eco-
nomic benefit is essential to deter facilities from violating regulations." Id. 
181. See HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 60 (noting that EPA inspectors report that 
"without the ..• deterrence [provided by EPA enforcement and the threat of citizen suits] many per-
mittees would clearly violate the law"); Promoting Voluntary Compliance: Environmental Auditing, 
Outreach, Incentive Programs, in FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 137, at 399, 400 
(noting agreement of participants at an international environmental enforcement conference that "there 
[will be no] such thing as voluntary compliance without regulation or requirements with which all 
must comply"). See generally Diver, supra note 16, at 297 ("Enforcement is necessary not only to 
control the aberrant lawbreaker, but also to defend the legitimacy of governmental intervention that 
sustains voluntary compliance. This is particularly true of the typical business regulation, which can-
not readily be identified with widely held moral values."). 
182. See Michael, supra note 40, at 548; Wasserman, supra note 32, at 25-26. 
183. In one experiment, regulators in the Netherlands wamed drivers through media announce-
ments in advance that there would be speed traps on certain highways. The drivers were subsequently 
much better about observing speed limits on the affected stretches of highways. See J.C.M. Veenman, 
The Role of Communication for Implementing Enforcement Policy, in THIRD INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE, supra note 116, at 295. Other research shows that public education campaigns about 
drunk driving decrease the rate of drunk driving (albeit temporarily) even though they have little or no 
infiuence on the likelihood that a person will be punished. Researchers suggest this occurs because 
the publicity campaigns lead citizens to overestimate the probability of being caught and punished. 
See TYLER, supra note 17, at 22-23. 
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rior forces. So must enforcement actions, including inspections, be well 
placed and well publicized for maximum impact.,,184 
A fundamental problem with relying primarily on cooperative en-
forcement is that it threatens to significantly weaken the general deterrent 
effect of individual enforcement actions. Punitive enforcement may re-
main as a backstop for noncompliance, but it is likely to be used far less 
frequently, which regnlated entities will understand. The public message 
will be that noncompliance is far more likely to be met with conciliation 
than sanctions, at least for most first-time violations. Experience has dem-
onstrated that efforts to promote compliance are often ineffective alone. 18S 
Moreover, having the opportunity to remedy noncompliance without the 
threat of penalty greatly reduces the incentive to comply. As one analyst 
explains: 
[I]t is now generally recognized that if the polluter expects no conse-
quence from noncompliance (except having to meet with government 
officials to agree to do what was required in the first place), he has little 
incentive to undertake any costs of compliance before getting caught. 
This has proven to be true even when it is broadly understood that clean-
up costs will increase substantially if violations are not corrected early 
and where actual cost savings from compliance activities has been real-
ized.186 
Likewise, the General Accounting Office has concluded that penalties 
playa key role in environmental enforcement by deterring violators and 
by ensuring that regulated entities are treated fairly and consistently so 
184. Cheryl E. Wassennan, An Overview of Compliance and Enforcement in the United States: 
Philosophy, Strategies and Management Tools, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, FIRST INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 7, 10 (1990). 
185. See Cheryl E. Wassennan, The Principles of Environmental Enforcement and Beyond: 
Building Institutional Capacity, in THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 116, at 15, 29; 
Wesley A. Magat & W. Kip Viscusi, Effectiveness of the EPA's Regulatory Enforcement: The Case of 
Industrial Effluent Standards, 33 J.L. & ECON. 331, 343 n.20 (1990) (observiug that in a well-
functioning regulatory system, it is not necessary for an agency to issue fines frequently, but rather 
only for firms to believe they will be sanctioned if they fail to comply). 
186. Wassennan, supra note 32, at 4041. See also RUSSEll.., ET AL., supra note 25, at 38-39 
(concluding that "it is not clear that voluntary compliance provides any compliance incentives until 
after a violation has bcen discovered because a plant knows that it will have a chance to return to 
compliance before sanctions are imposed," and noting that this is consistent with fragmentary evi-
dence that rates of continuing compliance with environmeutal requirements are only fair). The Su-
preme Court recognized the nced for sanctions to ensure compliance when it interpreted the Federal 
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act in National Independent Coal Operators' Ass'n v. KleplJe, 423 U.S. 
388 (1975). The Supreme Court noted that "the deterrence provided by monetary sanctions is essen-
tial" to acbieving the statutory objectives: "If a mine operator does not ... face a monetary penalty for 
violations, he has little iucentive to eliminate dangers until directed to do so by a mine inspector." 
National Indep. Coal Operators' Ass'n, 423 U.S. at 401. 
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that no one gains a competitive advantage .... [T]he Clean Water Act 
and other environmental statutes have been violated repeatedly when 
penalties have not been applied.187 
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On the other hand, enforcement without the threat of meaningful 
sanctions often directly translates into noncompliance. Absent a targeted 
enforcement effort against municipal dischargers in the 1980s, for in-
stance, the great majority of municipal facilities violated the Clean Water 
Act. 188 A study of enforcement of underground fuel tank laws in northern 
California found that the conciliatory style of the local agency failed to 
bring most regulated facilities into compliance.189 In Virginia, the legisla-
tive auditor recently concluded that lackadaisical enforcement by state 
regulators resulted in serious noncompliers thumbing their noses at regula-
tory requirements. 190 In one highly publicized instance where Virginia of-
ficials failed to assess sanctions against a recurrent violator, the U.S. Jus-
tice Department eventually filed criminal and civil actions against a 
company that committed more than 5,000 violations of its discharge 
permit from 1991 to 1996. These violations contributed to the closure of 
shellfish harvesting in the Pagan River in Virginia. 191 Most recently, envi-
187. GAO. WATERPOLLunON: ENFORCEMENT ATIENTION. supra note 108. at 12-13. See also 
DIMENTO. supra note 101. at 110-121 (arguing that enforcement activity perceived as equitable. im-
minent, continuous. consistent, and carried out in a professional manner is likely to result in greater 
compliance by regulated entities). 
188. See GAO. WATER POLLunON: IMPROVED MONITORING. supra note 107. at 4 (describing 
high levels of noncompliance by industrial users with discharge limits to sewage treatment plants and 
concluding that "GAO's review suggests that the absence of aggressive enforcement by treatment 
plants against violators may be an important underlying cause for discharge limit violations"). Anec-
dotal evidence also suggests that during the mid- and late 1990s. in the absence of meaningful en-
forcement efforts. there has been widespread noncompliance with the Clean Water Act's industrial 
stonn water discharge requirements. at least in California. See Telephone Interview with Laurie 
Kermish. Assistant Regional Counsel. Region IX. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Dec. 18. 
1997). 
189. See White. supra note 28. at 112-13.117. Of the more than 1.000 instances of unauthorized 
releases from underground fuel tank (lIFT) sites between 1985 and 1990 in Alameda County, Cali-
fornia, the agency failed to take enforcement action at 834 sites. See id. at 113. Of these 834 sites, 
726 had not taken any voluntary steps to remediate the release four to nine years after its occurrence. 
See id. The agency determined that the spill had affected or threatened groundwater in 512 of the un-
remediated releases. See id. at 112-13. The author of this study explained that because of the lack of 
enforcement, 
a rational UFf owner or operator will make only token efforts to comply. They have no in-
centive to pursue costly remediation knowing that the most a [local] regulator will do is is-
sue a fonnalletter requesting a preferred course of action ... with no follow-up or subs tan-
tiallikelihood of further enforcement action. 
/d. at 145. 
190. See Nakashima, supra note 10, at AI. 
191. See Hearings on the Relationship Between Federal and State Governments, supra note 2, at 
67-68 (prepared statement of Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natural 
Resources Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice). Another high-profile instance in which weak sanctions 
1228 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1181 
ronmental groups have assembled considerable anecdotal evidence sug-
gesting that weak enforcement and a shift to compliance-assistance activi-
ties by state agencies have contributed to significant rates of industry non-
compliance. 192 
Strong enforcement strengthens the internal regulatory systems of 
many companies, and it provides credibility and resources to internal com-
pany compliance officers.193 Thus, the EPA has concluded that its en-
forcement efforts contributed to the recent dramatic expansion in environ-
mental aUditing. More than ninety percent of corporate respondents in one 
survey, for example, reported that they conducted audits at least in part to 
find and correct violations before agency inspectors discovered them.194 
Another recent EPA study found that environmental enforcement actions 
were among the most important factors in getting businesses to consider 
environmental issues in the performance of their duties.195 State officials 
reported similar findings. 196 
failed to deter a company involves Fancy Cut! Farms, Inc., a lettuce company in Hollister, California, 
whose contaminated produce may have caused more than 60 cases of serious food poisoning in 1996. 
State health officials failed to fine or shut down the company, despite repeated inspections showing 
violations of state food safety laws, based on its policy of trying to work cooperatively with industry. 
As a result, the company failed to correct the violations, and the company's president cited the state's 
low-key approach as a reason for its slow response. See Pam Belluck & Christopher Drew, Tracillg 
Bout of Illness to Small Lettuce Farm, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1998, at AI. 
192. See Hearillgs all the Relatiollship Betweell Federal alld State Governmellts, sllpra note 2, at 
219-24 (prepared statement of Todd E. Robins). Robins cites a host of states in which the number of 
inspections conducted, enforcement actions taken, and penalties collected by environmental depart-
ments have declined noticeably in the mid-1990s. See id. at 220-23. At the same time, approximately 
20% of Clean Water Act permit holders were in significant noncompliance in 1995 and 1996. See 
DIRTY WATER SCOUNDRELS, supra note III. 
193. See REEs, sllpra note 63, at 225-27. See also Jeff Johnson, Ellforcemellt Cuts Hit by Corpo· 
rate Attorney, 30 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. NEWS, 1996, at 109A (quoting a corporate environmental at· 
torney who asserted that cutbacks in EPA enforcement will undermine corporate willingness to com· 
ply with environmental laws by diminishing the authority of a company's environmental health and 
safety officer). Some believe that, without the threat of a strong federal hand in enforcement, the in· 
ternal company compliance official's role would return to a lowly part of the corporate hierarchy and 
be staffed by a person "close to retirement, with no real power base in the organization, and no staff-
just window dressing." Id. 
194. See Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Vio-
lations, FRL-5400-1, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,707 (1995) [hereinafter Incentives for Self.Policing] 
(quoting 1995 Price-Waterhouse survey). 
195. See Manik Roy & Ohad Jehassi, Envtl. Protection Agency, Study of Industry Motivation for 
Pollution Prevention (April 23, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, draft on file with author). 
196. See David A. Ronald, The Case Agaillst all Erzvirollmelltal Audit Privilege, NAT'L ENVTL. 
ENFORCEMENT J., Sept. 1994, at 3, 4. According to James Morgester, Chief of the Compliance Divi-
sion of the California Air Resources Board, the number of companies conducting environmental 
audits has increased in direct proportion to the level of civil and criminal enforcement. See id. 
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Moreover, moving toward a primarily cooperative approach over-
looks evidence that the level of traditional enforcement activity tends to 
increase the rate of industry compliance.197 In their study of Clean Water 
Act enforcement in the pulp and paper industry, for example, Professors 
Wesley Magat and Kip Viscusi found permanent improvements in dis-
charge levels as a consequence of regulatory inspections and associated 
enforcement activities. These activities substantially reduced discharges 
of Biological Oxygen Demand chemicals after about three months and 
helped permanently reduce an individual firm's future pollution levels. 
They also had a major impact on compliance rates; firms not subject to in-
spections and enforcement activities were twice as likely to be in non-
compliance as those subject to the activity .198 Professor Evan Ringquist in 
his detailed study of state and federal environmental programs likewise 
concluded that the strength of enforcement programs made a significant 
difference in reducing pollutant emissions. He specifically found that fed-
eral enforcement efforts, which generally tend to be more aggressive than 
state efforts, and state enforcement efforts that were "consistent, focused 
and well-supported" resulted in greater reductions than weaker and incon-
sistent state programs.199 An examination of OSHA enforcement demon-
strated that between 1979 and 1985, inspections imposing penalties re-
sulted in a twenty-two percent decline in injuries in the inspected plants 
197. The evidence is not unambiguous, however. Professors Hunter and Watennan eoncluded 
that higher levels of Clean Water Act enforcement activity did not translate into improved water-
quality outcomes, as measured by the percentage change in average pollutant concentrations of phos-
phorous, dissolved oxygen, and dissolved solids between 1973 to 1975 and 1986 to 1988. See 
HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 199-205. Moreover, there is relatively little experience with 
environmental inspections and enforcement activity conducted in a nondeterrence-based system. For 
example, a recently completed pilot project in Washington found that, one year after state inspectors 
made compliance-oriented visits to auto repair shops, the great majority of the facilities had complied 
with at least some (and in many instances most) of the inspectors' recommendations. See Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Briefing Materials for Public Meeting, Workshop on National Perfonnance 
Measures Strategy for EPA's Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Program (Mar. 17, 1997) 
<http://es.epa.gov/oecalperfmeaslmarchI7/meeting.htrnl> [hereinafter Workshop on National Per-
fonnance Measures Strategy] (on file with author) (testimony of Brian Dick, Wash. State Department 
of Ecology). The range of compliance issues identified by state inspectors was broad, however, and 
the agency did not attempt to analyze compliance with significant as opposed to minor recommenda-
tions. See Electronic Mail Communication with Darin Rice, Wash. State Dep't of Ecology (Apr. 2, 
1997). 
198. See Magat & Viscusi, supra note 185, at 353-54. 
199. See EVAN J. RINGQUIST, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AT THE STATE LEVEL: POLITICS 
AND PROGRESS IN CONTROLLING POLLUfION 135-50 (1993). See also DIMENTO, supra note 101, at 
136-37 (citing s study showing a direct link between the level of enforcement resources and the level 
of local compliance with the Clean Air Act). 
1230 SOUTHERN CAliFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1181 
during the following few years.200 Other studies have found that pollutant 
emissions have declined as the probability of detection and the size of 
[mes levied for a violation increase.201 A California study found that 
stepped-up enforcement by the State Department of Toxic Substances 
Control successfully fostered compliance with hazardous waste require-
ments. The study found that over a five-year period the average number of 
violations per facility inspection dropped two-thirds, from 3.3. to 1.1, and 
that the percentage of facility inspections finding mUltiple violations 
dropped from sixty-three percent to thirty-three percent.202 Most recently, 
the Indiana Department of Environmental Management found that in sixty-
five percent to seventy percent of cases in which enforcement actions were 
taken against facilities, follow-up inspections showed the facilities com-
plied with environmental requirements.203 
Thus, shifting too far toward cooperative enforcement threatens to 
seriously undermine the threat of enforcement that is essential for wide-
spread voluntary compliance. 
D. A SmONG SYSTEM OF CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT 
Currently, citizen enforcement is a feature in all the major federal 
environmental statutes.204 As a general matter, these statutes allow citi-
zens to sue companies for violations when the government fails to do so 
and various, often strict, procedural conditions are met.205 Traditionally, 
Congress has viewed citizen enforcement as an important supplement to 
200. See Wayne B. Gray & John T. Scholz, Does Regulatory Enforcement Work? A Panel 
Analysis of OSHA Enforcement, 27 LAW & SOC'y REV. 177, 199 (1993). The authors posit that 
"[ilnspections that impose a penalty appear to focus managerial attention on safety issues in a way that 
leads to broader efforts to reduce hazards." Id. See also Kovach, et al., supra note 116, at 179 (noting 
a high correlation between worksites where the majority of serious accidents occurred and worksites 
that were not inspected by OSHA). 
201. See RUSSELL, ET AL., supra note 25, at 95 (citing studies). Cf, id. at 98 (noting studies thnt 
show monitoring and enforcement efforts led to more accurate reporting of discharges by firms when 
an emission tax policy was in place). 
202. See Evaluation of Changes and Patterns in RCRA Violation Rates for Treatment, Storage 
and Disposal Facilities in California, Report prepared for U.S. EPA, Contract No. 68-W9-0009, Dec. 
7,1993 (on file with author). 
203. See Workshop on National Performance Measures Strategy, supra note 197 (testimony of 
Michael O'Connor, Commissioner, Indiana Department of Environmental Manngement). 
204. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1995) (citizcn suit provision); Clean 
Air Act § 304,42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1995). 
205. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365. 
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agency enforcement and an important prod to agency regulators.206 Con-
gress therefore has repeatedly sought to strengthen it. In the 1990 Clean 
Air Act Amendments, for example, Congress expanded citizen suits by 
authorizing private actions for repeated past violations.207 
Citizen enforcement has played an extremely valuable role in 
achieving compliance with environmental law, including spurring EPA 
and state agency enforcement efforts.208 Citizen enforcement has been es-
pecially instrumental in helping to bring government facilities into compli-
ance.209 It also has played a siguificant enforcement role in the private 
sector. Citizen groups are not dissuaded from enforcement by political 
pressure, nor are they subject to capture like regulatory staff.210 Citizen 
action thus provides an important deterrent to noncompliance when gov-
ernment agencies fail to act either because of lack of resources or political 
will. As Professor David Hodas has convincingly demonstrated, govern-
ment agencies by themselves cannot ensure widespread compliance: Many 
states have weakened enforcement efforts to attract economic growth, and 
206. See Wendy Naysnerski & Tom Tietenberg, Private Enforcement of Federal Environmental 
LaIV, 68 LAND EcON. 28, 30-31 (1992) ("A pervasive recognition that the government had neither the 
time nor resources to provide sufficient enforcement led Congress to authorize citizen suits."). 
207. This was in direct response to the Supreme Court's decision in GlValtney of Smithfield Ltd. 
v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49 (1987), holding that citizens could only sue for ongoing 
violations under the Clean Water Act. 
208. See William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The Congressional Prescription for 
Vigorous Federal Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 202, 206-07 (1987); 
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ALAN S. MILLER, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER & JAMES P. LEAPE, EN-
VIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw, SCIENCE & POLICY 1078 (2d ed. 1996) (quoting Environmental 
Law Institute study of citizen enforcement); Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supra note 206, at 35, 4 I. 
209. See Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supra note 206, at 42, 46. Unlike citizens who are willing to 
pursue violations by government entities, enforcement agencies have been historically reluctant to do 
so: 
[d. 
The track record for public enforcement actions against public facilities has been rather 
poor, not because of any statutory or constitutional barriers to enforcement, but rather be-
cause of a lack of will. Private enforcers have no such lack of will to pursue public polIuters 
and therefore would presumably be able to produce compliance faster. 
210. See generally AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 34 (arguing for citizen enforcement to 
prevent agency capture); PERCIVALET AL., supra note 208, at 932 (noting that EPA officials acknowl-
edge that they virtually never obtain economic benefits when they file enforcement actions against 
municipal sewage treatment facilities). For an interesting recent illustration of how citizen enforce-
ment can guard against sweetheart deals with regulators, see Citizens for a Better Environment v. Un-
ion Oil Co., 83 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 1996), cert denied 117 S. Ct. 789 (1997). In that case, the local 
regulatory agency, succumbing to political pressure, granted a lengthy extension on stricter discharge 
limits to several refineries. It did so by resolving an enforcement action through a settlement agree-
ment that did not impose any penalties on the refineries. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the agency set-
tlement did not preclude a citizen suit to enforce the stricter permit limits. 
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the federal government lacks the resources and political will to fill the gap 
left by this lax state enforcement,211 
A system of enforcement that relies primarily on cooperative methods 
would have difficulty co-existing with vigorous citizen enforcement, 
which has always been unpopular with businesses for obvious reasons. 
Under existing law, citizen enforcement is largely unsupervised by the 
government. Private enforcers do not need agency approval before initiat-
ing actions, and agencies generally are quite reluctant to file enforcement 
actions merely to contain or preempt citizen enforcement,212 Some stat-
utes require private settlements to be reviewed by the Department of Jus-
tice before they are judicially approved, but the scope of this review is 
rather limited.213 Thus, citizens largely are able to set their own enforce-
ment priorities. 
Citizen enforcers do not adhere to the cooperative school. They gen-
erally believe that noncompliance with environmental laws is significant, 
and that the central failings in current enforcement are too many un sanc-
tioned violators and lenient treatment of violators.214 They believe that 
more stringent enforcement is necessary to increase compliance, and they 
are likely to continue aggressively to seek sanctions in enforcement ac-
tions. 
211. See Hodas, supra note Ill, at 1572-75, 1585-89, 1615-17; Engel, supra note 135, at 351-54 
(concluding, based on empiricnl study, that states engage in a "race to the bottom" in environmentni 
regulation to attract business); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: 
PENALTIES MAY NOT RECOVER EcONOMIC BENEFITS GAINED BY VIOLATORS, GAOIRCED-91-166, 8-
9 (1991) (reporting that state and local enforcement offices are susceptible to pressures that make 
them reluctant to adhere to strong penalty policy); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PRO-
TECTION AGENCY, AUDIT OF REGION 9's ADMINISTRATION OF TIlE CALIFORNIA AIR COMPLIANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, EIGA06-06-0023-7100246, 9 (1997) [hereinafter EPA, AUDIT OF REGION 
9] (observing that locni air districts reported their boards did not support aggressive enforcement ac-
tions in some cases because of potential economic impacts if major industries relocate). 
212. Under most citizen enforcement schemes, the government can preclude a private action by 
filing a suit within 60 days after receiving a notice of intent to sue by the private party. See, e.g., 
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1994). 
213. See, e.g., id. § 1319(g)(6)(b); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c)(3) (1994). 
214. See Hodas, supra note II 1, at 1613-14 (arguing that only significant penalties have a 
meaningful deterrent effect and motivate voluntary compliance). "[B]oth Congress and EPA have 
long declared civil penalties to be central to the [Clean Water Act's] enforcement scheme because 
without adequate and consistently imposed civil penni ties, particularly in judicial aetions, polluters 
will have little motivation to comply voluntarily with the law." [d. at 1644-45. See also Hearings on 
the Relationship Between Federal and State Governments, supra note 2 at 219 (prepared statement of 
Todd E. Robins) ("Without environmental cops aggressively on the beat, without a credible, predict-
able deterrent to illegal pollution, polluters have little incentive to clean up their acts and plenty of 
incentive to disregard the law."). 
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The schism between advocates of cooperative enforcement and citi-
zen enforcers was highlighted at a recent Congressional hearing on the 
federal-state relationship in environmental enforcement. On the one hand, 
state government representatives chastised the EPA for stifling state inno-
vative reform efforts to move away from traditional enforcement, and for 
the EPA's continued emphasis on "enforcement-specific activities, focus-
ing on enforcement for enforcement's sake.,,215 By contrast, environmen-
talists argued that the new enforcement approach of the states was result-
ing in "gross and unacceptable levels of non-compliance" with 
environmental law: 
A significant number of States around the country have explicitly re-
duced, or even dismantled, their already weak, under-funded environ-
mental enforcement programs under the philosophy that voluntary, 
hand-holding compliance assistance efforts will achieve compliance 
more efficiently. State and EPA data, as well as anecdotal evidence 
from around the country indicates that the opposite is true .... 216 
They called on Congress to beef up traditional enforcement: 
[The approach] to Clean Water Act enforcement that we have seen in 
New Jersey since 199O-characterized by mandatory minimum penalties 
for serious violations, stronger citizen suit provisions, better monitoring 
and reporting, and adequate resources-should serve as a national model 
for enforcement of the Clean Water Act and other Federal environmental 
statutes.217 
Even if private enforcers were more philosophically sympathetic to 
cooperative enforcement, it would be very hard for them to implement. 
Under the cooperative scheme, inspectors act mainly as consultants and 
educators, dispensing advice and assistance about how to achieve compli-
ance. The system works best when regulated entities have ongoing, pre-
dictable relations with regulators.218 Citizen enforcers, however, do not 
215. Hearings on the Relationship Between Federal and State Governments, supra note 2, at 202 
(prepared statement of Christopher A.G. Tulou, Secretary, Delaware Department of Natuml Resources 
and Environmental Control). See also id. at 198 (prepared statement of Patricia S. Bangert). 
216. ld. at 220 (prepared statement of Todd E. Robins) (citation omitted). For a similar argu-
ment, see Sanford Lewis, Feel-Good Notions, Corporate Power and the "Reinvention" of Environ-
mental Law (Good Neighbor Project for Sustainable Industries, Working Paper, March 17, 1997) 
<http://www.envirolink.orglorgs/gnp/fgnful.htm> [hereinafter Feel-Good Notions] ("Diminishing the 
threat of detection and punishment makes it less likely that individuals and corporations will do the 
right thing. The environmental audit laws are based on a faulty, feel-good assumption about the reach 
of people's and corporations' good intentions."). 
217. Hearings on the Relationship Between Federal and State Governments, supra note 2, at 218 
(prepared statement of Todd E. Robins). 
218. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE, supra note 91, at 114-15. 
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have the resources, expertise, or access to company information to be con-
sultants. Citizen enforcers also do not enjoy continuing relationships with 
regulated fIrms in many instances. Additionally, few companies would 
likely heed the advice of citizen groups even if they attempted to undertake 
this role. 
A radical shift away from deterrence-based enforcement is thus likely 
to greatly weaken citizen enforcement, which has played an important role 
in promoting compliance with environmental requirements. 
V. HOW TO REFORM ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 
As discussed in Part III, the evidence is mixed about the best way to 
achieve compliance with environmental laws; it does not decidedly show 
the superiority of either deterrence or cooperative-oriented enforcement. 
Each approach has its strengths and weaknesses, and elements of both 
systems are desirable. A system that is purely or primarily deterrence-
based can be improved by integrating features of the cooperative model, 
such as more emphasis on agency advice and consultation, and greater re-
liance on voluntary self-policing. A system that is purely or primarily co-
operative-based, however, will lose some of the expressive character of en-
forcement, suffer serious risks of substantial noncompliance, agency 
capture and inconsistent treatment, and negate citizen enforcement. The 
best approach, therefore, is one that is grounded in deterrence theory but 
integrates certain constructive features of a cooperative model. This sec-
tion discusses ways in which current enforcement practice may be im-
proved, and evaluates many of the key enforcement reforms urged by crit-
ics. 
A. AGENCIES SHOULD PROVIDE MORE CONSULTATION AND 
COOPERATIVE ASSISTANCE 
Enforcement agencies have always considered compliance promotion 
and education necessary to enforcement programs. Until recently, these 
efforts have often been overlooked and underfunded.219 One positive ele-
meut in current reforms has been a push to expand cooperative assistance 
efforts signifIcantly, particularly those directed at small businesses.22o 
219. See MINTZ, supra note 23, at 106. 
220. In other regulatory areas, some Congressional proposals have sought to phase out direct 
agency enforcement activities and replace them with compliance-assistance programs. For example, 
one bilI introduced in 1995 would have required OSHA to spend at least 50% of its budget on consult-
ing and other employer assistance programs. See H.R. 1834, 104th Congo § 4(f) (1995). Another 
measure would have required OSHA to institute a program of cooperative agreements under which 
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Congress mandated in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments that 
states establish compliance-assistance programs for small businesses.221 
Likewise, in the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act 
(SBREFA), Congress required all agencies to publish easy-to-understand 
"small entity compliance guides" for all federal rules.222 On its own, the 
EPA has made a major effort to elevate the importance of its compliance-
assistance efforts, as reflected in the reorganization of its enforcement pro-
gram into a new Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance.223 
The agency recently developed national Compliance Assistance Centers in 
several industrial sectors to provide "plain English" guides about compli-
ance requirements, technical assistance, and pollution prevention training 
to regulated entities.224 As an incentive for industries to use these centers, 
the EPA offers businesses with up to six months to correct violations iden-
tified through these programs.22S EPA regional offices have also been ex-
perimenting with enhanced assistance programs.226 The EPA also has in-
regulated employers could consult with agencies about voluntary self-regulatory efforts. See H.R. 
1433, 104th Congo § 2 (1995). 
221. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661(f) (1997). Programs must include adequate mechanisms for inform-
ing small businesses of their obligations under the act, including providing referrals to qualified audi-
tors or providing state-sponsored audits of sources. See id. 
222. See Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 
§ 212, 110 Stat. 857, 858 (1996). Agencies are also required, whenever appropriate, to answer inquir-
ies by small businesses about how to comply with regulatory requirements. Guidance provided by the 
agencies may be considered as evidence in assessing the reasonableness of penalties sought against 
the firms in subsequent enforcement actions. See id. § 213. 
223. See Stahl, Enforcement in Transition, supra note 3, at 21. 
224. See id. at 22. Such centers have been developed for the metal finishing, agricultural, auto-
mobile services and repair, and printing industries. The EPA is working on centers to assist munici-
palities, the transportation industry, small chemical manufacturers, and manufacturers of printed wir-
ing boards. See Hearings on the Relationship Between Federal and State Governments, supra note 2, 
at 157-58 (prepared statement of Steven Herman, Assistant Administrator, Office of Enforcement and 
Compliance Assurance, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency); Steven A. Herman, New OECA In-
centives Policy, Metal Finishing National Assistance Center Will Enhance Compliance by Small 
Business, NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Aug. 1995, at 9. The EPA has also published 18 "sector 
notebooks," described as comprehensive environmental and technical profiles of industries designed 
to help the EPA develop compliance-assistance strategies and to help industries improve their compli-
ance. See Steven Herman, EPA's FY 1997 Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Priorities (1997) 
<:bttp:/Ies.epa.gov loeca/naag97 .html>. 
225. See Bill Clinton & Al Gore, "Reinventing Environmental Regulation": Clinton Administra-
tioll Regulatory Reform Initiatives (March 16, 1995) <:bttp:/Iwww.epa.gov/ooaujeaglnotebookl 
clinton.hlm>. 
226. For example, in Region l's CLEAN initiative (Compliance Leadership through Environ-
mental Audits and Negotiation), the EPA, state agencies, universities, and a trade association provide 
free audits to small and medium-sized firms in exchange for a commitment to achieve compliance and 
implement at least one pollution prevention project. Violations uncovered during the audit receive 
penalty reductions or waivers. See Hawkins, supra note 5, at 44-45. The EPA's Region 6 has estab-
lished compliance-assistance programs for chlorofiuorocarbons, dry cleaners and foundries. The pro-
grams provide training and certification to the small business community to make them aware of 
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fonned front-line inspectors that it is proper for them to provide compli-
ance assistance as part of their traditional enforcement activities.227 Many 
states have pursued similar programs that provide businesses with detailed 
technical assistance and compliance advice, usually in exchange for an 
agreement not to seek penalties or take enforcement action if detected 
violations are promptly corrected.228 Other states have sought to integrate 
compliance-assistance programs directly into their enforcement activi-
ties.229 
regulations. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION 6's 
ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM, EIGAF5-06-0056-6100309, at 21 (1996) 
[hereinafter REGION 6 PROGRAM] (reporting findings of an audit of Region 6's (and Texas and Louisi-
ana's) enforcement programs). 
227. See Enforcement: Pollution Prevention Guidance Deemed Appropriate Action for Agel/cy 
Inspectors, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 726,726 (Aug. 15, 1997). 
228. The Illinois' Clean Break project, geared toward small businesses with an emphasis on 
firms reluctant to participate, is one such example. Small businesses seeking help with regulatory re-
quirements can contact initially the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) directly or can 
call the State Department of Commerce and Community Affairs, which will provide an anonymous 
contact with the 11Iinois EPA. The 11Iinois Office of Small Business then schedules an in-person 
meeting or a telephone meeting (with the option for business anonymity) at which regulatory staff will 
provide the company with preliminary options for compliance and pollution prevention. The firm can 
then drop out of the program and remain anonymous or schedule a site visit so that agency staff can 
develop more detailed advice. Participating firms enter a compliance/amnesty agreement under which 
the business agrees to achieve compliance and the state agrees to forego enforcement action if compli-
ance is accomplished within the agreed-upon timeframe. The program excludes a range of serious and 
criminal violations. See ILLINOIS ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND 
COMMUNITY AFFAIRS & ROCKFORD AREA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SMALL BUSINESS GUIDE FOR 
GETIING A CLEAN BREAK (1995) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter SMALL BUSINI!SS GUIDE]. 
The California Department of Toxic Substances Control (for all regulated hazardous waste facilities) 
and the Ohio Environmenlal Protection Agency (for all dry cleaners) run similar, if somewhat less 
elaborate, compliance-assistance programs. See CALIFORNIA ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ON-SITE 
CONSULTATION AT YOUR BUSINESS (on file with author); Ohio Envtl. Proteclion Ageney, Dry Cleal/er 
Initiative, in ECOS-OLD INNOVATIONS (The Envtl. Council of the States, June 16, 1997) 
<http://www.sso.orglecosloldinno.htm> (describing Ohio's multimedia initiative targeting dry clean-
ers). Texas has an amnesty program in which the state provides assistance to particular industrial 
sectors for one-year periods. See REGION 6 PROGRAM, supra note 226, at 15. Like many other states, 
Texas and Louisiana also provide compliance assistance to small businesses through methods such as 
industry workshops, distribution of literature, special hotlines, aid with permit applications and regula-
tory questionnaires, and determinations of whether regulations are applicable to a particular firm. See 
id. at 15-16. See generally GAO, EFFORTS TO Focus ON RESULTS, supra note 8, at 21-24, 66-67 
(indicating that most of the 10 states surveyed by GAO had adopted compliance-assistance programs 
that included seminars, technical assistance visits, and "plain-English" guides explaining regulatory 
requirements-all generally targeting smaller businesses and specific industries). 
229. In Massachusetts, for instance, the Department of Environmental Protection conducts mul-
timedia facility inspections and provides firms with guidance about how to achieve basic compliance 
and meet the state's toxics use reduction law. See Stahl, Enforcement in Transition, supra note 3, at 
23. Indiana's Department of Environmental Management has recently created a multimedia compli-
ance division that brings together pollution prevention, technical assistance, compliance, and en-
forcement staff. See Indiana Dep't of Envtl. Management, Integrated Complial/ce Division, in ECOS-
OLD INNOVATIONS (The Envtl. Council of the States, July 28, 1997) <http://www.sso.org 
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These stepped-up assistance efforts should increase compliance. The 
programs should be directed first at small businesses, many of which may 
lack the expertise and resources needed to fully comprehend environ-
mental regulation. Assistance directed at small businesses presents the 
greatest opportunity for significant improvements in compliance.23o 
Agencies should also have separate inspectors carrying out these expanded 
"advice and consultation" functions, or at least not assign inspectors to 
carry out these traditional activities at the same facilities where they have 
provided special technical assistance. This separation will help minimize 
the risk and appearance of preferential treatment by agency staff who have 
devoted considerable time and energy consulting with a firm. It also will 
promote business confidence that the compliance-assistance program will 
not be used to gather evidence for later enforcement actions, and thus 
should prompt greater openness by participating firms.231 Agency em-
ployment of aggressive outreach efforts in connection with the technical 
assistance programs also would be desirable. In Illinois, for example, 
regulators carried out a promotional campaign, organized workshops with 
trade associations, and contacted facilities several times to enlist their par-
ticipation.232 These outreach efforts hopefully will allow agencies to reach 
lecosloldinno.htrn> (describing Indiana's "reengineering effort" to create a new multimedia compli-
ance division). 
230. The lllinois Small Business Environmental Task Force noted that 
there are a substantial number of small businesses that are currently operating in noncompli-
ance with one or more regulatory requirements. Some of the businesses have some knowl-
edge of environmental requirements but are unsure if the requirements are applicable to 
them and are afraid to find out. Some are unaware of environmental requirements in gen-
eral. Some know they are operating in violation, but are afraid if they attempt to come into 
compliance they will subject themselves to large monetary penalties and thereby jeopardize 
their business. It is believed that the [lliinois EPA] is unaware of the identity of many of 
these businesses. 
GOVERNOR'S SMALL BUSINESS ENVIRONMENTAL TASKFORCE, supra note 87, at 12. 
231. The compliance-assistance programs in lllinois, Arizona, and Texas, for example, accom-
plish this separation of function. Under lllinois' Clean Break Program, regular agency inspectors 
provide technical assistance but do not have the routine inspection responsibility for the facilities 
which they assist See Welks, supra note 9, at 28 n.30. Moreover, there is an express understanding 
in the agency that the routine inspectors will not try to discover nor make use of the information ob-
tained through the Clean Break Program. See id. at 30. In Arizona, state employees who conduct 
hazardous waste and other types of facility assessments are employed by a special Office of Customer 
Service that is completely segregated from the traditional enforcement and inspection staff. See id. at 
36. Arizona's drinking water program employs independent representatives entirely outside the 
agency to provide technical assistance-an idea dubbed the "circuit rider" program. See id. at 39. In 
Texas, the staff of the Small Business Assistance Program is separate from enforcement personnel. 
See REGION 6 PROGRAM, supra note 226, at 15. 
232. See SMALL BUSINESS GUIDE, supra note 228; Welks, supra note 9, at 31. 
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some firms that have the most difficulty keeping abreast of current re-
quirements.233 
Unfortunately, many states have swung too far in providing assistance 
and consultation without utilizing traditional enforcement tools. As a re-
sult, enforcement is seriously undermined. Indeed, recent experiences in a 
number of states suggest that, under the guise of working more coopera-
tively with industry and providing greater compliance assistance, state 
agencies have simply weakened enforcement. For example, the EPA re-
cently found that while Texas and Louisiana had effective compliance as-
sistance programs, their traditional enforcement efforts had important 
weaknesses.234 A report by auditors in Virginia indicated that environ-
mental officials were giving no more than a slap on the wrist to persistent 
and serious violators, and had cut back substantially on air and water in-
spections.235 In Pennsylvania, an audit by the EPA's Inspector General 
found that the state had seriously underreported the number of significant 
violators of the Clean Air Act and failed to take appropriate enforcement 
action to bring violators into compliance, thereby "allowing facilities that 
were serious contributors of air pollution to continue harming the envi-
ronment-sometimes for many years."236 EPA auditors reached similar 
conclusions about New York's enforcement of environmentallaws.237 The 
EPA, fearing that these results represent only the tip of the iceberg, has 
commenced a nationwide examination of the states' performance.238 Its 
233. While it is appropriate for compliance-assistance programs to offer participating firms in-
centives, such as reduced inspections and reduced penalties, it is unwise to remove all agency discre-
tion to impose penalties on such finns when violations are detected and corrected as a result of agcncy 
assistance. See infra Part V.B. 
234. See REGION 6 PROGRAM, supra note 226. The EPA reported that both states failed to com-
pute economic benefit when assessing fines, that Texas failed to complete enforcement actions in a 
timely manner, that Louisiana did not adequately publicize its actions, and that both states underre-
ported or inaccurately characterized violations. See id. The EPA recently reached comparable con-
clusions about air quality enforcement in California, which it noted has an excellent compliance-
assistance program. See EPA, AUDIT OF REGION 9, supra note 211. 
235. See Cushman, Virginia Seen, supra note 10, at 22; Nakashima, supra note 10, at AI. 
236. EPA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., VALIDATION OF AIR ENFORCEMENT DATA REPORTED TO 
EPA BY PENNSYLVANIA (1997) <hUp:/Iwww.epa.gov/oigearthlpennchp2.htm>. The audit also con-
cluded that Pennsylvania's inspections sometimes were not thorough enough to determine whethcr 
facilities were in compliance, and that the state did not always ensure that facilities took action to cor-
rect detected violations. See id. Pennsylvania has vigorously disputcd the suggestion that it is un-
dermining enforcement of the Clean Air Act and attributes the Inspector General's conclusions to dif-
fering approaches over how to bring violators back into compliance. See id. 
237. See Metzgar, supra note 129, at B2 (reporting EPA findings that the New York Department 
of Environmental Conservation failed to take timely and appropriate enforcement action against sig-
nificant violators in 12% of cases studied over a two-year period and that an earlier EPA report notcd 
a significant decrease in the number of air inspections by the state agency). 
238. See Cushman, States Neglecting, supra note 31, at AI. 
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findings to date document serious problems in the states enforcing envi-
ronmentallaws.239 
B. POLICIES AUTOMATICALLY PRECLUDING SANCTIONS AND 
ELIMINATING ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION 
ARE UNDESIRABLE 
One very popular strand of current reform efforts seeks to preclude or 
greatly mitigate penalties for certain classes of violations or against small 
businesses. While in many circumstances this type of enforcement re-
sponse is entirely appropriate, it is unwise public policy to negate agency 
discretion totally and mandate that sanctions are impermissible. 
The most notable example of this type of initiative is the SBREFA, 
enacted by Congress in 1996.240 The statute requires federal agencies to 
develop policies that provide for the reduction and waiver of minor viola-
tions by small businesses in certain instances, such as when the violation is 
corrected within a reasonable period or is discovered in a compliance-
assistance program.241 
239. For example, the EPA Inspector General found that numerous states failed to recover (and 
some failed to even calculate) economic benefits stemming from noncompliance with the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). This audit also found that penalties imposed for RCRA 
violations by states were significantly lower than those levied by the local EPA regional offices-in 
some cases 4% and 6% of those assessed by the regions. See EPA, FuRTHER IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED, 
supra note 174, at 21. Another study noted significant weaknesses in enforcement of federal air qual-
ity requirements by agencies in California, including failures to timely resolve enforcement actions 
and to impose adequate penalties, including those that recover economic benefits of noncompliance. 
See EPA, AUDIT OF REGION 9, supra note 211. Another series of reports by EPA's Inspector General 
found extensive failures by agencies in Idaho, Alaska, Washington, and New Mexico to take enforce-
ment actions against permit violators, conduct inspections, and report violations to the federal gov-
ernment. See John H. Cushman, EPA and States Found to Be Lax on Pollution Law, N.Y. TiMES, 
June 7, 1998,atAI. 
240. See Small Business RegUlatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 
110 Stat. 857 (1996). 
241. See id. § 223. As part of the SBREFA, Congress took other steps to modify traditional 
agency enforcement efforts. For example, it amended the Equal Access to Justice Act to make it eas-
ier for small businesses to recover costs of defending government enforcement actions. Specifically, 
small businesses can recover costs in administrative actions to enforce a party's compliance with a 
statutory or regulatory requirement if "the demand by the agency is substantially in excess of the de-
cision of the adjudicative officer and is unreasonable when compared with such decision, under the 
facts and circumstances of the case." 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(4) (1997). A like provision applies in civil 
actions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(D) (1997). Congress also required the Small Business Admini-
stration (SBA) to designate an ombudsman to facilitate small businesses' complaints about agency 
enforcement activity. Also under the act, Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards set up 
by the SBA are required to report instances of excessive agency enforcement actions to the ombuds-
man. See Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act § 222. 
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Even before the SBREFA was implemented, the EPA announced a 
very similar policy declaring that it would refrain from seeking civil pen-
alties or would mitigate civil penalties when a small business makes a 
"good-faith" effort to comply with environmental requirements by either 
receiving on-site compliance assistance or promptly disclosing the findings 
of a voluntary environmental audit.242 A related EPA effort is its Policy 
on Flexible State Enforcement for Small Community Violations, designed 
to afford states greater enforcement flexibility in responding to environ-
mental violations by small communities.243 Under the policy, the EPA 
agrees not to initiate its own enforcement actions against small community 
violators where a state waives all or partial penalties against any violators 
that show good faith in correcting identified violations. Good faith is 
measured by a community's requests for compliance assistance and other 
steps taken to achieve compliance promptly. 
States have adopted similar measures.244 In California, for instance, 
recent legislation mandates that minor violations of state hazardous waste, 
air, and water pollution requirements result in "notices to comply," rather 
than in penalties.245 Notices to comply are informal agency notices that 
instruct the facility to correct the violations within a given time period. No 
sanctions attach to the discovery of violations. A 1997 California proposal 
would extend this principle further, providing immunity for persons who 
disclose minor violations that are detected as a result of monitoring al-
ready required by existing law. The bill does not require the entity to take 
242. See Interim Policy on Compliance Incentives for Small Businesses, FRL-5512-7, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 27,984 (June 3, 1996). Small businesses are defined under the policy as companies employing 
100 or fewer persons on a company-wide basis. The policy does not apply to criminal violations, re-
peat violations, violations that cause a significant health, safety, or environmental threat or hnnn, or 
violations that are not remedied within the period set forth by the agency. See id. at 27,985. The EPA 
reserves the right to recover any economic benefit associated with a violation (but to waive the gravity 
component of any penalty) where a business may have obtained an economic advantage over its com-
petitors from a violation under certain conditions. See id. 
243. See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Policy on Flexible State Enforcemellt Responses to 
Small Community Violations (last modified Sept. 16, 1996) <http://es.epa.gov/oecnlore/aedlcomp/ 
acomp/a24.html>. Small communities are defined as communities with fewer than 2,500 residents. 
See id. 
244. See GAO, EFFORTS TO Focus ON REsULTS, supra note 8, at 27-28,68-69 (listing programs 
adopted by a number of states that grant amnesty from penalties to facilities under certain conditions). 
245. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25187.8,39152 (West Supp. 1998); CAL. WATER 
CODE §§ 13399-13399.2 (West 1997). A minor violation is defined by a number of criteria, including 
its magnitude, scope, and severity; its threat to human health and the environment; and its impact on 
important regulatory objectives. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 31 950(d)-(t). 
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steps to come into compliance, nor does it require (or provide any incen-
tives for) facilities to engage in any special monitoring activities.246 
Likewise, under New Jersey's "grace period" law, when state or local 
enforcement agencies detect minor violations of environmental laws, they 
must provide regulated firms with a period of time (from thirty to ninety 
days based on the nature of the violation) in which to achieve compli-
ance.247 If compliance is achieved within the specified time period, the 
department is precluded from imposing a penalty for the violation.248 The 
law also bars regulators from imposing penalties against persons who vol-
untarily disclose minor violations within thirty days of discovery, imme-
diately remedy them, and achieve compliance.249 
On the one hand, the notion of excusing first-time minor violations 
seems quite reasonable, particularly if limited in scope and tied to proac-
tive measures by regulated facilities, such as requesting agency assistance 
or making good-faith efforts to comply.250 This allows agencies to devote 
their resources to serious cases and minimizes resentment by businesses 
when they are penalized for insignificant violations. 
On the other hand, it is poor policy either to mandate that all minor 
violations be forgiven, or that they be forgiven simply because they are 
246. See S.B. 647, 1997-1998 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997) available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Sttext 
File. 
247. Minor violations are those that are not purposeful, pose minimal risk to the public health 
and safety, do not substantially undermine the goals of the regulatory program, have existed for less 
than 12 months prior to discovery, and do not involve repeat offenders (meaning no prior violations 
by the same person within the previous 12 months). See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:10-129 (West 1995). 
248. See id. § 13:10-127. 
249. See id. § l3:1O-l30. Washington also enacted a general regulatory reform statute in 1995 
that restricts the ability of the Department of Ecology to issue civil penalties for certain first-time vio-
lations, including those that result in only minor environmental harm or are likely to result in property 
damage ofless than $1,000. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 43.05.070 (West 1997). In late 1997, the 
department indicated that it would not implement this statutory provision, citing threats from the EPA 
to withhold approvals of federal hazardous waste and air quality program delegations to the state. At 
the same time, the agency indicated it would continue to follow its (very similar) administrative en-
forcement policy of not imposing civil penalties for minor, first-time violations that do not result in 
environmental harm. See Washington, Facing USEPA Pressure, Abandons Amnesty Law, 3 STATE 
ENVTL. MONITOR 11 (Feb. 2, 1998). Other proposals in this vein would go considerably further than 
the New Jersey or Washington laws, and would bar penalties except for serious violations. During the 
104th Congress, for instance, proposed legislation addressing OSHA enforcement provided that cer-
tain violations, including requirements for reporting and notification, would not result in a citation 
unless a "pattern or practice" was shown and the violator intended to deceive. See H.R. 1834, 104th 
Congo (1995). The proposed legislation also provided that penalties could be imposed only when an 
employer failed to correct a violation previously noted or when there was a death or serious injury. 
See id. 
250. But see MINlZ, supra note 23, at 104 (noting that there are many practical difficulties in 
trying to discern the motives of those who violate the law). 
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corrected. Such a policy is unnecessary since repeated empirical studies 
show that environmental requirements are enforced in a pragmatic way, 
with little likelihood of penalties being imposed rigidly or arbitrarily.2S1 
More importantly, this approach removes any incentive for entities to 
comply before they are found in violation, since being caught has essen-
tially no consequence other than perhaps a warning. Professor Hodas 
notes that this approach "often signals to the regulated community that it 
need not comply until enforcement begins."252 An OSHA administrator in 
the Reagan Administration, analyzing similar proposals in the occupa-
tional safety and health area, noted: 
One of the basic premises underlying the present OSHA law is the con-
cept that employers are expected to be in compliance prior to an OSHA 
inspection. OSHA will never have the resources to inspect every work-
place under its jurisdiction. [Congress] did not want to allow employers 
to wait until after an inspection before taking steps to come into compli-
ance. That essentially is how every law works. You don't get to drive 
drunk or hold up a store one time for free; a penalty is provided the first 
time such a "violation" occurs.253 
A better way to deal with relatively minor violations is to expand 
agency authority to enable regulators to rapidly issue informal administra-
tive orders, such as field citations, or "fix-it" tickets. Field citations are 
similar to traffic tickets: The citations, issued in the field, address a c1ear-
cut violation, require the violator to correct the violation, carry a small 
penalty, and provide for some type of appeal.254 Congress expanded the 
EPA's authority to utilize these tools in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amend-
ments, authorizing a field citation program assessing civil penalties of up 
to $5,000 for minor air quality violations.2S5 Field citations have been 
used effectively in a range of contexts, both domestically and interna-
tionally.256 In New Mexico, for example, when the state relied on tradi-
tional methods to enforce its underground storage tank requirements, only 
fourteen percent of the owners/operators who were found in violation 
251. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text. 
252. Hodas, supra note Ill, at 1616-17. Hodas also argues that as the regulated community 
perceives that government agencies are unlikely to initiate formal enforcement aetions, they are less 
willing to settle on terms favorable to the government. See id. 
253. Patrick R. Tyson,ls This Really OSHA Reform?, SAFETY + HEALTH, July 1995, at 33,35-
36. 
254. See Shelda A. Sutton-Mendoza, Field Citations: A Tool for Enforcing UST Reglliations in 
New Mexico, in THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, sllpra note 116, at 409. 
255. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3) (1994). 
256. See Cheryl E. Wasserman, Bllilding International Networks, Cooperation, and Capacity for 
Environmental Compliance: A Progress Repon, in FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, sllpra note 
137, at 97, 110-11. 
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complied with the agency's orders. By contrast, eighty-two percent of 
owners/operators cited as part of the field citation program corrected their 
violations and achieved compliance.257 In California, when the state ex-
perimented with "fix-it" tickets in its hazardous waste program, inspectors 
used these informal citations to resolve the great majority of violations at a 
fraction of the time and expense required for formal administrative or-
ders.258 
C. GREATER SELF-REGULATION SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO 
SUPPLEMENT, NOT REPLACE ENFORCEMENT 
The environmental enforcement reforms advanced with the greatest 
vigor and currently attracting the most intense controversy concern inter-
nal environmental audits and environmental management systems. Busi-
nesses and other reformers aggressively have pushed to substitute these 
self-regulatory systems for traditional enforcement activities. Twenty-
three states have adopted environmental audit privilege or immunity laws 
that provide qualified immunity from penalties for violations disclosed and 
corrected as a result of voluntary internal audits. Reformers propose to af-
ford similar treatment to the self-policing efforts of management sys-
tems.259 
The expansion of internal regulatory systems is a positive develop-
ment that should be encouraged. In fact, audits should be made mandatory 
for publicly traded corporations. Non-publicly traded firms that imple-
ment audits or management systems should receive enforcement benefits 
such as reduced penalties and inspections. But audit privilege and im-
munity laws, promoted by some businesses as it strategy to curtail gov-
ernment enforcement, should be resisted. These laws undermine incen-
tives for preventative compliance measures and conceal important 
257. See Sutton-Mendoza, supra note 254, at 410-11, 417-18. 
258. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 19, at 54-17. In 1992 and 1993, the California Department 
of Toxic Substances relied on expedited administrative orders, known as "toxic tickets" and "desk 
orders," to resolve 85% of all enforcement actions for violations of hazardous waste requirements. 
See id. 
259. See, e.g., Ira Feldman, Escapefrom Command and Control?, ENVfL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 
39, 39-40 (quoting Pennsylvania Environmental Secretary Jim Seif stating that "the day may soon 
come when a company certified to ISO 14001 would never again need to see an inspector from his 
agency," and arguing that "[t]he time has arrived to begin the shift away from prescriptive regulation 
to a greater reliance on an environmental management systems approach to environmental policy"). 
Accord Ed Shoener, No Substitute for Legal Standards, ENVfL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 27, 27 (noting 
that some government officials have asserted "that if [the ISO 1400 I management standard] is used by 
a company •.. there wi11 be no need for the government to inspect its manufacturing facilities"). 
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environmental information. More generally, self-policing systems should 
supplement, but not replace, traditional enforcement activities.260 
1. Mandatory, Publicly Disclosed Environmental Audits of Publicly 
Traded Companies 
a. Existing policies for disclosure of violations detected by 
environmental audits: As the term is generally used and defined by the 
EPA, an environmental audit is a "systematic, documented, periodic and 
objective review by regulated entities of facility operations and practices 
related to meeting environmental requirements.,,26I Companies began 
conducting audits with some frequency in the mid-1980s due to 
increasingly aggressive activity by government and private citizens, 
including stepped-up criminal enforcement, as well as the recognition that 
audits could result in siguificant economic savings.262 
The EPA, reasoning that auditing would lead to higher levels of 
compliance, issued a policy statement in 1986 designed to encourage 
aUditing.263 The EPA indicated it would not routinely request environ-
mental audit reports from regulated entities.264 It also stated that facility 
260. Professor Douglas Michael has advocated a modified form of self-regulation, which he de-
scribes as "coopemtive implementation" of regulations. Under this approach, regulatory standards are 
written to provide entities with considemble discretion in determining how to achieve compliance. 
Agencies rely to a greater extent than usual on the internal regulatory efforts of firms and conduct 
fewer routine inspections. In exchange, firms are required to self-monitor and report their own com-
pliance to agencies, which retain tmditional enforcement authority. Professor Michael maintains that 
regulated entities will be attmcted to this approach because it will give them greater flexibility in in-
terpreting regulatory standards, and he proposes other incentives for participating firms. See Michael, 
supra note 40, at 543-53. He also argues that this self-regulatory approach will better enable agencies 
to evaluate the compliance efforts of regulated firms. He notes that, under the current system, inspec-
tions provide only a "snapshot "of what is occurring at a facility. Under the coopemtive implementa-
tion approach by contmst, firms will keep ongoing compliance records that will allow investigators to 
see how a facility opemtes over time, to determine whether problems have occurred and how they 
were addressed, to spot trends that could lead to problems, and to help prevent problems from recur-
ring. See id. at 570. He also argues that coopemtive implementation will place a greater emphasis on 
prevention mther than detection and correction of violations. See id. at 571. 
261. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, OPPE-FRL-3046-6, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004, at 
25,006 (July 9, 1986) [hereinafter Environmental Auditing Policy Statement]. Beyond verifying 
compliance, environmental audits can also evaluate the effectiveness of environmental management 
systems or assess risks from facility activities. A compliance audit is a snapshot of a firm's current 
compliance with environmental requirements. A comprehensive management audit assesses a firm's 
adherence to a broader set of firm environmental policies and pmctices. See id. See a/so Harris, Sllpra 
note 35, at 671-72. 
262. See supra note 65 and accompanying text, and infra note 305. 
263. See Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, sllpra note 261. 
264. It reserved the right to do so in limited instances, such as where the reports were integml to 
"accomplish a statutory mission" or material to a criminal investigation. It listed as examples in-
stances where audits are conducted nnder a settlement agreement, a firm places its management pmc-
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audits would be taken into consideration in determining inspection priori-
ties and fashioning enforcement responses.265 Subsequent governmental 
policies created additional incentives to conduct audits. In 1991, the De-
partment of Justice issued guidance indicating that self-auditing would be 
a mitigating factor in its decisions whether to criminally prosecute envi-
ronmental violations.266 Likewise, sentencing guidelines proposed by the 
Federal Sentencing Commission for environmental crimes provided that 
voluntary compliance programs, including auditing, would be important in 
evaluating both aggravating and mitigating factors in sentencing.267 
Since 1993, the states have moved rapidly to encourage auditing 
practices. By the end of 1997, twenty-three states had adopted audit 
privilege or immunity laws,268 and similar bills have been introduced in 
tices at issue by raising them as a defense, or a defendant's state of mind is at issue. In these in-
stances, the EPA explained that it would likely limit its request to particular information rather than 
the entire report, and make the request only where the pertinent information could not be obtained 
through other sources. See id. 
265. The agency refused, however, to flatly forego inspections or waive penalties in exchange 
for implementing audits. See id. at 25,007. 
266. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FACTORS IN DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS IN TIIE CONTEXT OF SIGNIFICANT VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE OR 
DISCLOSURE EFFORTS BY TIIE VIOLATOR (July I, 1991). The policy provides that "self-auditing, self-
policing, and voluntary disclosure of environmental violations" are mitigating factors in the Depart-
ment's exercise of its criminal enforcement discretion. See id. at I. 
267. See Memorandum from Phyllis J. Newton, Staff Director, U.S. Sentencing Commission, on 
the Report from Advisory Group on Environmental Sanctions (Dec. 6, 1993). The Commission de-
cided in 1994 not to submit its proposal to Congress for consideration, but the guidelines likely will 
playa significant role in shaping future proposals. See Silecchia, supra note 65, at 607 n.70. Both the 
Department of Justice policy on criminal enforcement and the Sentencing Guidelines encourage 
compliance management systems that are more comprehensive than environmental auditing. See id. at 
604-12. Other policies that seek to encourage auditing through similar approaches are the EPA's pol-
icy on the exercise of its criminal investigative discretion and its policy on debarment from govern-
ment contracts. See Office of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring, U.S. Envtl. Protection 
Agency, The Exercise of Investigative Discretion (last modified Apr. 17, 1997) <http://es.epa.gov/ 
oecalore/aedlcomp/acomp/all.html>; EPA Policies Regarding the Role of Corporate Attitude, Poli-
cies, Practices, and Procedures in Determining Whether to Remove a Facility from the EPA List of 
Violating Facilities Following a Criminal Conviction, FRL-4039-4, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,785 (Dec. 12, 
1991). Congress also sought in a limited way to encourage auditing by stating in the Conference Re-
port accompanying the 1990 Clean Air Amendments that available criminal penalties "should not be 
applied in a situation where a person acting in good faith, promptly reports the results of an audit and 
promptly acts to correct any deviation." H.R. REp. No. 101-952 (1990). 
268. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.450-09.25.490 (Michie 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1-301 to 
8-1-312 (Michie 1995); COLO. REV. STAT §§ 13-25-126.5,25-1-114.5 (1995); IDAHO CODE §§ 9-801 
to 9-811 (1997); 415lLL. COMPo STAT. 5152.2 (West 1997); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-28-4-1 to 13-28-4-
10 (Michie 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3332 to 60-3339 (1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-
040 (Banks-Baldwin 1997); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 324.14801-324.14810 (West 1997); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 114C.20-114C.31 (West 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71 (1996); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 75-1-1201 to -1206 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. § 445c.Ol0-.120 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 147-E:l to -E:9 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3745.70-3745.73 (Banks-Baldwin 1997); OR. 
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almost all of the remaining states.269 The measures fall into two general 
categories, granting either an evidentiary and discovery privilege for the 
contents of reports based on environmental audits or immunity for viola-
tions uncovered by an environmental audit.27o Although the specifics of 
the state measures vary, they generally require that entities voluntarily re-
port any self-discovered violations within a certain time to regulatory 
agencies and timely correct the violations to qualify for immunity.271 
In 1995, the EPA issued its policy on voluntary disclosure of viola-
tions in an attempt to forge a middle ground in the audit debate.272 The 
policy does not accord any privileges or immunities, but rather seeks to 
promote auditing and other iuternal review processes by granting a variety 
of beuefits to firms that voluntarily disclose and correct violations they 
discover in their self-conducted audits.273 Several states have taken simi-
REV. STAT. § 468.963 (1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS, § 42-17.8-1 to -8 (1997); s.c. CODE ANN. §§ 48-57-
10 to 48-57-110 (Law Co-op. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 1-40-33 to 1-40-37 (Michie 1996); TEx. 
NAT. REs. CODE ANN. Art. 4447cc (West 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-101 to 19-7-109 (1996); 
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1198 to 10.1-1199 (Michie 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-11-1105 to 35-
11-1106 (Michie 1995). 
269. See Lynn Holdsworth, Comment, Florida's Environmental Self-Audit Legislation: All /11-
centive for the Environmentally-Conscientious Business or an Opportllnity for the Corporate Polllller 
to Suppress the Truth?, 27 STETSONL. REV. 211, 217 nn.26, 27 (1997). Federal legislation providing 
privileges to environmental audits has also been introduced. See S.866, 105th Congo (1997); S.582, 
l04th Congo (1995); H.R. 1047, l04th Congo (1995). 
270. The majority of states have adopted laws that contain both privilege and immunity provi-
sions. 
271. The scope of the privilege varies by state. Generally, the privilege does not apply to infor-
mation required by law to be collected and disclosed to government agencies, where the audit is con-
ducted in bad faith or for fraudulent purposes, where the audit shows evidence of noncompliance and 
no attempt to correct the noncompliance, or where information in the audit report is necessary to pro-
tect the publie health or safety and cannot be obtained by other means. A few states extend the privi-
lege to the underlying facts of an audit or require the auditing entity to report the audit to assert the 
privilege; the majority of states do not. The immunity laws also vary, but they typically do not grant 
immunity where there are repeated violations, willful violations, knowing criminal violations, serious 
harm from violations, or where disclosure to the agency occurs after the violations have been discov-
ered or enforcement action commenced by government agencies. Almost all state immunity laws 
provide immunity in civil court proceedings, but only about one-third also grant immunity in criminal 
proceedings. 
272. See Incentives for Self-Policing, supra note 194. For a detailed discussion of the policy, see 
James T. Banks, EPA's New Enforcement Policy: At Last, a Reliable Road Map to Civil Penalty Miti-
gationforSelf-Disclosed ViolatiollS, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,227 (1996). 
273. For an economic analysis of why mitigating penalties are necessary to encourage auditing 
and other self-monitoring by corporations, see Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of 
Corporate Criminal liability, 23 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994). Professor Arlen argues that vicarious 
corporate liability for violations committed by employees will not necessarily lead to greater corporate 
self-enforcement efforts. This is because increased internal enforcement by firms will not only reduce 
the number of violations that occur, but also increase the probability that the government will detect 
these violations-thus enhancing the firm's expected liability. (The analysis assumes that corpora-
tions will voluntarily disclose violations uncovered through self-enforcement efforts.) This is true 
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lar positions.274 Under EPA policy, the strongest incentives are for firms 
that conduct an environmental audit or that have a systematic compliance 
management program which "reflects the regulated entity's due diligence 
in preventing, detecting, and correcting violations."275 For these entities, 
the EPA does not seek gravity-based penalties for violations that are 
promptly disclosed and corrected. Gravity-based penalties are penalties 
that seek to punish violators after the economic benefit of noncompliance 
has been recovered. The agency, however, may seek to recover any eco-
nomic gain firms have realized from noncompliance. It also does not rec-
ommend criminal prosecution against these firms, with some limited ex-
ceptions. For other entities, the EPA reduces gravity-based penalties by 
seventy-five percent for violations promptly disclosed and corrected even 
if not the result of a formal audit or systematic compliance program. To 
come within the policy, the violation must have been identified voluntarily 
and not as a result of legally required monitoring or auditing.276 The pol-
icy does not apply to repeat violations or violations which resulted in ac-
regardless of the size of the penalty; in fact, imposing greater sanctions may result in even greater in-
centive to reduce internal corporate enforcement expenditures. Professor Arlen recommends, among 
other solutions, that penalties should vary based on the level of corporate self-enforcement expendi-
tures. 
274. In California, Pennsylvania, and Florida, state environmental agencies have adopted poli-
cies that largely parallel the EPA's guidance. See Memorandum from Gerald G. Johnston, Assistant 
Secretary for Law Enforcement and Counsel, California Environmental Protection Agency, to Direc-
tors, Executive Officers, Chief Counsel, and Enforcement Chiefs, California Environmental Protection 
Agency (July 8, 1996) <http://www.calepa.cahwnetgov!epadocslpolincni.txt> (describing the state 
agency's policy on incentives for self-evaluation); OFFICE OF POLICY AND COMMUNICATIONS, 
PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, Doc. No. 012-0840-001, POLICY To ENCOURAGE 
VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE BY MEANs OF ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AUDITS AND IMPLE-
MENTATION OF COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (last modified on Feb. 5, 1997) 
<http://www.dep.state.pa.usldep!subjectlfinal_policies!audiCpolicy.htm>; OFFICE OF THE GENERAL 
COUNSEL, FLORIDA DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, DEP 922, INCENTIVES FOR SELF-EVALUATION BY 
THE REGULATED COMMUNITY (1996), reprinted in DEP ENFORCEMENT MANUAL app. MISCEL-
LANEOUS DIRECTIVES (1998) <http://www.dep.state.fi.us!ogc/documents!enfmanual!appendixl 
dep922.pdf>. A number of other states have also enacted self-disclosure poliCies that do not include 
audit privilege or immunity provisions. See The Review of Activities by the Federal Government Con-
cerining Individuals or Organizations Voluntarily Submitting to Environmental Audits: Hearings Be-
fore the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1997) (prepared state-
ment of Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator, Office of Enforcement and Compliance 
Assurance, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) [hereinafter Hearings on Environmental Audit 
Privileges] (listing I I states with their own self-disclosure policies that do not limit enforcement 
authority). 
275. Incentives for Self-Policing, supra note 194, at 66,708. 
276. So long as the violations are voluntarily discovered, however, the policy applies even if the 
violations must otherwise be reported. The violations must be disclosed promptly and prior to the 
initiation of an enforcement action, investigation or citizen notice, and they must be corrected expedi-
tiously. The regulated entity must also cooperate with enforcement agencies in determining the facts 
of the violation, and take steps to prevent a recurrence of the violation. 
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tual harm or presented a substantial threat to public health or the environ-
ment. It is also not applicable to criminal violations involving conscious 
avoidance of, or willful blindness to, the law, or management practices to 
conceal or condone noncompliance.277 
b. The benefits of mandatory, publicly disclosed audits of publicly 
traded corporations: The current debate about auditing focuses on the 
wisdom of privilege and immunity provisions-in particular, whether they 
are necessary to promote corporate auditing practices, and whether they 
undermine enforcement and the public's right to know. This emphasis is 
too narrow; the discussion instead should be about making audits 
mandatory for as many regulated entities as possible. 
Although not without limitations, environmental auditing is a very ef-
fective means for businesses to monitor their compliance with environ-
mental requirements, which is precisely why many responsible corpora-
tions voluntarily conduct them. As discussed above, audits may be more 
extensive than agency inspections or carried out more frequently.278 Such 
self-policing efforts, especially where results must be reported to govern-
mental agencies, can be a highly effective tool for promoting compli-
ance.279 Ideally, all regulated firms should conduct audits. As a first step 
in this direction, audits should be required for all publicly traded corpora-
tions. Publicly traded corporations can best afford environmental audits, 
and many already conduct them.28o 
Environmental audits also should be disclosed to the public. There 
are strong utilitarian and entitlement rationales justifying public disclo-
sure.281 For example, disclosure of environmental audits, like disclosure 
277. The EPA also reiterated its preexisting policy not to routinely request audit reports, but re-
serving its option to seek the reports in limited circumstances. 
278. See supra Part III.A.3. 
279. See Eric Bregman & Arthur Jacobson, Environmental Peifo171UJnce Review: Self-Regulation 
in Environmental Law, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 465, 484 (1994) (arguing that there is no doubt that rou-
tine audits linked to effective internal control systems enhance the effect of regulation); Michael, su-
pra note 40, at 575 (suggesting that self-reporting requirements of the Clean Water Act create an in-
centive for sources to comply rather than to confess noncompliance). 
280. Moreover, publicly traded corporations are likely to be most sensitive to market pressure 
triggered by public disclosure of environmental audits since the audience of parties interested in the 
audits includes investors, consumers, and employees. Limiting an audit requirement to publicly 
traded corporations is admittedly an imperfect solution. Smaller, closely held companies clearly 
commit a substantial number of environmental violations. Moreover, some small public companies 
may not be in a better position to bear the costs of audits than private companies. Nonetheless, this 
incremental step is probably all that is politically feasible at this time. 
281. Requiring public disclosure is consistent with the broad trend in environmental law toward 
greater reliance on information disclosure and market-based incentives, and away from direct regula-
tion. This development has been embraced by those on all sides of the political spectrum; conserva-
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of financial audits, helps promote the efficient functioning of securities 
markets. Securities law requires publicly held corporations to disclose in-
dependently audited financial statements to the public and potential inves-
tors on the theory that disclosure provides investors with the information 
they need to make intelligent decisions. Information in an environmental 
audit-which is esseutially a snapshot of a firm's environmental health-
is at least as relevant to some investors as a picture of a firm's financial 
well-being.282 Likewise, audit disclosure can help consumers make better-
informed decisions about whether to purchase a firm's products, and al-
lows workers to negotiate for less hazardous working conditions or de-
mand wage premiums for risky jobs.283 Beyond the marketplace, disclo-
sure furthers citizen power and advances democratic decisionmaking. It 
allows local residents and members of the public to participate more ef-
fectively in permit, land use, and other local political decisions involving-
the company. It enhances the public's ability to bargain with private cor-
porations and exert pressure on companies to change their environmental 
practices.284 It also enables citizens to enforce environmental laws, since 
"the public cannot participate in [the enforcement] process without having 
access to adequate information regarding a facility's compliance with en-
vironmental regulations.,,285 In essence, disclosure has an important deter-
tives favor disclosure because it relies on market forces, while consumer advocates endorse it as a 
right and tool that enables individuals to protect their interests. See JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE 
DILEMMA OF TOXIC SUBSTANCE REGULATION: How OVERREGULATION CURES UNDERREGULATION AT 
OSHA 209-10 (1988). 
282. This is especially true as the socially responsible investment movement expands. See supra 
note 59. 
283. As discussed above, however, there are important limitations on the ability of the market-
place to promote compliance with environmental laws. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. 
284. For these reasons, the EPA has embarked on a program to provide the public with better 
access to its integrated enforcement data system, including information about the past compliance of 
companies and facilities. The agency advocates the program as "providing the public with a powerful 
tool they can use to promote environmental accountability." Stahl, Enforcement in Transition, supra 
note 3, at 22. 
285. Steven A. Herman, It Takes a Partnership, 14 ENVTL. F., May-June 1997, at 26, 30. As a 
noteworthy example of how audit privilege laws can frustrate citizen enforcement efforts, environ-
mental advocates cite the experience of community groups living adjacent to a landfill owned by 
Waste Management, Inc. in Cincinnati, Ohio. See Feel-Good Notions, supra note2l6. In 1996, based 
on Ohio's recently enacted audit privilege law, Waste Management sought to withhold (and actually 
recapture previously disclosed) audit results and other documents containing air emissions data, 
compliance reviews, and other information. The company was unsuccessful because the state's audit 
privilege law had yet to go into effect. Community advocates used the information, which showed a 
pattern of toxic gas emissions from the landfill and alleged violations of federal environmental laws, 
to persuade state regulators to issue a corrective order limiting emissions from the landfill. See id. 
Steven Herman, EPA's Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance, also recently testi-
fied before Congress that audit privilege laws jeopardize human health and the environment. See 
Hearings on Environmental Audit Privilege, supra note 274, at 49-55 (statement of Steven Herman). 
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rent function and helps promote compliance by raising the firms' costs of 
violating environmental requirements.286 
In addition to these utilitarian rationales, public disclosure is justified 
on entitlement grounds-namely, that members of the public have a fun-
damental right to know what substances and risks they are exposed to by 
facilities in their community.287 Disclosure furthers individual autonomy 
by creating awareness of the risks involved in specific choices and allow-
ing individuals to decide whether or not to encounter these risks. 
Businesses should be generally supportive of an auditing requirement, 
since it is a practice that many have voluntarily embraced. Auditing, un-
like substantive environmental regulation, does not intrude on manage-
ment prerogatives or dictate how a firm must satisfy regulatory require-
ments. It is a process for identifying whether a firm is meeting 
environmental requirements and c~ help a company avoid far more intru-
sive enforcement actions. Still, mandating audits, and in particular the 
public disclosure of audits, is certain to generate business opposition. One 
reason for opposition is the costs of audits.288 Publicly traded corpora-
tions, however, should be able to absorb this expense without great hard-
ship. Moreover, audits usually save firms money by identifying more ef-
ficient production processes and ways to reduce waste generation, as well 
Hennan referred to two specific instances. In Arkansas, the EI Dorado Chemical Company attempted 
to use the state's audit privilege law to shield environmental impacts infonnation from local citizens 
who sued the company alleging that they suffered respiratory ailments due to the company's air emis-
sions. See id. at 55. In Texas, Browning-Ferris, Inc. successfully used a privilege law to preclude 
disclosure of two environmental audits that local residents sought to document groundwater contami-
nation from the company's landfill. See id. 
286. As Malcolm Sparrow argues, the success of the Emergency Planning and Community Right 
to Know's (EPCRA) disclosure requirements, which mandate industrial facilities to report annually 
their routine releases of certain toxic chemicals, demonstrates how an infonned public can be an ally 
to the government in achieving compliance. See SPARROW, supra note 3, at 96. As a result of 
EPCRA's requirements, from 1987 to 1993, facilities reported a national drop in toxic releases of 43% 
from an initial figure of 7 billion pounds. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Efficient Pollution Rille Under 
Attack, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,1995, at A16. Senator Frank Lautenberg has argucd that "the right.to-
know [EPCRA] has probably led to more voluntary pollution prevention efforts and more environ-
mental cleanup than any other environmental law." 141 CONGo REC. S9886 (daily ed. July, 13, 1995) 
(statement of Sen. Lautenberg). 
287. Not all environmental audits will necessarily reveal this infonnation, but many likely will. 
288. The costs of auditing a facility vary considerably, depending on its size, number of emis-
sion points and other factors. The 1995 Price Waterhouse survey of u.s. companies found that the 
direct cost to audit a single facility ranged from $200 to $150,000, with a median cost of $1 0,000. See 
Voluntary Environmental Audit, supra note 66, at 6. The median annual cost of an auditing program 
for companies-many of which audit multiple facilities each year-was $120,000. See id. See also 
DON SAYRE, INSIDE ISO 14001-THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
140 (1996) (noting that ISO 14000 environmental audits may cost around $10,000 to $100,000). 
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as by reducing their exposure to enforcement actions and liability suits.289 
For smaller businesses that cannot afford auditing programs, however, the 
EPA and states should provide financial assistance for third-party auditors 
or offer aUditing services for free, perhaps creating a cadre of trained gov-
ernmental auditors. A good model is suggested by EPA's Region I, which 
recently began providing free compliance and pollution prevention audits 
to small and medium-sized companies.29o 
Firms will object strongly to forced public disclosure of audit results, 
and in particular to the unfairness of the use of audit information as the 
basis for government enforcement actions or third-party liability suits. 
However, regulated entities already are required to monitor, record, and in 
many cases, report extensive aspects of their compliance with environ-
mental laws to government agencies.291 Under the Clean Water Act, for 
example, dischargers must regularly monitor and report their compliance 
with permit limitations; the reports filed can be the basis of government or 
citizen enforcement actions.292 Likewise, all sources required to have a 
permit under the Clean Air Act must submit an annual compliance certifi-
cation report documenting facility compliance with their permits.293 
Permitted hazardous waste facilities also have extensive monitoring and 
reporting obligations.294 Thus, a requirement that audit reports be dis-
289. See supra note 64, and infra notes 301-05 and accompanying text. 
290. In exchange, participating companies must achieve compliance and implement at least one 
pollution prevention project. See Hawkins, supra note 5, at 45. 
291. See Silecchia, supra note 65, at 625-26 & n. 1 34. A variety of non environmental regulatory 
schemes likewise require firms to self-monitor and report violations, thus making available informa-
tion that can be used by agencies in enforcement actions. See Michael, supra note 40, at 589. 
292. See Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 122.41 0)(1) (1997). 
293. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(c) (1994). See also 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(3) (requiring enhanced 
monitoring and submission of compliance certificates by all major stationery sources); 40 C.F.R. 
§ 70.6(a)(3)(iii)(A) (providing that certified reports of required monitoring related to permits must be 
submitted at least every six months and include U[a]ll instances of deviations from permit require-
ments"). The Clean Air Act also requires reporting emissions in excess of applicable standards from 
sources that are subject to new source performance standards. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.7(c), (d). Further-
more, it requires reporting of excess emissions and monitoring results from sources subject to national 
emission standards for hazardous air pollutants. See id. Likewise, utilities subject to the Clean Air 
Act's acid rain trading provisions are required to install continuous emissions monitoring systems or 
their equivalent. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651k(a). One commentator notes that U[s]elf-reporting and self-
monitoring are 'cornerstones' of the enforcement system" for the Clean Air Act's requirements. 
ARNOLDREITZE, AIR POLLUTION LAW § 18-1 (1995). 
294. For example, they must keep records of their training of personnel, internal facility inspec-
tions and repairs of facility equipment, waste analyses, operating logs, and other matters, all of which 
are available for review by agencies during facility inspections. These entities must also submit to 
regulators reports regarding releases, fires, and explosions at their facilities, and reports about facility 
compliance with schedules set forth in the permit; they must conduct extensive on-site environmental 
monitoring and report the results to regulators. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 19, at 54-26 to -27. 
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closed is in many ways a logical extension of existing law.295 The fear of 
third-party toxic tort lawsuits is more imagined than real because these 
cases are enormously difficult to prosecute and win.296 But the more fun-
damental rejoinder to these arguments is that the information in audits is 
largely of a public character, reflecting whether a firm is in compliance 
with publicly enacted requirements designed to protect the public.297 As 
previously explained, depriving the public of access to this material denies 
them knowledge fundamental to their ability to make fully-informed and 
well-considered political and economic decisions-a cost too high to pro-
tect firms from the possibility of lawsuits. 
c. The disadvantages of audit privilege and immunity laws to 
enforcement: A mandatory audit requirement just for publicly traded 
companies, notwithstanding its many benefits, is unlikely to be adopted 
any time soon. In the meantime, a key policy question is the 
appropriateness of an evidentiary privilege for audits or immunity from 
prosecution for violations. This issue has sparked an intense debate among 
the EPA, states, regulated entities, and the environmental community, with 
one state official accusing the EPA of launching a "holy war" against 
states with privilege and immunity statutes.298 The Clinton Administration 
opposed many of the far-reaching state proposals, and warned a number of 
states that such audit measures may result in the agency withholding or 
revoking delegation of authority to administer federal environmental 
programs.299 Citizen groups in five states have requested that the EPA 
295. Moreover, government agencies report that they have rarely, if ever, used audit data as the 
basis for enforcement actions. See infra note 304. 
296. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. 
297. To the extent that audits discuss trade secrets or confidential business information, this in-
formation should be withheld. 
298. See Hearings on the Relationship Between Federal and State Governments, supra note 2, at 
199 (prepared statement of Patricia S. Bangert). 
299. The EPA has articulated the types of enforcement authority states with privilege and im-
munity laws must retain to receive approval to enforce federally-delegated programs. States must 
have the authority to (1) obtain immediate and complete injunctive relief for any violation of program 
requirements; (2) recover civil penalties for significant economic benefit, repeat violations and viola-
tions of judicial or administrative orders, serious harm, and activities that may present an imminent 
and substantial danger; and (3) obtain criminal penalties for willful and knowing violations. The state 
laws must also not interfere with the public's right to obtain information about a facility's compliance 
with environmental requirements, and not restrict the state's ability to obtain information needed to 
identify noncompliance or criminal conduct. See Memorandum from Steven A. Herman, Robert Per-
ciasepe, Mary Nichols and Timothy Fields to U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Regional Ad-
ministrators (Feb. 14, 1997), reprinted in Daily Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at E-16 (Feb. 24, 1997). 
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withdraw parts of its delegated programs in their states because of the 
passage of audit/immunity laws.30o 
Without repeating the issues explored at length elsewhere,301 the ar-
guments below form the basic contours of this debate. Advocates of 
privilege and immunity provisions argue that these laws create a critically 
important incentive for firms to conduct audits. Without these legal pro-
tections, many firms would forego audits because of fear that the informa-
tion discovered will be used against them in enforcement actions or third-
party lawsuits. In fact, the audit reports would provide a road map of vio-
lations for enforcement agencies. Moreover, the argument goes, self-
audits uncover and correct many violations that the government would 
never discover on its own.302 Thus, absent protection from future en-
forcement, firms would expose themselves to greater risk by conducting 
audits.303 A 1995 Price Waterhouse survey found that two-thirds of the 
firms with auditing programs in place would conduct more audits if penal-
ties were waived for violations voluntarily discovered and disclosed.304 
300. Petitions have been filed in Colorado, Idaho, Michigan, Ohio, and Texas. See id. Some 
have taken the position that the push for audit/immunity laws has been driven by corporations with 
poor environmental records. See Engel, supra note 135, at 349 & n.228 (quoting BEDFORD, supra 
note 72). 
301. The literature discussing the debate over audit immunity and privilege provisions is exten-
sive. For some recent examples, see Heather L. Cook & Robert R. Hearn, Putting Together the 
Pieces: A Comprehensive Examination of the Legal and Policy Issues of Environmental Auditing, 7 
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 545 (1994); Peter A. Gish, The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege and Environmental 
Audit Reports, 25 ENVTL. L. 73 (1995); Michael Goldsmith & Chad W. King, Policing Corporate 
Crime: The Dilemma of Internal Compliance Programs, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1997); E. Lynn Grayson 
& Christina Riewer, EPA's Audit Policy and State Audit-Privilege Laws: Moving Beyond Command 
and Control?, 27 Envtl. Law Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,243 (1997); Harris, supra note 35; Holdsworth, 
supra note 269; Terrel E. Hunt & Timothy A. Wilkins, Environmental Audits and Enforcement Policy, 
16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365 (1992); Johnston, supra note 66; Edwin F. Lowry, Environmental 
Audit Privilege Legislation: Necessary for Business or a Nightmare for Prosecutors?, 17 PROSE· 
CUTOR'S BRIEF 5 (1995); Van Cleve & Holman, supra note 13; Weaver et al., supra note 63; Marty, 
supra note 14. See also Silecchia, supra note 65, at 603 n.58 (citing articles); Carr & Thomas, supra 
note 71, at 115 & n.79, 117 & n.81 (citing articles). 
302. See, e.g., Weaveret al., supra note 64, at7 ("[B]ecause the resources of EPA and most state 
regulatory agencies are spread so thin, most violations discovered and reported by businesses as a re-
sult of voluntary environmental audits probably would not otherwise have been found, much less re-
ported and corrected."). 
303. See Marty, supra note 14, at 544-45 (arguing that audit privilege laws will reduce costs of 
audits since attorneys will no longer he strategically employed to bring audits within attorney-client or 
work-product privileges, and will lead to more effective auditing practices since the lack of privilege 
protections encourages the production of vaguely worded and difficult-to· implement audit reports). 
304. See Voluntary Environmental Audit, supra note 66, at 6. On the other hand, the survey 
found that 75% of responding firms were already conducting audits, and that among companies that 
did not audit, the primary reason most often cited was not fear of disclosure but a perception that the 
firm's processes and products had an insignificant environmental impact. See id. at 5·6. Enforcement 
agencies contend that privilege/immunity legislation is unnecessary because information in an envi-
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The opposing camp contends that audit privileges or immunities are 
not necessary to stimulate auditing for a number of reasons. First, many 
businesses wiII voluntarily conduct audits to reduce their liability and for 
other sound business reasons.305 Many will audit to comply with voluntary 
environmental management codes.306 Additionally, firms already realize 
important enforcement benefits from conducting audits, under the EPA's 
voluntary disclosure policy, the Department of Justice's guidelines for 
criminal prosecution of environmental violations, and the EPA's policy on 
criminal environmental investigations.307 Even in the absence of such 
formal policies, state and local agencies inevitably consider a firm's 
auditing practices when calculating penalties or making other enforcement 
decisions.308 
The EPA contends its policy is effective by pointing to the more than 
225 companies that had disclosed and corrected violations at more than 
700 facilities as of October 1997.309 Privilege proponents reply that privi-
lege laws have resulted in a greater number of regulated entities reporting 
and correcting violations than under the EPA's policy.310 In fact, the ini-
ronmental audit is virtually never used to prosecute a company; the most frequently cited statistic is 
that it has been used in three cases. See Lowry, supra note 301, at 6. But as supporters of privilege 
legislation note, the prospect that the information might be used still influences corporate willingness 
to conduct audits. They also rejoin that if the information is used so rarely, enforcers should not ob-
ject to cloaking it with a privilege. 
305. See Harris, supra note 35, at 679-83 (arguing that the benefits to auditing include: avoiding 
and reducing liability, reducing costs and increasing profits by gathering information about a com-
pany's expenditures for production and pollution prevention, attracting and maintaining corporate 
investors, and generating favorable publicity). 
306. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
307. See supra Part V.C.I.a. Businesses counter that penalty mitigation is not easy to obtain 
under the EPA's policy; the policy itself is vague in certain key areas; and the policy excludes serious 
violations. See Weaver et aI., supra note 64, at 7. See also Jim Moore & Nancy Newkirk, Not Quite 
a Giant Step, ENVTL. F., May-June 1995, at 16, 19. 
308. See, e.g., Krista McIntyre, Voluntary Disclosure-Gotella!, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 52, 
53 (Spring 1997) ("No member of the regulated community can dispute that in any environmental 
enforcement action (state or federal agency initiated) it is easier to negotiate resolution of violations 
that are voluntarily disclosed and corrected, than to negotiate resolution of violations that were dis-
covered independently by the government and are ongoing."). 
309. See Environmental Audit Privileges, supra note 274, at 51 (statement of Steven Herman). 
310. See Weaveret aI., supra note 64, at 12-13 (citing a 1996 report from the Texas Senate Natu-
ral Resources Committce indicating that the state environmental agency received 256 notifications of 
intent to audit and 42 voluntary disclosures of violations from facilities during the first ycar the audit 
privilege bill was in effect, and arguing that these figures compare very favorably to the 105 disclo-
sures the EPA received from regulated entities during 1996). See also Environmental Audit Privi-
leges, supra note 274, at 85-86 (prepared statement of Barry McBee, Chairman, Texas Natural Re-
source Conservation Commission) (noting that during the first two and a half years the Texas audit 
privilege bill was in effect, the state environmental agency received 650 notifications of intent to audit 
and 100 voluntary disclosures of violations). 
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tial evidence does not support these latter claims; there apparently has 
been relatively little additional auditing and disclosure stimulated by the 
state statutes.311 But this lack of activity may not be determinative either, 
since, as audit advocates are quick to point out, companies may be chilled 
from taking advantage of state laws by the prospect of direct federal ac-
tions or federal overfiling against them.312 At the very least, while the evi-
dence is not conclusive, it suggests that most businesses (especially larger 
firms) will likely audit for business reasons even in the absence of privi-
lege/immunity protections.313 
Opponents of audit privilege and immunity measures also contend, 
with considerable justification, that privilege laws would complicate and 
increase the costs of enforcement. These provisions would invite litigation 
over what material is or is not privileged, a problem compounded by the 
lack of clear guidelines in many state statutes over the scope of the privi-
lege.314 
Beyond these concerns, there are two overriding flaws of privi-
lege/immunity measures. First, they seriously undermine the incentives 
for facilities to take preventative steps to achieve compliance. To varying 
degrees, they permit firms to sit back and wait until an audit is conducted 
311. See Environmental Audits: State Immunity, Privilege Laws Examined for Conflicts Affecting 
Delegated Programs, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 181, at AA-I, I (Sept 18, 1996) (observing that 
some states report no instances of regulated entities seeking the protection of audit laws); Arrandale, 
supra note 71, at 36 (noting that Colorado's audit/privilege statute has resulted in just 23 violation 
disclosures in three years). 
312. The Colorado Attorney General Office has complained that "it is impossible to measure the 
success of audit programs if companies are discouraged from participating in them by EPA's threats of 
overfiling. EPA's response [to State privilege and immunity laws], in practice, nullifies State laws." 
Hearings on the Relationship Between Federal and State Governments, supra note 2, at 200 (prepared 
statement of Patricia S. Bangert). On the other hand, federal overfiling-the initiation of a federal 
enforcement action following a state action for the same violation against the same facility-occurs 
very rarely, and because of the politically sensitive nature of such actions, is unlikely to increase in the 
future. See id. at 161-62 (statement of Steven A. Herman). During fiscal years 1994 and 1995, the 
EPA overfiled on 18 cases or about 0.1 % of state enforcement actions; during the next fiscal year, the 
EPA overfiled in four cases. Moreover, the EPA has disclaimed any intention to target companies in 
states with audit privilege and immunity laws. See id. at 162. 
313. See Silecchia, supra note 65, at 628 (arguing that firms wiII continue to create environ-
mental compliance plans because of substantial legal benefits for doing so). See also Breger, supra 
note 3, at 327 (noting that the argument that companies will cut back their voluntary self-policing ef-
forts in the absence of privilege laws, "[f]or large corporations, at least, is IittIe more than an advo-
cate's assertion and should be taken as such"). 
314. See Incentives for Self-Policing, supra note 194, at 66,710; Lowry, supra note 301, at 19 
("[prosecutors] fear that in virtually every case where a company document is involved, the defense 
will request a hearing about its admissibility."). A number of state laws require privilege questions to 
be resolved by in camera proceedings, further adding to the expense of enforcement actions. See In-
centives for Self-Policing, supra note 194, at 66,710. 
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before coming into compliance. Then, so long as a firm corrects and dis· 
closes the violations, its sanctionable behavior will be excused. Privilege 
laws achieve this effect indirectly by making it more difficult and in some 
cases impossible for enforcement agencies to obtain evidence about viola· 
tions contained in an audit report. Immunity statutes achieve this effect 
directly. The broader versions of these latter measures immunize inten· 
tional criminal conduct and serious violations that pose significant threats 
to the environment. This runs counter to the assumptions of most en· 
forcement activity; as one prosecutor succinctly puts it, "[y]ou wouldn't 
expect that the act of confessing to a crime should bring with it an entitle· 
ment of immunity .'>315 
Privilege/immunity laws also allow firms to retain the economic 
benefit they obtain from noncompliance, removing an important incentive 
for timely compliance. As the EPA argues in opposition to state measures 
that do not recoup economic benefit if violations are disclosed and cor· 
rected, "[t]axpayers expect to pay interest or a penalty fee if their tax pay· 
ments are late; the same principle should apply to corporations that have 
delayed their investment in compliance."316 
Second, privilege laws are highly objectionable because, as described 
above, they keep a category of public environmental information pertain· 
ing to the facility's compliance with environmental requirements secret 
and out of the public's reach.317 As one commentator summarizes, these 
measures "[regard] third parties as almost unnecessary to administration of 
the regulatory system.',318 
The EPA's voluntary disclosure policy and similar state initiatives 
strike a better, albeit not perfect, balance between promoting self·policing 
and retaining a meaningful deterrent component of enforcement. The 
policies provide strong encouragement to audit by waiving all gravity· 
based penalties and generally not recommending criminal enforcement 
when violations are voluntarily disclosed and corrected, but they do not 
315. Lowry, supra note 301, at 5. Another commentator cchoes these concerns: 
[Audit amnesty programs] emphasize, virtually to the exclusion of other considerations, the 
need to correct the present violation .•.. [H]ow does an audit amnesty progmm affirmatively 
discourage employees from allowing, through inattention or negligence, non·complying 
conditions to come into existence? If employees can be presumed to be knowledgeable both 
about their firm's audit procedures and the government's amnesty response, then it can be 
speculated that their vigilance may in fact be reduced. 
Welles, supra note 9, at 16 (citations omitted). 
316. Incentives for Self-Policing, supra note 194, at 66,707. 
317. The EPA's position is that "[i]n the final analysis, an audit privilege invites secrecy and 
breeds distrust." Herman, supra note 285, at 30. 
318. Welles, supra note 9, at 46. 
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grant any privileges to audit documents. The policies contain insufficient 
incentive, however, for firms to take steps to prevent violations before the 
audits are conducted.319 The only sanction facing a firm that does not act 
proactively to achieve compliance is potential action by the EPA or states 
to recover the economic benefit gained from noncompliance. However, 
this merely puts a firm back in the position it would have been had it 
originally complied; it does not alter the firm's basic cost-benefit calcula-
tion as a way to deter violations in the first place. A better approach would 
be not to waive all penalties, but to allow enforcement agencies to consider 
the voluntary disclosure and correction of the violations when determining 
enforcement responses and the size of penalties to impose.32o Audits 
should also be the basis for agencies to provide firms with other enforce-
ment and permit benefits, such as less frequent inspections or inspections 
reduced in scope, accelerated permit reviews, and eligibility to participate 
in other flexible regulatory initiatives.321 
2. Environmental Management Systems 
Environmental management systems are more comprehensive than 
environmental audits. Audits are intended to measure, at a fixed point in 
time, a facility's compliance with a specific set of regulatory requirements 
or other criteria. Management systems, by contrast, seek to evaluate and 
319. There is an important qualification to this point, however. The EPA policy also provides 
enforcement benefits to firms that voluntarily disclose and correct violations detected through "a 
documented, systematic procedure or practice which reflects the regulated entity's due diligence in 
preventing, detecting, and correcting violations." Incentives for Self-Policing, supra note 194, at 
66,708. Due diligence is defined by the EPA to include efforts to prevent, detect, and correct viola-
tions, including mechanisms for systematically assuring that compliance policies are being carried out. 
See id. at 66,708, 66,710 to 66,711 (emphasis added). Thus, arguably, some firms that satisfy the 
EPA's due diligence standard may have management systems that include preventative measures to 
avert violations-systems comparable to the environmental management systems discussed below. 
For these firms, it may be appropriate to waive gravity-based penalties for certain types of violations 
when they are voluntarily detected and corrected. See infra notes 358-59 and accompanying text. 
320. It also is desirable for enforcement officials to retain some discretion in choosing enforce-
ment responses rather than being bound by fixed policies. There is extensive evidence demonstrating 
that, contrary to popular misconception, agency officials act flexibly and pragmatically in meting out 
penalties. There may be some instances where, despite the voluntary disclosure and correction of a 
violation, a small penalty would be appropriate; the EPA approach would preclude this. 
321. For a critique of the EPA's auditing policy as insufficiently ambitious, see Silecchia, supra 
note 65, at 615-24. Professor Silecchia criticizes the auditing policy, as well as the Department of 
Justice's policy on criminal enforcement of environmental violations and the Sentencing Commis-
sion's proposed guidelines for organizational environmental crimes, because it places too much em-
phasis on attaining legal compliance (and on certain means of realizing compliance), and gives insuf-
ficient attention to avoiding environmental harm and improving environmental performance beyond 
what is required by law. See id at 616-33. 
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typically improve the environmental impacts of all activities of a firm.322 
Moreover, the systems are process-oriented; the underlying notion is that 
having better systems in place will lead to better environmental perform-
ance and less pollution. Many environmental management systems, there-
fore, do not focus on a facility's actual performance in complying with 
regulatory standards.323 Like environmental audits, management systems 
have grown over the past decade in response to growing liability concerns 
and enforcement actions.324 
a. The key environmental management systems: The three most 
important environmental management systems for U.S. companies are the 
standard contained in the ISO 14000 series, a recently published set of 
environmental standards issued by the International Organization for 
Standardization (IS 0);325 the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme 
(EMAS) , a voluntary management system adopted by the European 
Union;326 and the EPA's Environmental Leadership Project (ELP). 
ISO's standards have been highly influential in the past,327 and the 
ISO 14000 environmental standards are likewise predicted to become the 
most widely accepted global environmental standards and a condition of 
doing business with a number of countries and corporations.328 The man-
agement standard of the ISO 14000329 consists of several key components. 
322. See Keny E. Rodgers, The ISO Environmental Standards Initiative, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.1. 
181, 184 (1996). 
323. See WELFORD, supra note 72, at 75. 
324. Their growth has also been fueled by the desire of some corporations to import total quality 
management principles into the environmental area, and the desire of some firms to adopt sustainable 
environmental practices. 
325. ISO is an international standards-setting organization whose purpose is to promote interna-
tional standards to facilitate international trade. It consists of the standards-setting organizations of 
100 member nations. ISO standards are documented agreements of technical specifications that com-
panies use as guidelines to ensure that materials and products fit their purpose. For example, the for-
mat of automatic teller machine cards is based on an ISO standard. 
326. The EMAS standard is contained in Council Regulation 1836/93, art. 1(1), 1993 0.1. (L 
168). It was initially proposed as a mandatory scheme for about 50 industrial scctors, but was 
changed to a voluntary program under pressure from industry and concerns about implementation 
costs. See WELFORD, supra note 72, at 72. 
327. The 1987 ISO 9000 quality control standards have become a de facto requirement for doing 
business in Europe and other parts of the world, and have been adopted by about 8,500 companies in 
the United States. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 58, at 500-01; Michael Prince, ISO Now Offering 
Voluntary Standards, Bus. INS., Nov. 11, 1996, at 21. 
328. See Marc E. Gold, ISO 14000: A New Global Business Benchmark, 12 ENVTL. COMPLIANCE 
& LmG. STRATEGY 1 (May 1995). 
329. The ISO 14000 series will establish environmental management systems in six areas: man-
agement systems, auditing, labeling, performance evaluation, life-cycle assessment, and terms and 
definitions. The management systems standard, ISO 14001, will form the overarching framework for 
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The first element is planning: Top management must establish an envi-
ronmental policy for their organizations;330 firms must identify the 
"environmental aspects" of their activities, products and services, and 
applicable legal requirements;331 and they must establish environmental 
objectives and targets, and a program documenting how and when these 
will be achieved.332 The second element is implementation: Firms must 
put in place a number of internal processes to carry out their policies and 
objectives, including designation of responsible managers, training pro-
grams, communication systems and documented operating procedures.333 
The final element is monitoring and review: Firms must regularly measure 
the key characteristics of their activities that have a significant environ-
mental impact, and must periodically conduct management system audits 
to verify compliance with the ISO standard.334 
Under the EMAS, companies are required to establish an environ-
mental policy based on eleven basic principles of good management prac-
tice. For each participating site, companies must develop an environ-
mental program that describes the company's environmental protection 
objectives and an environmental management system.335 As with the ISO 
14001 standard, companies must implement their policies and programs 
through a variety of internal systems, including maintaining a registry of 
"significant" environmental effects at each site.336 Each facility must also 
engage in periodic environmental auditing at least once every three years 
the other standards. For a comprehensive list of sources discussing the ISO 14001 management sys-
tem, see Carr & Thomas, supra note 71, at 152 & n.160. 
330. See International Standards Organization 14001, Environmental Management Systems-
General Guidelines on Principles, Systems and Supporting Techniques, §§ 4.0-4.1 (1996) [hereinafter 
ISO 14001]. 
331. See id. §§ 4.2.1-4.2.2. 
332. See id. §§ 4.2.3-4.2.4. 
333. See id. §§ 4.3.1-4.3.7. 
334. See id. §§ 4.4.1-4.4.4. 
335. See Allowing Voluntary Participation by Companies in the Industrial Sector in a Commu-
nity Beo-Management and Audit Scheme, Council Regulation 1836/93, Annex I, § C (1993), avail-
able in WESTLA W, ENFLEX-EU database [hereinafter Council Regulation]. The principles of good 
management pmctice go well beyond simply achieving compliance, and include: assessing in advance 
the environmental impact of all new activities and products; monitoring the impact of current activi-
ties on the local environment; preventing pollution and reducing pollutant emissions; and providing 
information to the public necessary to understand the environmental impact of the company's activi-
ties. For a detailed list of citations discussing EMAS, see Carr & Thomas, supra note 71, at 167-68 & 
nn.208-10. 
336. See Council Regulation, supra note 335, Annex I, §§ A-C. Among other things, the man-
agement systems must include: periodic review at the highest appropriate management level; designa-
tion of key personnel responsible for environmental performance, education and training of personnel 
at all levels; establishing procedures for investigation and remediation of noncompliance; and estab-
lishing communication procedures concerning environmental practices. 
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that reviews both compliance issues and the facility's management sys-
tem.337 Unlike the ISO standard, facilities also must prepare and publicly 
disseminate statements that summarize in nontechnical form the findings 
of internal audits. The statements must include an assessment of "all the 
significant environmental issues of relevance," and a summary of infor-
mation about emissions, waste generation, consumption of resources, and 
other factors regarding environmental performance. These public state-
ments are verified by "accredited environmental verifiers" who check to 
ensure that the company is in compliance with all aspects of the EMAS 
regulation.338 Once the statements are verified, they are disclosed to the 
public.339 
The EPA's vehicle for encouraging environmental management sys-
tems, ELP, began as a pilot project in 1995 with ten private and two gov-
ernmental facilities, and has expanded to include any eligible facility.340 
To participate, firms must have a "mature" environmental management 
system that expands on the ISO 14001 management requirements.341 The 
environmental management system must specifically include systems for 
achieving continual compliance with all legal requirements, continually 
improving the organization's environmental performance, implementing 
pollution prevention practices to stop the generation of pollution at its 
source, and communicating with community stakeholders about the or-
337. See id. Annex II, § C. The auditing may be done by company staff or external auditors, but 
the auditors must be technically qualified, and in the case of internal auditors, independent of the ac-
tivities they are auditing. 
338. See id. art. 6.1-.7. The verifiers, described as a new professional occupation that is "part 
accountant, part environmental scientist, and part lawyer/regulator," are accredited by each European 
Union member state, and must be independent. Orts, supra note 3, at 1306. 
339. See Council Regulation, supra note 335, art. 4.7. The data underlying the environmental 
statement remain confidential, however. See id. art. 10.3. Facilities that successfully comply with 
EMAS requirements are officially registered and listed, and also can use a gmphic to announce their 
compliance, but the gmphic cannot be used for advertising products or on packaging. 
340. The EPA also seeks to encoumge states to work with regulated entities to develop environ-
mental management systems through a grant progmrn administered by its Office of Water. See Pro-
posal for Using Voluntary Environmental Management Systems in State Water Progmms, FRL-5678-
7,62 Fed. Reg. 3036 (Jan. 21, 1997). Regional EPA offices are also experimenting with their own 
initiatives to promote the development of environmental management systems, such as the "Merit" 
progmm in EPA's Region 9 office. 
341. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECl10N AGENCY, DRAFf-ELP PROPOSED FRAMEWORK (visited Feb. 
1997) <http:www.envirosense.com!elp/om5frm.html> [hereinafter ELP PROPOSED FRAMEWORK]. A 
"mature" management system is one that has been in place for at least two years and has gone through 
an initial "shake-down" period in which the system's weaknesses were identified and corrected. Fa-
cilities are precluded from participating if they have been the subject of recent enforcement actions, 
and they may be disqualified for recent instances of noncompliance. 
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ganization's environmental management system.342 The facility also must 
have an auditing program that periodically evaluates compliance with 
regulatory standards and with EMS requirements.343 Finally, the firm 
must prepare an annual report, available to the public, that discusses the 
facility's environmental performance and success in meeting its manage-
ment objectives, and the results of environmental audits and any agency 
inspections conducted during the year.344 Firms that participate in ELP 
will receive a number of enforcement benefits. 
b. Environmental management systems as the basis for enforcement 
benefits: Environmental management systems are likely to improve 
compliance and better the environmental performance of regulated 
entities.34s Therefore, firms with environmental management systems in 
place should be granted enforcement benefits, provided that several 
conditions are met. First, the system should require compliance with 
environmental requirements and prophylactic measures to prevent 
violations in advance of any self-audits. Second, adherence to the system 
should be verified by outside parties to ensure the system's integrity to 
agencies, the public, and other private parties, including companies and 
consumers doing business with the firm. Third, the environmental 
management system should provide the public with access to 
environmental information. The EPA's ELP and the EMAS standard meet 
all of the above criteria; the ISO 14001 standard does not. 
The orientation of the ISO 14001 standard, for example, fails to as-
sure that a firm will realize any specific compliance benefits. ISO 14001 
does not prescribe specific operational practices or set numeric or other 
342. See id. The definition of pollution prevention is broader than that used in the ISO 14001 
standard. 
343. See id. Audits must be conducted, at a minimum, in the second and fifth years of a six-year 
cycle. 
344. See id. 
345. As Richard Welford notes, "a systems approach to attaining the goals of an enterprise is 
most likely to be successful. . .. No matter what the structure of the firm ... it is the lack of a com-
prehensive and effective management system which can often lead to failure." WELFORD, supra note 
72, at 51. One writer describes the premise of ISO 14001 as an assumption that "organizations that 
systematically manage their environmental obligations will improve their environmental performance, 
broadly measured." Christopher L. Bell, Bench Test, 14 ENVTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 24,25 ("This 
assumption is based on the history that managing other organizational functions-inventory, finance, 
production, quality-has typically improved their performance, and the common sense concept that it 
is better to manage something than it is not to manage it."). Even skeptics concede that "[t]here is 
little question that some environmental problems can be better addressed by shoring up a firm's man-
agement systems. A management system allows a firm to learn from its past mistakes, and to deline-
ate clear pathways, systems and incentive systems for achieving specified goals." Lewis, Analysis of 
[SO 14000, supra note 72. 
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kinds of performance standards. It also does not require emissions and 
discharge reductions. By its own terms, ISO 14001 does not necessarily 
expect immediate, tangible environmental improvements from the man-
agement systems.346 Moreover, the standard cannot be counted on to en-
sure compliance with environmental regulations. While firms must in-
clude in their environmental policies a commitment to comply with 
relevant environmental legislation and regulation, outside auditors certify-
ing a firm's conformance to ISO 14001 are not expected to audit the com-
pany's actual compliance.347 By contrast, both the EMAS standard and 
ELP require participating firms to assure compliance with all environ-
mental requirements. 
Likewise, the ISO 14001 standard does not mandate that independent, 
third parties verify adherence to the ISO requirements.348 Under EMAS, a 
company's environmental policy, program, management system and audit 
346. As described in the standard's guidance: 
Although some improvement in environmental performance can be expected duc to the 
adoption of a systematic approach, it should bc understood that the environmental manage-
ment system is a tool which enables the organization to achieve and systematically control 
the level of environmental performance that it sets itself. The establishment and operation 
of an environmental management system will not, in itself, necessarily result in an immedi-
ate reduction of adverse environmental impact. 
Council Regulation, supra note 335, Annex A, § A.4. As Professor Roht-Arriaza cxplains, the Unitcd 
States (and somc other participants in the ISO drafting process) objected to any fixed set of mandatory 
improvements, preferring a less substantive, more flexible approach that preserved management pre-
rogatives. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 58, at 504-05. Thus, ISO 14000's substantive requirements 
were considerably weakened from thc original British template on which thc standard was based in 
order to achicvc consensus among all the participants. See id. at 534-36. See also BENCHMARK 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTING, ISO 14001: AN UNCOMMON PERSPECflVE 6-10, 15-17 (rev. 1996) 
[hereinafter BENCHMARK CONSULTING] (criticizing ISO 14001 becausc it does not require improved 
environmental performance, does not address health and safety requirements, and is far more limited 
in scope and commiunent than international environmental agreements, such as Agenda 21, and vol-
untary industry codes, such as the ICC Business Charter and the Responsible Care program). Bm see 
Joseph Cascio, They Will Be Used-For Good Reason, ENvTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 38, 39 
(maintaining that focused management of the environmental aspects of a firm's activities required by 
ISO 14001 will result in better environmental performance, as evidenced by the ISO 9000 product 
quality standards). 
347. See ISO 14001, supra note 330, §§ 4.1, 4.4.1. See Joseph Cascio, Implications of ISO 
14001 for Regulatory Compliance, in FOURTII INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 137, at 45 
("It must be remembered that under ISO 14001, no proof of actual compliance is actually required for 
an organization to obtain registration. ISO 14001 requires only cvidence of working processes that 
are designed to maintain compliance."); Gareth Porter, Little Effect on Environmental Perfomumce, 
12 ENVTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 43, 44. As Porter notes, it is unrealistic to expect firms to spend 
resources on ensuring actual compliance if they know they can achievc ISO 1400 I certification simplY 
by adopting appropriate procedures. As Porter further cxplains, "[h]aving a 'system in place for 
compliance' does not necessarily lead to complying with environmental regulations." Id. 
348. Some firms may nonetheless hire cxternal auditors to certify that their management systems 
follow the ISO 14001 standard in order to become ISO "registered," a certification that confers a cer-
tain legitimacy upon firms. See Nash & Ehrenfeld, supra note 58. 
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findings must be validated by independent, accredited environmental veri-
fiers. ELP also requires outside verification; facilities may use internal 
auditors to check compliance with a firm's management system, but their 
work must be monitored by third-party observers.349 
The ISO 14001 standard also fails to provide for meaningful public 
disclosure of a facility's environmental performance.350 It does not require 
disclosure of a facility's environmental audits, releases, or other pertinent 
information about the environmental impacts of its activities and products. 
The only information that must be disclosed is a company's environmental 
policy.351 Both EMAS and ELP have much stronger disclosure elements 
requiring release of annual environmental reports. As Eric arts argues, 
disclosure of these reports will increase public trust that environmental 
business practices are sincere, as well as increase the general level of in-
formation available concerning important environmental issues.352 
EMAS' required public statements are broader than those required by 
ELP; they must include information about emissions, waste generation, 
consumption of resources, and the like, although firms may keep the data 
underlying the statements confidential. ELP's public outreach compo-
nent-the Community OutreachlEmployee Involvement Program that 
every firm is required to have-is also disappointingly vague. It requires 
facilities to "have a written policy to demonstrate its commitment to open 
communication with its employees and with the community for the pur-
pose of understanding and responding to environmental issues," as well as 
a "strategy for identifying and interacting with affected communities, 
identifying community needs and a plan of action for addressing those 
community needs.,,353 The most concrete specification is that the facility 
349. See ELP PROPOSED FRAMEWORK, supra note 341. 
350. See BENCHMARK CONSULTING, supra note 346, at 19-21. 
351. These very limited disclosure requirements resulted from pressure by the United States 
during drafting of the ISO standard. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 58, at 504. They run counter to the 
trend toward greater disclosure of environmental information in international environmental agree-
ments and voluntary industry codes. See BENCHMARK CONSULTING, supra note 346, at 19. 
352. See Orts, supra note 3, at 1323. See also BENCHMARK CONSULTING, supra note 346, at 20 
("A core idea of the [European Union's] EMAS ... is that public pressure will motivate companies to 
improve environmental performance. However, in order for this to work, there needs to be disclosure 
of corporate environmental performance. Without external audit and public disclosure, self-
monitoring is an oxymoron.") (citations omitted). 
353. The substantive requirements of the Community OutreachlEmployee Involvement Program 
are that it (1) "should be designed to impart an environmental message or contribution;" (2) "should 
respond to a community need or desire [and] provide ... a means of obtaining feedback from the 
community regarding facility environmental issues;" and (3) "should involve employees and recog-
nize that employees are one of the best resources of the facility [and] provide training or information 
for employees to ensure that the employees know about the facility's position on environmental and 
health issues, and environmental policies and plans." U.s. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, DRAFr-
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must educate the community on any environmental impact the facility may 
have. These hortatory guidelines do relatively little to ensure that affected 
communities will become meaningful partners in corporate environmental 
decisions or have any greater access to environmental information than 
they enjoy under existing laws. If, as the EPA envisions, the ELP program 
is designed to publicly recognize facilities that "demonstrate outstanding 
environmental management practices,"354 firms should be required to do 
considerably more, such as committing to allow citizen auditors direct ac-
cess to the facility to monitor compliance with a firm's environmental 
management objectives.355 
Despite these limitations, the EPA's ELP contains sufficient safe-
guards to ensure improvements in compliance, and the EPA has appropri-
ately proposed to provide firms participating in ELP with enforcement 
benefits.356 Specifically, the EPA will reduce facility inspections for par-
ticipating firms and also waive gravity-based civil penalties for the viola-
tions, provided that the firms promptly correct any detected instances of 
noncompliance with essentially the same exceptions that apply to disclo-
sures by firms that voluntarily conduct aUdits.357 Unlike the case with 
audits, the ELP prompts far less concern that waiving gravity-based penal-
ties will undermine an important element needed to deter violations in the 
first place.358 This is because the ELP includes systems designed to 
achieve ongoing compliance, effectively requiring firms to take preventive 
measures before violations are detected. This more confident view is par-
ticularly true if independent parties certify the integrity of the environ-
COMMUNITY OUTREACH/EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT (visited Mar. 5, 1998) <http://es.epa.gov!elp! 
pf4.html> (emphasis added). 
354. Environmental Leadership Program: Request for Pilot Project Proposals, FRL-5001-5, 59 
Fed. Reg. 32,062,32,062 (June 21,1994) [hereinafter Pilot Project Proposals]. 
355. Such a system would probably need to incorporate some mechanism for protecting the 
(nonenvironmental) trade secrets of the firms. See generally Feel·Good NotiollS, supra note 219 
(describing Good Neighbor Agreements that provide community members with the right to obtain any 
company documentation or studies relevant to safety or environmental matters of concern and that 
provide rights of access to company facilities for direct visual inspection and confidential discussions 
with employees). See also Susan Casey-Lefkowitz, The Evolving Role of Citizens in Environmental 
Enforcement, in FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 137, at 221, 227-28. In some 
countries, citizens are deputized as public inspectors and carry out government inspection responsi-
bilities. In other countries, citizens can demand inspections under certain circumstances. See id. 
356. Firms that implement the EMAS should also be entitled to similar benefits from enforce-
ment agencies. 
357. See discussion infra notes 274-77 and accompanying text. 
358. This is not to say that some deterrence value is not lost by waiving penalties. One could 
certainly argue that firms will carry out preventative measures less diligently knowing that they will 
not be sanctioned for any violations that nonetheless occur if the violations are voluntarily discovered 
and remedied. 
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mental management system program. The EPA should follow through on 
other benefits it has suggested for participating firms, including expedited 
permit approval and a streamlined process for modifying permits.359 
3. Summary 
Environmental auditing practices and management systems have great 
potential to improve compliance with environmental laws. They should be 
encouraged with carefully designed incentives and in some instances made 
mandatory. They are not, however, a reason to dismantle traditional en-
forcement activities. 
D. CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT SHOULD REMAIN AN INTEGRAL FEATURE OF 
THE ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM 
Citizen enforcement has played a significant role in fostering compli-
ance with environmentallaw.36o Thus, a largely cooperative-oriented en-
forcement system is likely to be incompatible with vigorous citizen en-
forcement.361 Indeed, some scholars who support cooperative approaches 
expressly favor limiting the role of private enforcers or the ability of third 
parties to affect agency enforcement priorities.362 The regulated commu-
nity is beginning to focus on the inherent tensions between the different 
modes of enforcement and to suggest devices to curtail citizen actions.363 
While citizen enforcement may not be compatible with a purely or 
primarily cooperative-oriented system, it can and should be integrated into 
359. See Enforcement: EPA Preparing for 1997 Launch of Environmental Leadership Program, 
Daily Env't Rep (BNA) No. 200, at AA-l (Oct 16, 1996). Participating firms also receive public rec-
ognition and a logo that can be used for limited advertising purposes (in facility advertisements but 
not on product advertising). Although the EPA should be commended for insisting that the ELP sur-
pass the ISO 14001 standard in several key areas, the ELP is nonetheless insufficiently ambitious. 
Most notably, the ELP does not require a substantive commitment to any specific set of environmental 
goals, such as requiring all facilities to endorse a Code of Environmental Management Principles (as 
the EPA initially considered). See Environmental Leadership Program, FRL-4552-6, 58 Fed. Reg. 
4,802 (Jan. 15, 1993) (outlining possible elements of Corporate Statement of Environmental Princi-
ples); Pilot Project Proposals, supra note 354 (announcing that the EPA would not develop its own 
principles but would work with organizations that have developed their own corporate or industry 
codes). But see Silecchia, supra note 65, at 629-31 (praising the ELP because of its requirement that 
firms engage in pollution prevention activities). 
360. See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text. 
361. See supra notes 212-18 and accompanying text. 
362. See Scholz, Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement, supra note 117, at 124, 129-30. 
363. Thus, some propose permit conditions that explicitly provide for a certain number of in-
stances of noncompliance, or that liberalize the underlying standards to provide for accidents or nor-
mal variations in operating conditions. See Ross Macfarlane & Lori Terry, Citizen Suits: Impacts on 
Permitting and Agency Enforcement, 11 NAT. REsOURCES & ENV'T 20,24-25 (1997). 
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a system that is deterrence-based but includes significaut cooperative-
based features. Under the reforms proposed here, citizen enforcement 
would remain a backdrop to traditional government enforcement. Citizen 
enforcers could continue to bring actions to remedy violations where the 
government has failed to act because of lack of resources, political pres-
sures, capture of regulatory staff, or other factors. Moreover, citizens 
could continue to file enforcement actions largely unsupervised by the 
government, as they do under the current system.364 
Some companies claim that the prospect of citizen enforcement is 
likely to discourage businesses from implementing some of the reforms 
suggested here, such as audits and other management systems.365 How-
ever, firms that self-police and correct discovered violations are likely to 
face very little citizen enforcement. Under most federal statutes, coming 
into compliance defeats a jurisdictional prerequisite for citizens to file 
suit-namely that there is an ongoing violation alleged at the time a com-
plaint is filed.366 Even if citizens are not barred from suing, voluntary 
compliance will greatly mitigate any penalties awarded and obviate the 
need for injunctive relief. Finally, there is little evidence to support the 
charge levied by some critics that citizen enforcement needs to be curtailed 
because it is focused on trivial violations.367 
E. REFORMS TO COMMAND AND CONTROL REGULATION SHOULD 
INCLUDE STRICT ENFORCEMENT 
Any discussion of enforcement would not be complete without briefly 
touchiug on the separate but related issue of reforms in the underlying 
substance of environmental regulation. As previously discussed, the sub-
stance of environmental regnlation is also in a state of flux and is moving 
364. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text. 
365. See supra Part V.C. 
366. In Gwaltney of Smithfield Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49 (1987), the Su-
preme Court ruled that the present tense language of the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision, 33 
U.S.C. § 505(a)(I) (1994), authorizing citizen suits against any person "who is alleged to be in viola-
tion" of the Act, only permits actions for ongoing violations. Several other federal statutes have 
similarly worded citizen suit provisions. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6972(a)(I) (1994); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1) (1994); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1) (1994). Moreover, 
in Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 118 S.Ct. 1003 (1998), the Supreme Court 
held that as a matter of constitutional standing, citizens could not bring suits for wholly past violations 
of a statute, at least where penalties authorized by the statute are payable to the federal government. 
367. See Macfarlane & Terry, supra note 363, at 20, 23 (arguing that citizen suits "are being 
prosecuted whenever there is evidence of a violation," and that U[t]he sole measure of [corporate] per-
formance is strict compliance with all permit and regulatory requirements, [which business] must 
achieve ... 100 percent of the time"). 
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toward providing greater flexibility to regulated entities. This is a hall-
mark of the Clinton Administration's "reinvention of environmental regu-
lation,"368 as well as a major theme of state regulatory reform efforts. For 
example, the EPA's Environmental Excellence (XL) initiative frees regu-
lated entities from command and control requirements in exchange for a 
commitment to accomplish environmental performance superior to what 
would be achieved through compliance with existing regulation.369 
The relaxation of underlying substantive standards further strengthens 
the need to maintain strong deterrence-based enforcement provisions, in-
cluding those that assure citizen groups a meaningful role in policing 
compliance. Given that many of these reforms grant facilities great leeway 
in meeting regulatory limits, government regulators and the public are no 
longer assured that an effective control strategy is being implemented. In 
return for this freedom, regulated entities should be held closely account-
able for their promises.370 
This point of view is reflected in the Clean Air Act's Acid Rain Pro-
gram, which provides marketable allowances for sulfur dioxide emis-
sions371 but with stringent enforcement provisions. Utilities subject to the 
program are required to install continuous emission monitors (or their 
equivalent), and if the monitors do not work, the EPA is required to as-
sume that the source is operating in an uncontrolled manner.372 In addition 
to the possible imposition of standard criminal and civil penalties for vio-
lations of the Clean Air Act,373 fIrms that fail to meet emission limits must 
pay a penalty of $2,000 per excess ton emitted and must offset the excess 
368. This reinvention encompasses a variety of initiatives, including greater reliance on market-
based incentives and performance-based standards rather than on command and control regulation, 
more flexibility through development of industry-wide standards as opposed to individual poJIutant 
approaches, and increased use of coJIaborative partnerships (between the public and private sectors 
and between different levels of government). See Clinton & Gore, supra note 225. 
369. See Rena I. Steinzor, Regulatory Reinvention and Project XL: Does the Emperor Have Any 
Clothes?, 26 EnvtI. L. Rep. (EnvtI. L. lnst) 10,527 (Oct. 1996). 
370. Professor Michael has identified a number of reasons why a backdrop of traditional en-
forcement practices is necessary in a system that grants flexibility to regulated entities: to verify 
compliance by entities, to maintain the perception that noncompliance wiII be detected and sanc-
tioned, to account for the diversity of regulated sources with some less skillful in achieving compli-
ance, to ensure compliance where the costs of necessary preventative measures exceed the likely costs 
of a system of self-regulation, and to maintain compliance if the failure of self-regulation programs 
makes compliance unduly expensive. See Michael, supra note 40, at 544, 547. 
371. Under the program, utilities are provided with allowances based on historic fuel consump-
tion and operating factors, and provided with complete flexibility in determining how to meet these 
limitations. 
372. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651k(a), (d) (1994). 
373. See id. § 7651j(e). 
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emissions by an equal tonnage amount in the next year.374 Moreover, the 
EPA is required to deduct allowances equivalent to the excess emissions 
from those allocated to the source for the next year.375 Notably, recent 
analyses indicate that the rate of noncompliance with the program has been 
extremely low and may be zero.376 
This type of strict enforcement approach, accompanied by citizen suit 
provisions, should be the template for other regulatory flexibility efforts. 
F. BEITER WAYS TO MEASURE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ENFORCEMENT 
SHOULD BE DEVELOPED 
Many observers agree that regulatory agencies should improve the 
way they evaluate the effectiveness of their enforcement programs. The 
EPA has recognized that its traditional approach of using numerical indica-
tors is of "limited value for determining the state of compliance and identi-
fying [the] environmental results and benefits of [enforcement] actions.,,377 
The agency is currently engaged in an ambitious effort to develop addi-
tional performance measures for its enforcement program.378 State en-
forcement agencies have likewise begun exploring new evaluation meas-
ures.379 While these are worthwhile undertakings, it is important to realize 
the inherent difficulties in developing precise, objective measurements of 
success for an enforcement program. 
One obvious starting point for improvement is to better evaluate the 
extent of compliance by regulated facilities and the extent to which en-
forcement actions promote compliance. For example, Professor Joel 
Mintz suggests that agencies should evaluate the percentages of regulated 
sources inspected, their overall rates of compliance, and the rates of re-
cidivism among violating sources.380 Another useful measure would be to 
374. See id. § 7651j(a), (b). The sources must submit a compliance plan for achieving the re-
quired offsets within 60 days, which becomes a condition of the source's operating permit. See id. 
§ 7652j(b). 
375. See id. 
376. See Byron Swift, The Acid Rain Test, ENVTL. F., May-June 1995, at 17, 17 (noting there has 
been virtually 100% compliance with the aci~ rain trading provisions in the first two years of the pro-
gram's operations). . 
377 . Workshop on National Performance Measures Strategy, supra note 197. 
378. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
379. See GAO, EFFORTS TO Focus ON RESULTS, supra note 8, at 29-32. 
380. See MINTZ, supra note 23, at 102-03. EPA's Performance Measures Strategy has proposed 
measuring the percentage of significant violators with new or recurrent significant violations within 
two years of any prior enforcement action. See DRAFT REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
MEASURES STRATEGY, supra note 97, at 20. 
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determine multimedia compliance rates for entire facilities or industry 
sectors.381 
However, determining the rate of compliance is easier said than done. 
Indeed, the definition of "compliance" is not a fixed or purely objective 
one. Because measurement techniques are never perfect, for example, 
there is always some ambiguity in what constitutes a "violation."382 Other 
subjective factors help determine what constitutes "compliance," such as 
the time period an industry is given to reach compliance, or how strictly 
businesses must adhere to a standard.383 Indeed, differing interpretations 
of compliance partially underlie current disputes between the EPA and a 
number of states about the effectiveness of the states' enforcement pro-
grams.384 
Beyond ascertaining rates of compliance, agencies should measure 
the environmental benefits of enforcement actions. This includes steps 
taken by facilities in response to enforcement actions and reductions in 
pollutants discharged by regulated entities. Most ambitiously, it would 
also embrace improvements in the ambient environment resulting from en-
forcement actions.385 The EPA, as well as some states, has started calcu-
lating these measurements386 to varying degrees.387 Other federal envi-
381. The EPA has begun to develop such measures. See Stahl, Enforcement in Transition, supra 
note 3, at 22. The EPA has also proposed to measure how quickly significant violators return to 
compliance or enter compliance agreements. See DRAFT REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
MEASURES STRATEGY, supra note 97, at 20. 
382. See Clifford Russell, Environmental Enforcement, in INNOVATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY, supra note 32, at 215, 216 (arguing that the notion of a "violation" is always treated in litera-
ture as better defined than it possibly can be in practice). See also RUSSELL, ET AL., supra note 25, at 
178 (noting that the unavoidable variation in discharge levels and imperfections in measurement 
equipment introduces ambiguity into the notion of compliance and noncompliance). 
383. See DIMENTO, supra note 101, at 26-27. For example, does compliance mean good-faith 
efforts, substantial compliance, reasonable probability of compliance, or total compliance? 
384. See, e.g., EPA, AUDIT OF REGION 9, supra note 21 I, at 7. A local air board in California 
considered a facility in compliance if it immediately repaired a piece of equipment or submitted a 
permit application even where the facility had previously violated same requirements. The EPA's 
Inspector General, however, was concerned that repeat violations indicated the facility was not 
achieving continuous compliance. 
385. See NATIONAL ACADEMY, supra note 49, at 81 (suggesting that the EPA develop environ-
mental performance indicators to measure changes in air and water quality, ecosystem health, and en-
vironmental threats to human health and welfare). 
386. In 1994, the EPA began supplementing its measures of enforcement effectiveness with a 
"case conclusion" sheet for enforcement actions. The case conclusion sheet lists steps taken by the 
regulated entities, the environmental impact of such actions, quantitative reductions in polIutants, in-
formation about the types and impacts of compliance-assistance activities, and industry-specific 
compliance rates. See DRAFT REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES STRATEGY, supra 
note 97. 
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ronmental agencies are also moving in this direction.388 But attempting to 
judge the effectiveness of an enforcement program by looking at these 
measures is also problematic. In many cases, calculating steps taken by 
regulated entities will likely show important environmental benefits from 
enforcement actions. The EPA's 1996 enforcement report, for example, 
estimated that its actions would reduce pollutant discharges by 260 million 
pounds.389 On the other hand, a facility's compliance with certain regula-
tory requirements, such as the many standards that are preventative, may 
greatly reduce the risk of serious environmental harm but will not neces-
sarily lead to a quantifiable emissions reduction or environmental bene-
fit.39o 
It is especially difficult to link compliance with actual improvements 
in the ambient environment for a variety of reasons. Environmental 
changes may not manifest themselves for years; other confounding factors 
may be at work that block or delay any changes resulting from specific ac-
tions. Alternatively, the underlying regulation may be inadequate to 
prompt changes, or ongoing pollution may result from a few major dis-
charges.39I 
387. See Wetherell. supra note 154, at 22-23 (describing new programs in 1l1inois, Indiana. and 
Florida that place more emphasis on measuring environmental indicators and actions taken by regu-
lated entities, and noting that "[n]o longer can [states] only count the number of inspections, enforce-
ment orders entered, and fines collected. Instead, we must ask, Is the air and water getting cleaner? If 
not, why not? Are companies complying with the law? ... Is the environment healthier for chil-
dren?"). See also GAO, EFFORTS TO FOCUS ON REsULTS, supra note 8, at 33-34, 36-3S (describing 
state programs and discussing the difficulties for states to quantify and measure environmental indica-
tors as a means of evaluating compliance strategies). 
388. For example, the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement recently an-
nounced that it will no longer collect data on the number of inspections conducted or violations citcd 
by state regulators. Instead, it will measure the effectiveness of state programs by analyzing the num-
ber and extent of off-site pollution impacts from mining activities, and the number of mined acres that 
meet various reclamation standards. See U.S. Dep't of Interior, Office Surface Mining. Reclamation 
and Enforcement, "Reg-S", Appendix 11-3-8 (June 20, 1996). These reclamation standards include 
restoration of land form and land capability, hydrologic reclamation, and contemporaneous reclama-
tion. 
389. See News Release from the U.S. EnvtI. Protection Agency, Environmental Enforcemcnt 
Records Set for 1996 (Feb. 25, 1997) (on file with author). 
390. The EPA has noted that "[c]ausality between program activities and outcomes is usually 
impossible to prove. Outcomes cannot generally be attributed to individual functions of an agency or 
program. 'Prevention' or deterrence of undesired outcomes is difficult to measure." DRAFT REPORT 
OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES STRATEGY, supra note 97, at 8. 
391. See HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 209. 
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An even more fundamental problem is the difficulty of measuring 
what constitutes "better environmental quality.,,392 Professors Hunter and 
Waterman have highlighted this problem with the Clean Water Act, con-
cluding that 
there is no uniform method of measuring water-quality across the fifty 
states, and although some quantifiable measures do exist ... a major 
problem with surface-water regulation in the United States is that nearly 
twenty-five years after the enactment of the Clean Water Act of 1972, 
we still do not have a reliable means of measuring the legislation's rela-
tive success or failure.393 
Similar problems exist, perhaps to a lesser degree, with other environ-
mental media. 
Finally, it is important that the search for improved performance 
measures not override the essential purposes of environmental regulation. 
One impetus behind the quest for improved performance measures is a de-
sire to import into government the principles of private sector management 
theory.394 Yet "there are such fundamental differences between the public 
sector and the private sector that management theory from one will never 
be applicable to the other.,,395 Thus, while in the private sector the search 
for bottom-line measures of performance may be necessary and under-
standable, there are conflicting pressures in government that may frustrate 
the ability to assess objectively the impacts of regulation, or in some cases 
trying to do so may be inappropriate. 
In summary, developing better ways to evaluate the efficacy of envi-
ronmental enforcement and de-emphasizing bean counting is important, 
and should lead to smarter, more targeted enforcement activities. But de-
termining precisely how enforcement efforts translate into actual im-
provements in the environment is likely to prove an elusive goal. 
392. See SPARROW, supra note 3, at 145 (explaining it is enonnously difficult to generate any 
consensus, even scientific consensus, as to which measures of environmental quality have broad va-
lidity). 
393. HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 210. They note that state agencies use very di-
verse and often dubious methods to measure water quality. One state relies on "reports of bad news 
from citizens and other sources. If there are no reports of fish kills or complaints from recreational 
areas, [state] officials interpret this as evidence that water quality in their state is sound." [d. at 207. 
394. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE WITCH DocroRS 282-84 (1996). 
In recent years, observers note, the public sector "has shown a blind affection for management theory 
that is rarely seen in the private sector." [d. See also Ronald, The Role of the CEC, supra note 159, at 
6-7 ("One of the mantras of total quality management is that, in order to control, you must manage 
and, in order to manage, you must measure."). 
395. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 394, at 6. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The movement to transform environmental enforcement is being ad-
vanced with exceptional ardor. Before the old system is discarded how-
ever, it is critical for policymakers to engage in a careful and sober as-
sessment of the calls for reform. If the system is flawed, will the proposed 
changes improve it? In particular, is there a sufficient basis on which to 
conclude that the new approaches will be superior to the ones being re-
formed? 
As this Article demonstrates, the record does not support a wholesale 
transformation of enforcement practices as has been proposed. Deter-
rence-based enforcement has many attributes essential to effective en-
forcement, the most notable one being its strong, credible threat of mean-
ingful enforcement necessary to promote widespread voluntary 
compliance. Strong enforcement also serves important expressive func-
tions, better guards against agency "capture" by regulated entities, and en-
sures more consistent treatment of regulated facilities. Rather, the best 
way to promote effective environmental enforcement is to integrate some 
of the most constructive features of a cooperative model within a deter-
rence-based system. Agencies should provide more consultation and co-
operative assistance to regulated entities, reward well-conceived self-
policing efforts with reduced enforcement attention and lower penalties, 
and expand the traditional indicia for measuring enforcement success. 
Publicly traded corporations should be required to conduct environmental 
audits. At the same time, government regulators should retain the ability 
to respond to violations with strong and meaningful enforcement meas-
ures; measures that strip agencies of discretion in responding to certain 
classes of violations undermine enforcement and shonld be avoided. Citi-
zen enforcement should remain an important supplement to agency en-
forcement, and corporations should not be allowed to withhold from the 
public information in environmental audits and other internal environ-
mental reviews. In short, it is a thoughtfully and carefully considered 
evolution in environmental enforcement that is called for, not a reckless 
revolution. 
